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foreword to second revised edition

In 1978 I was invited to be the main speaker at the annual
James Montgomery Hester Seminar at Wake Forest University, dedicated to the continuing dialogue between the two
great intellectual approaches of the human mind to God, one
through philosophical reason, through the Book of Nature,
the other through faith and theological reason from the Book
of Revelation. I have selected here for reprinting from the
larger seminar the three lectures I gave, which focus on the
ascent to God by philosophical reason in the Neo-Thomist
tradition of ‘‘creative retrieval’’ of St. Thomas Aquinas.
The first two lectures deal with my adaptation of the resources of the Thomistic approach: the first through the more
recent turn to the Inner Path through ‘‘the unrestricted dynamism of the human spirit toward God’’ as the infinite fullness
of Being: through the intellect toward the fullness of Being as
Truth, and through the will toward the fullness of Being as
Good, as lovable. The second lecture deals with the classic
Thomistic metaphysical ascent from creatures to God through
participation and finitude. Note that the strict ‘‘path’’ of ascent
is not that of the better known ‘‘Five Ways.’’ The latter, St.
Thomas claims, is meant for beginners, and always starts from
vii
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Foreword

some evident sense experience. But only the Fourth goes all
the way to conclude to a single infinite Source of all being.
This conclusion occurs much later in the Summa Theologiae (Part
I, Question 11, Article 3), where Thomas speaks of it as ‘‘And
this is God,’’ not just as ‘‘And this is what all men call God.’’
The arguments I will present here start with a brief reconstruction of a more adequate synthesis of the Five Ways, using
participation metaphysics only for the last part, the passage to
a single infinite Source of all being. Then I present a more
strictly metaphysical argument starting from within Aquinas’s
Neoplatonic participation metaphysics.
The third lecture deals with the question of whether the
conception of God in the contemporary Whiteheadian Process Philosophy is really compatible with that of Christianity,
in particular that of Catholic Christianity as represented by
St. Thomas. My answer is principally negative, but with indications of openings for future fruitful dialogue. The original
edition of this book had a very limited printing, has been
long out of print, and many scholars have asked me to have
it reprinted. Since the original publisher, Wake Forest University Press, is no longer in operation, and since most of the
content seems as relevant today as in 1979, Fordham University Press has graciously agreed to reprint this work of its
own long-time Fordham professor.
I have taken the opportunity to make significant revisions
of the original text, especially in the second and third lectures, so that this is properly a ‘‘second revised edition.’’
W. Norris Clarke, S.J.
Fordham University
Bronx, New York
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part one

The Turn to the Inner Way in Contemporary
Neo-Thomism
Recent History of Thomism
The aim of the first three chapters, which constitute part I of this monograph, is to present for your reflection and discussion some of the significant ongoing developments in the contemporary Neo-Thomist
school of philosophers and philosophizing theologians with respect to
the philosophical approach to God.
I understand the term ‘‘Neo-Thomist’’ here very broadly to signify
that loosely but recognizably united group of thinkers who acknowledge
that the basic inspiration and structure of their thought derives from St.
Thomas Aquinas, even though each one may have made various creative
adaptations of his own, in both method and content, inspired by various
movements of thought since the time of St. Thomas. Many of you may
perhaps believe that since the heyday of Jacques Maritain and Etienne
Gilson, when it seemed temporarily to regain a place in the sun in contemporary thought, Thomism had quietly faded away, save perhaps in a
few seminaries. Others may perhaps wish that it would just fade away
and cease to bother us, once and for all, as anything but a chapter in the
history of thought. Neither belief nor wish seems likely of immediate
fulfillment. Thomism has a remarkable survival power, and every so
often, just when it seems that it is about to fade out, it has a way of
renewing itself, like the phoenix, usually by a double movement of deeper
return to its own sources plus the creative assimilation of some new
insight or method of later thought.
This pattern of rise, decline, and renewal has been played out in
Thomism during roughly the second and third quarters of the twentieth
century.1 During the first half of the century there was a strong Thomistic revival in the community of Catholic thought and educational institutions, sparked by the famous encyclical letter Aeterni Patris of Pope Leo
XIII in 1879, which initiated the Thomistic revival in Europe. This was
the period of Thomistic ‘‘triumphalism’’ in the American Catholic
world, as we who grew up under it and now look back upon it have
come to call it. Church leaders exerted strong authoritarian pressure to
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make St. Thomas the ‘‘common doctor,’’ the major guide and norm of
sound teaching in both philosophy and theology for Catholic educational institutions, inspired by Pope Leo’s characterization of the synthesis of St. Thomas as ‘‘the best way of philosophizing’’ (optima ratio
philosophandi) and his recommendation that it replace all other methods
and doctrines of philosophy and theology in the formation of the
Church’s priests. During that time, if one went to any Catholic college
or university or seminary—save for a few rather lonesome Franciscan
enclaves—it was a matter of course that the basic training in philosophy,
as well as theology, would be some brand of Thomism. This was the
establishment orthodoxy of the time.
Somewhere in the late 1950s and 1960s, however, the whole movement
went into a rapid and precipitous decline. It is not entirely clear whether
this was due to a revolt against the authoritarian aura surrounding Thomistic teaching, the overconfidently dogmatic attitude of too many Thomists, the Second Vatican Council with its new opening to modern
thought, the general turning away in the philosophical world from the
great system-building philosophers of the past, the pull of new philosophical schools coming into the limelight—such as existentialism, personalism, phenomenology, and especially existential phenomenology
among young Catholic scholars—or a combination of all these forces.
The fact remains that young Catholic philosophers just simply went
elsewhere than to Thomistic sources and centers for their training, and
this was quickly reflected in their classroom teaching. It is not that they
carefully studied St. Thomas first, then rejected him. They simply lost
interest and commitment and moved elsewhere.
As a result, the chances now seem to me considerably less than fifty/
fifty—and almost nil in some places—that if one goes to a Catholic
college or university today he will be exposed to a basic Thomistic
training in philosophy. The whole authoritarian pressure to impose St.
Thomas as the established master has collapsed. One benefit of this is
that it is now possible at last to approach him on his own merits as a
thinker. Students no longer have to fight him as an authority-figure;
most know and hear too little about him even to know what they would
be fighting against or why. As a result, when students do come into
contact with St. Thomas, they can now approach him with a whole fresh
attitude, discovering him as a thinker in his own right and not as imposed from above by some other authority-figure. This is what is in fact
happening, it seems; there is a quietly growing renewed interest in the
thought of St. Thomas, especially his philosophy, for its own sake,
among both Catholics and non-Catholics.
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The Transcendental Thomist Movement

In this quiet renewal of Thomistic thought, one of the movements that has attracted the most interest and shown the
most creative power in synthesizing old with new goes by
the loose general title of ‘‘Transcendental Thomism.’’2
It was initiated by the Belgian Jesuit philosopher Joseph
Maréchal, in the late 1920s and 1930s at Louvain, in his famous five-volume work Point de départ de la métaphysique. In his
work, Maréchal went in the door of the Kantian method of
transcendental analysis to discover the existence of God as
the necessary a priori condition of the dynamism of human
intelligence. This approach ran into considerable opposition
from the contemporary Thomist establishment because of its
supposedly dangerous affinities with German idealist thought
in taking over the Kantian transcendental method—which,
rather than moving directly outward to examine the objective
3
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The Philosophical Approach to God

contents of man’s knowledge about the world, turns inward
to search out the necessary a priori conditions of possibility
of the inner life of the human spirit in its activities of thinking and willing, and which studies the dynamic structure, the
form rather than the content, of human thinking.
Nonetheless, the essentials of Maréchal’s method and its
results have since been taken up by many contemporary disciples in various countries, each of whom tends to put his
own unique and original stamp on it. Thus we have Karl
Rahner and Johannes Lotz in Germany; Emerich Coreth in
Austria;3 in France, André Marc (my own first professor of
metaphysics, now deceased) and Joseph de Finance (preceded
a quarter of a century before by Maurice Blondel, who in his
famous first edition of L’Action in 1893, prior even to Maréchal, applied the transcendental method to the dynamism of
the will); Bernard Lonergan in Canada and then the United
States, with his own quite original development of the same
basic orientation;4 and Joseph Donceel,5 originally a student
of Maréchal’s in Belgium but for many years Professor at
Fordham University in the United States—all the above, of
course, with their various groups of less well-known disciples. I might add that, though not considered a fully orthodox card-carrying member of the school, I am still a deeply
sympathetic fellow-traveler. It is a remarkable fact that all of
the above—though not their disciples—are Jesuit thinkers,
either philosophers or theologians or both, so that Transcendental Thomism might well be said to be the most characteristic movement among Jesuit Thomists in the last half of the
twentieth century.
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How do I differ from the strict Transcendental Thomist
position? I accept the ascent to God through the dynamism
of intellect and will, but not the roundabout way of grounding the validity of human knowledge by first going up
through God as final cause, then back to our ordinary knowledge of the finite world of our experience. I have been told,
by those who have studied the later correspondence of Maréchal, that he himself admitted he had done that only because
he wanted to go in the Kantian door to bring his readers out
the Thomistic door. Otherwise a more direct Thomistic path
was quite valid.
The movement is by no means accepted as an authentic
development of Thomism by all Thomists today, however.
Many thinkers among the Dominican order, and especially
the descendants of the older Maritain and Gilson schools,
are quite critical and suspicious that it leans too much
toward idealism or overstresses the subjective dimensions of
human thought, underplaying the objective causal metaphysics that has always been the hallmark of Thomism.6 Nonetheless, the movement has shown itself to be remarkably
creative and dynamic, forming a basis for the immensely rich
and influential philosophical-theological synthesis of Karl
Rahner and his school.7 Hence I think it is well worth presenting to you here, though I have no intention of surveying
the positions of these various authors in detail. What I intend to do is rather to extract what seems to me the essential
core common to the whole school and present it in a way
that I myself can accept and use in constructing a viable
philosophical approach to God—one that is quite free, it
seems to me, of any leanings toward idealism or of under-
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playing the objective causal metaphysics that is indeed an
integral part of authentic Thomism.

Paul Tillich’s Criticism of Traditional Thomism
I would like to take as my starting point of reference a famous essay by Paul Tillich, the distinguished Protestant philosopher-theologian—an essay which I am sure that most of
you at Wake Forest University, more at home as I presume
you are in the theological tradition of Protestant Christianity, are familiar with and which has probably colored no little
your own attitudes toward St. Thomas. This is his essay on
‘‘Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,’’ which first appeared in the Union Seminary Quarterly in May 1946 and has
since been reprinted in the collection of Tillich’s essays, Theology of Culture (Oxford University Press, 1959).
In his essay, Tillich distinguishes two main types of philosophical approach to God inherited from medieval thought.
One is the Augustinian-Franciscan school represented by Augustine, Anselm, and Bonaventure, with which Tillich himself is deeply sympathetic and which has inspired his own
thought. The other is the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition,
toward which he feels quite out of sympathy and critical.
The essence of the first approach is that God is found by
turning within to the inner life of the human spirit, where
He is discovered to be one who is always already present as
the necessary ultimate ground of the inner life of thought
and love, but whose presence is veiled at first, not yet recognized by us. This discovery proceeds both along the line of
intelligence, through the notion of Infinite Being as the hid-
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den light through which we know all finite being, and along
the line of will, through the notion of the Infinite Good, the
ultimate drawing power or goal through which we desire all
finite goods. The process is always the same in its various
modalities: the unveiling to explicit knowledge and love of
the God who is already God-with-us, the inner light and
guide of the life of the spirit, but not yet recognized as such.
The discovery of God is an interior journey into our own
depths, not a journey outward to find God at the other end
of the material cosmos.
St. Thomas, on the other hand, Tillich characterizes as
the first ‘‘atheist’’ (implicit, of course) in Christian thought,
the consistent following out of whose principles and methods leads inexorably to our modem secular experience of the
absence of God, the death of God. The reason is that St.
Thomas’s method, following Aristotle in his famous Prime
Mover argument, is to seek to demonstrate the existence of
God in a rigorous scientific way by starting from the external
material cosmos outside the human soul itself, discovering
how its being is deficient in some way, not self-explanatory,
and then, at the end of a long chain of premises, finally
concluding to God as the Ultimate First Cause of the data
we started with. But the radical vice of this procedure—and
all similar ones, logically valid or not—is that it begins by
treating God as the Absent One, absent both from ourselves
and the world at the beginning of the proof and finally logically concluded to at the end of the proof.
Yet to start off treating God as the Absent One, as a God
who is not God-with-us but outside us somewhere, to be
sought by a journey through the cosmos, is the essence of the
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atheistic attitude—or at least the first decisive step toward it.
If God is not present with us, in us, from the beginning, and
somehow recognized as such, we shall never find Him. In
fact, it took a long time for the latent atheism of this method
to be revealed in its true colors. But once modern science
and the philosophy inspired by it rejected the intermediary
steps in the logical journey to God through the natural cosmos, we woke up to the traumatic realization that the absent
God could no longer be found at all. We were full into the
secular-minded absence-of-God mentality which is dominant
today.
This is indeed in many ways a tendentious interpretation
of St. Thomas, who was clearly a deeply believing Christian
and who experienced God as immediately present through
grace, even through direct mystical experience. But coming
as he did in the middle of the sudden massive influx of the
new Aristotelian science and philosophy, St. Thomas felt
that his immediate task in the service of God and the Church
was to show how even through this new logical-scientific
method and philosophy of nature one could also reach
God—through reason as a preparation for revelation, and
with what appeared to be greater logical rigor and conceptual
precision than in the older, more intuitive and subjective interior approach. Identifying St. Thomas too exclusively with
Aristotle, as Tillich tends to do, does not do justice to the
rich Neoplatonic dimension of his metaphysics, which proceeds much more from the veiled presence of God revealed
through the participated perfection of His creatures than is
the case with the Aristotelian arguments from motion.
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Nonetheless, there is a great deal of insight and not a little
disturbing truth in the basic message of Tillich’s essay. There
is a perennial strength and resonance with the depths of the
human spirit in the Augustinian-Franciscan interior approach
that somehow seems missing in the more rigorously argued
cosmic path initiated by Aristotle, even developed and enriched as it was by St. Thomas. It is precisely in its effort to
fill this gap in Thomistic thought that the special historical
significance of the Transcendental Thomist movement seems
to me to lie. It represents a new turn to the inner path,
analogous to that in the Augustinian tradition, but discovered within the resources of St. Thomas’s own thought and
his more rigorous philosophical method—although he himself, aside from a few pregnant hints, never explicitly exploited these resources in the same way.

Discovery of God through the Dynamism of the Human
Spirit
The Transcendental Thomists did not come to discover this
inner path under the stimulus of Tillich’s criticism, since
they had already begun to publish in the late 1920s, but rather
under the challenge of the Kantian critique, with its new
transcendental method so powerfully exploited not only by
Kant but also by Fichte, Hegel, and the later Neo-Kantian
schools in Europe. For the Kantian critique of knowledge
and metaphysics still dominated European philosophical
thought in the early twentieth century, and had in fact
proved the principal challenge to the rising Neo-Thomist
revival, which it accused of a naive and uncritical confidence
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in the mind’s ability to know extra-mental reality. But it is a
remarkable fact that in returning to St. Thomas to find resources to meet the contemporary challenge of the Kantian
critique, the Transcendental Thomists rejoined in a new way
the old Augustinian inner way to God, thus filling a disturbing lacuna in St. Thomas’s own metaphysical achievement.
The essence of the Transcendental Thomist approach to
God seems to me to be this: it has brought out of obscurity
into full development St. Thomas’s own profound doctrine
of the dynamism of the human spirit, both as intellect and
will, toward the Infinite—a dynamism inscribed in the very
nature of man as a priori condition of possibility of both his
knowing and his willing activities—and then applied this
doctrine to ground epistemology, philosophical anthropology, metaphysics, and the flowering of the latter into natural
theology. Using this radical dynamism of the human spirit
to illuminate the foundations of the whole of Thomistic philosophy—in particular the rational ascent to God—was entirely in harmony with St. Thomas’s own deepest thought.
For he himself had worked out quite explicitly and carefully,
in his treatise on the ethical life of man, the doctrine of the
natural desire in man for the beatific vision of God. Yet
intent as he was on following out the new Aristotelian cosmological approach in metaphysics through the objective
framework of act and potency, he never seems to have
thought of using the doctrine as a key piece in the formal
structural development of epistemology or metaphysics, including natural theology. He devoted his explicit efforts
toward applying this spiritual dynamism to work out the
objective intellectual comprehension of the world itself, in-
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cluding man, rather than toward developing in detail the a
priori transcendental conditions of possibility of the operation of the mind itself—although even here, certain basic
seminal positions are laid down whose fecundity needs only
to be unfolded.
This is what the Transcendental Thomists have done in
their analysis of the transcendental conditions of possibility
of human knowing and willing. Let me now present briefly
the essential core of this analysis, insofar as I myself can take
philosophical responsibility for it and make it my own.

................. 16344$

$CH1

01-23-07 15:25:20

PS

PAGE 11

The Ascent through the Dynamism of the
Intellect

As we reflect on the activities of our intellectual knowing
power, we come to recognize it as an inexhaustible dynamism
of inquiry, ever searching to lay hold more deeply and widely
on the universe of reality. It is impossible to restrict its horizon of inquiry to any limited area of reality, to any goal short
of all that there is to know about all that there is. For our
experience of knowing reveals to us that each time we come
to know some new object or aspect of reality we rest in it at
first, savoring and exploring its intelligibility as far as we can.
But as soon as we run up against its limits and discover that
it is finite, the mind at once rebounds farther, reaching beyond it to wherever else it leads, to whatever else there is to
be known beyond it. This process continues indefinitely in
ever-expanding and ever-deepening circles. As we reflect on
the significance of this inexhaustible and unquenchable drive
12
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toward the fullness of all there is to know, we realize that
the only adequate goal of our dynamism of knowing is the
totality of all being. We live mentally, therefore, as they express it, in ‘‘the horizon of being’’—or, as St. Thomas himself puts it in his own technical terminology, the only
adequate formal object of the human mind is being itself.
This means that the mind must have a dynamic a priori
orientation, an aptitude or affinity, for all that is, for the
totality of being—an aptitude that constitutes it precisely as
a knowing nature in the intellectual and not merely the sensible order. Now every dynamism or active potency, St.
Thomas holds, has its goal already inscribed in it in some
way, in the mode of final cause, as that toward which it
naturally tends, as that which naturally attracts or draws it
to itself, and therefore as that which is somehow already
present to it. In a dynamism which is as self-aware as ours
is—aware not only of the contents of its knowledge, but
also of its own activity of knowing and radical desire to
know—there must accordingly be a dim, obscure, implicit,
but nonetheless real awareness of this goal as drawing it.
This means that the mind has, from its first conscious
movement from emptiness toward fulfillment, a kind of implicit, pre-conceptual, anticipatory grasp or foretaste of being
as the encompassing horizon and goal of all its inquiries. As
Karl Rahner and the Germans like to put it, this is not a
Begriff (i.e., an explicit, thematized concept or distinct idea of
being); it is rather a Vorgriff (i.e., a pre-conceptual, implicit,
unthematized, anticipatory awareness of being present to the
mind as its goal, as its connatural good drawing it). This is
to live mentally within the horizon of being. It is because of
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this innate a priori orientation that all our questions are directed toward being: ‘‘Is this the case? What is this? How is
it?’’ All the answers, too, to our determinate inquiries are
framed against the background of being. All our judgments
reflect, at least implicitly, this insertion of our knowledge
into the horizon of being. The ‘‘is’’ of being is the hidden
backdrop and frame of all our assertions. We continually say,
‘‘This is, that is, this is such and such,’’ and by so doing we
insert some limited essence or aspect of the real in its place
in the whole of being. Thus we assert implicitly the participation of all finite essences or modes of being in the ultimate,
all-pervasive attribute of all things, the very act of presence
or existence itself, expressed by the inconspicuous but omnipresent ‘‘is’’ that in some equivalent way is the inner form of
all human judgments.
This a priori orientation toward being—with its implicit
pre-conceptual awareness of being by connatural affinity and
desire, as we know a good by being drawn to it—is a genuine
a priori presence of being to the human mind constitutive of
its very nature as a dynamic faculty. It is not, however, a
Cartesian innate idea, since it is not present as a clear and
distinct conceptual content, and takes a long experience of
conscious, reflective knowing before it can emerge into explicit conscious awareness expressible in conceptual form.
The entire mental life of man consists in gradually filling in
this at first conceptually empty and indeterminate but limitless horizon of being with increasingly determinate conceptual comprehension, as we step by step come to know one
part of this totality after another.
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Let us further analyze this vague and indeterminate horizon of being which defines ahead of time the whole enterprise of human knowing and is present to it in an implicit,
pre-conceptual lived awareness, as a connatural attracting
goal, from the first breath of intellectual life.
The first point we notice is that no limits can be set to
this field of intentionality, this anticipated horizon of being.
Any attempt to do so immediately stimulates the mind to
leap beyond these limits in intentional thrust and desire.
Thus this horizon or totality of being-to-be-known appears
at first as an indefinite, indeterminate, but unlimited and illimitable field, a field to which no determinate limits can be
set.
What is the actual content of this field? There are only
two alternatives. If the actual content of being is nothing but
an endless or indefinite field of all finite entities or intelligible
structures, the dynamism of the mind is doomed to endless
rebounding from one finite to another, with no final satisfaction or unqualified fulfillment ever attainable, or even possible. Our restless, unquenchable search has no actually
existing final goal. It trails off endlessly into ever-receding,
always finite horizons, its inexhaustible abyss of longing and
capacity ever unfilled and in principle unfillable. Once we
postulate that this situation is definitive and cannot be overcome—that there is no proportion between the depths of
our capacity, the reach of our mind, and what there is for it
actually to grasp—the very possibility arouses a profound
metaphysical restlessness and sadness within us; the dynamism of our mind turns out to be a strange existential surd,
an anomaly. It is a dynamism ordered precisely toward a
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non-existent goal; a drive through all finites toward nothing;
an innate, inextinguishable summons to frustration: a living
absurdity. Sartre would indeed be right, when he says every
human being longs for the infinite, but since God is dead,
‘‘man is a useless passion.’’
The other possibility is that somewhere hidden within this
unlimited horizon of being there exists an actually infinite
Plenitude of Being, in which all other beings participate yet
of which they are but imperfect images. St. Thomas describes
this actually Infinite Plenitude not as a particular being—
with its connotation of determinate limits setting it apart
from other equally finite beings—but rather as the pure subsistent plenitude of be-ing, of the act of existence itself, Ipsum
Esse Subsistens, pure subsistent to-be. It now becomes the adequate, totally fulfilling goal of the dynamism of our minds,
matching superabundantly the inexhaustible abyss of our
own capacity and desire to know: one abyss, a negative one,
calling out to another, a positive one. As the German mystical poet Angelus Silesius so beautifully put it, ‘‘The abyss in
me calls out to the abyss in God. Tell me, which is deeper?’’
The existence of this Infinite Center of being (obviously it
would have to be actually existent, for if it were merely possible,
nothing else could bring it into existence and it would be in
fact impossible) now gives full intelligibility to the horizon
of being itself, as its unifying center and source, and also
confers full and magnificent intelligibility on the natural dynamism of my mind and the whole intellectual life arising
out of it. This implies, of course, that it is in some way
possible, if only as a loving gift originating from this Center,
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for me to achieve actual union with this ultimate Fullness,
the ultimate Whereunto of my whole intellectual life.
At this point the objection naturally arises—and it deserves the most careful consideration and personal reflection
to test out its validity concretely in our inner life—why there
could not be a third alternative. Why could it not be that the
human mind would be adequately fulfilled and entirely content as long as it was assured of inexhaustible novelty, an
unending series of finites to know and enjoy? I am well aware
that such an alternative may seem plausible at first blush, but
working through it carefully in a thought experiment will, I
think, show clearly enough that it must finally collapse. Such
an alternative must be set in a framework of immortality and
eternity of time; otherwise the series would come to an end
without fulfillment: fulfillment depends necessarily in this
conception on the unending sequence. In this perspective,
surely a series of endless repetitions of the same kind of finite
satisfactions, a mere quantitative repetition, would eventually
pall and leave us open again to a profound and insatiable
restlessness. For the human mind—and will—has a remarkable and wonderful capacity to transcend whole series at a
time, to sum up their quality if not their quantity; and if the
former remains always finite, the mind at once leaps beyond
the whole series questing for a qualitative more, a richer final
goal.
This at once launches us in a new direction, no longer
along merely horizontal lines at the same level of things, but
in a vertical ascent toward qualitatively ever-higher and richer
realities. Once we have moved into the spiritual realm here,
we would be into immortal entities, and an actually infinite
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number of them. If there are causal links of any kind between
the degrees of being, as is likely, it is not clear that such a
structure makes sense. But even if it did, the mind could
comprehend this whole ascending series, its appetite expanding as it rises, and long to leap ahead to the really greatest
and best—or at least one much further advanced—and not
have to wait for unending eternity and never actually get
there. With no possibility of ever reaching the best, the infinite
series would again evoke a profound frustration at this eternal unfulfillableness.
To sum up, we have not really taken full possession of our
own inner dynamism of inquiry until we keep penetrating to
its profoundest depths and suddenly become aware in a kind
of epiphany of self-discovery precisely that its very nature is
to be an inexhaustible abyss that can comprehend and leap
beyond any finite or series of finites, unending or not. This
involves perhaps more existential self-discovery than logical
or abstract reasoning.
My final point is that the notion of an Infinite Plenitude
and union with it leads many people to a certain block, because this is conceived as a static state—finished once and
for all with nothing further going on. But there is no reason
to conceive of the infinite and total fulfillment through union
with it in this way. It is more natural to think of it as a
fullness out of which continually and spontaneously overflow
free creative expressions of ecstatic joy. These are not necessary
steps on the way to achieve fulfillment, but a natural, spontaneous overflow of expression because we have reached it. There
would still be endless novelty, but no longer as fulfilling everinsatiable need.
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Now that we have again reduced our ultimate alternatives
to two, the crucial question arises: which of these two is
actually the case? Which should I opt for? Which is the more
reasonable to opt for? On the one hand is the acceptance of
myself, in the profoundest depths of my intellectual nature,
as a living frustration, an existential absurdity, ordered ineluctably toward a simply non-existent goal, magnetized, so
to speak, by the abyss of nothingness, of what is not and
can never be—a dynamism doomed eternally to temporary
gratification but permanent unfulfillment. On the other hand
lies the acceptance of my nature as drawn, magnetized
toward an actually existing, totally fulfilling goal, which confers upon it total and magnificent meaningfulness and opens
out before it a destiny filled with inexhaustible light and
hope. On the one hand, the darkness of ultimate nothingness
of what can never be; on the other, the fullness of ultimate
Light, which already awaits our coming.
How is this most radical of all options to be decided? The
founder of Transcendental Thomism, Joseph Maréchal—and
perhaps most others in this tradition—insist that the structure of human thought as oriented toward Infinite Being is a
necessary a priori structure or condition of possibility of all
our thinking. We cannot help, if we think at all, living in the
limitless horizon of being and tending toward the fullness of
being as fulfilling goal; we cannot help but make all our
judgments by affirming every finite being against the implicit
background of the infinite, as stepping-stones toward the infinite. ‘‘Man is an embodied affirmation of the Infinite,’’ as
Father Donceel likes to put it. We can conceptually and
verbally deny the existence of this Infinite as the ultimate
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Whereunto of our whole drive to know. But the very exercise
of the mind even in the most ordinary everyday affirmation
implicitly reaffirms what we explicitly deny, putting us not
in a logical but in a lived contradiction with ourselves. We
are committed a priori, by nature, to the affirmation of the
reality of the infinite—whether we call it by the term ‘‘being’’
or some other, or only point to it in eloquent silence—no
matter how much we deny it on the conscious, explicit level
of our knowing.
There is much to be said for this strong position. However, I myself prefer to dig a little deeper, if possible, and
move the option into the realm of a radical existential decision in the order of freedom, of free self-assumption of our
own nature as gift. For it does seem that the above argument
for the rigorous necessity of this implicit affirmation of God
in all knowing rests on the tacit assumption that the dynamism of my intelligence does actually make ultimate sense,
is not a radical absurdity, and hence must have some really
existing final goal, since an existing dynamism without goal
would be unintelligible. Yet modern man—as Sartre, Camus,
and others have shown—does seem to have an astonishing
capacity for self-negation as well as self-affirmation, irrational as this may be. Man is the being who can affirm or deny
his own rationality.
Hence it seems to me that there is no logical argument by
which one can be forced to choose one side of the option,
light or darkness, rather than the other. The issue lies beyond
the level of rational or logical argument because it is at the
root of all rationality. Hence I would like to propose it as a
radical option open to man’s freedom: he is free to assume
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his own rational nature as gift and follow its natural call to
total fulfillment, or else to reject this call and refuse to commit himself, on the level of conscious affirmation and deliberately lived belief, to the summons of his nature calling from
the depths of the dynamism of intelligence as such. All the
light lies on one side, and our whole nature positively pulls
us in this direction; only ultimate darkness lies on the other,
and cannot pull us as either rational or good. But we do
remain free, I am willing to allow, to make this radical assumption, to accept our own nature, or to reject it. This
existential choice, obscure and implicit though it may be
(and though it may never reach the conceptual clarity and
explicitness of a choice for ‘‘God’’ or ‘‘no God’’), is still the
most important choice of our lives, giving ultimate form and
meaning to the whole.
If I accept and listen to this radical innate pull of my
nature as intellectual being, if I accept this nature gratefully
and humbly as a gift, I will affirm with conviction the existence of the ultimate Fullness and Center of all being, the
lodestar that draws my intelligence ever onward, even though
this ultimate goal remains for me at present only obscurely
discerned, seen through a mirror darkly, pointed to beyond
all conceptual grasp as the mystery of inexhaustible Light, a
Light that with my present, body-obscured vision I cannot
directly penetrate or master with my own powers, but that
renders all else intelligible.
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The same process of discovery works even more powerfully
and effectively—from the point of view of its psychological
impact—when applied to the correlative dynamism of the
human will, operating within the limitless horizon of being
as the good, as the valuable and lovable.8 Reflecting on the
operation of my human will, I come to discover or unveil
the nature of this faculty, or active potency in Thomistic
terms, as an unrestricted and inexhaustible drive toward the
good, as presented by my intelligence. Our entire life of willing, desiring, loving, avoiding, is carried on within the horizon of the good, the formal object of the will as such. But
this horizon of being as the good, like that of being as truth
for the intellect, reveals itself to be also unlimited, unbounded. The process of discovery is similar. Each time we
take possession of some new finite good, we are temporarily
22
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satisfied as we explore and enjoy its goodness for us. But
again, as soon as we discover its limits, its finitude, our wills
at once spontaneously rebound beyond, in prospective desire
and longing for further fulfillment. Over and over throughout our lives this process is repeated.
Reflecting now on this process as a whole, we can disengage its meaning in the light of its final cause or goal. Its
ultimate goal, through which alone this dynamism—like any
dynamism—is rendered intelligible, can be nothing less than
the totality of the good, whatever that may turn out to be.
There is, therefore, in the will a dynamic a priori orientation
toward the good as such—i.e., a natural affinity, connaturality, aptitude for the good—which is written into the very
nature of the will as dynamic faculty before any particular
experience of an individual good, and defines this nature as
such. Everything it desires and loves it loves as good, as situated within this all-embracing horizon of the good, as participating in some way in the transcendental character of
goodness.
Now this a priori orientation and natural affinity for the
good implies that the will, in order to recognize and respond
to a good when it finds it, must have written within it—
analogously to the intellect—a pre-conceptual ‘‘background
consciousness,’’ an anticipatory grasp—unthematized or implicit, obscure and indistinct—of the good as somehow present in its very depths, magnetizing and attracting it, luring it
on to actual fulfillment of its innate potentiality by distinct
conscious appropriations of actually existing concrete goods.
This is what it means to live volitively in the horizon of
the good. The entire life of the will consists in filling in
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determinately and concretely this unbounded, all-embracing,
indeterminate, intentional horizon of the good as anticipated
field of all possible fulfillment. As Plato said long ago in the
Meno, in one of his profoundest insights, in any inquiry or
search, unless we somehow dimly and implicitly knew ahead
of time what we were looking for, we would never recognize
an answer as an answer to our search. The passage is not
from total non-knowledge or absence of the good to knowledge or presence, but from implicit and indistinct to explicit
and distinct awareness. As St. Thomas put it in a striking
formula, often highlighted by Transcendental Thomists,
‘‘Every knower knows God implicitly in anything it knows.’’9
Similarly, every will implicitly loves God in anything it loves.
We must now analyze more precisely what must be the
content of this unlimited horizon of the good, ever-present
by anticipation as implicit ‘‘background consciousness’’ in
the will and drawing it like a lodestar or hidden magnet.
This analysis can be set, if one wishes, in the outer form of
an Aristotelian demonstration; but in fact its inner soul is the
drawing out into explicitness of what is already necessarily
contained implicitly in the life of the will, if the latter is not
to collapse into unintelligibility. The horizon of the good
appears to us first as a vague, indefinite, indeterminate totality. It must be somehow a unity, first because of the analogous similarity of all that draws the will as good, second
because the unity of any dynamism or active potency is at
least partly dependent on the unity of its goal. A totally
unrelated multiplicity of final goals would fragment the unity
of the dynamism into an unintelligible, unintegrated multiplicity of drives. Now as we analyze the dynamism of the
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will, as above, we discover that no finite particular good can
be its adequate final goal for it at once rebounds beyond any
finite object once its limits have been discovered. And just as
no one finite can satisfy adequately this drive, neither can any
sum of all finite members, not even an endless series of all
finite goods. Once the mind has gathered, in a single synthetic act of comprehension, the meaning of the whole series,
and realizes that this is all there ever will be, or can be, it
then becomes clear that the will would be doomed to an
unfillable, insatiable abyss of longing—in a word, an ultimate
frustration, an ontological surd. It would be an actually existing dynamism, ordered by an a priori orientation constitutive
of its very nature—about which, therefore, it can do nothing—ordered precisely toward a non-existent final goal; an
active potency ordered toward nothing proportionate to its
potentiality; an innate drive toward nothing.
The only other alternative is that within this limitless, indeterminate horizon of the good lies hidden as its center and
source an actually existing Infinite Plenitude of Goodness—
not this or that particular good, but the Good itself, subsisting in all its essential unparticipated fullness—from which
all finite goods possess their limited goodness by participation. In this case the dynamism of the human will takes on
ultimate and magnificent sense, is ordered toward a totally
fulfilling final goal which must be at least possible for it to
obtain (whether by its own power or by free gift is not yet
clear), and the whole of human life takes on the structure of
hope rather than of frustration and absurdity.
Again, as in the case of the drive of the intellect toward
being as truth, we are brought up against a radical option. To
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which alternative shall we—ought we—commit ourselves?
Again, some of the Transcendental Thomists say that
whether we like it or not we are committed by the dynamism
of final causality built into our nature to affirm implicitly the
actual existence of the Infinite Good, since if it were only possible, no finite being could make it actual. If we deny it on the
conscious conceptual and verbal level, as we are free to do, we
put ourselves in a state of lived—not logical—contradiction
between the actual use of our power of willing and what we
say about it. As St. Thomas would say, all lovers implicitly
love God in each thing they love.10
But again, as I proposed above in the case of the intellect,
this stand, impressive and defensible though it may be, still
seems to me to presuppose as already accepted the intelligibility of the life of the will, and modern man has the ability
to put the very intelligibility of his own nature radically in
question. Hence I prefer again to propose the option as appealing to the radical freedom of each human person to assume or reject, freely, the ultimate meaningfulness of his or
her own human nature as power of willing and loving the
good. No logical argument can force me to choose one alternative over the other. Yet the luminous fullness of meaningfulness draws me with the whole spontaneous pull of my
nature toward the real existence of the Infinite Good as a
magnet fully adequate to, even far exceeding, the profoundest
imaginable reaches of my capacity for love. Full intelligibility
lies only this way. On the other side, there is only the prospect of an endless chain of unfinished and interminable
business, trailing off into the darkness of ultimate frustration—an abyss to whose profoundest longing cry there can
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be no responsive echo. If I humbly and gratefully accept my
nature with its natural pull toward the Infinite as a meaningful gift, I will commit myself to affirm—and to reach out
with anticipatory, hope-filled love toward—a Center of Infinite Goodness as actually existing and somehow possible
for me to be united with, though veiled from me at present
in mystery.
This approach to God through the dynamism of the will
toward the good has a far more powerful appeal to most
people than the approach through the intellect alone as ordered toward truth. Many people, at least in certain moods
and at certain times of their lives, feel that they could do
without the fullness of knowledge; at least its drawing power
is not overwhelming. But there is nobody, intellectual or not,
who is not constantly and wholeheartedly longing for happiness. This is the deepest and most urgent of all drives in
man—in fact, the dynamo behind all others. For as St.
Thomas points out, unless possessing the truth appeared to
us as a good attracting the will, we would not be drawn to
seek knowledge at all.
I would like to share with you, as an example, a case from
my own experience. One day I was in a cab in New York
City. The cab driver being very talkative, I decided to turn
the conversation to some useful purpose. So I asked him if
he was happy. ‘‘No, too many problems,’’ he answered.
‘‘What would make you happy then?’’ I asked. ‘‘Give me a
million dollars and all my problems would be solved. I’d be
a happy man and could enjoy life.’’ ‘‘All right,’’ I replied,
‘‘you have the million dollars. Now what?’’ Then he said he
would pay off all his debts. ‘‘All right, they are paid. Now
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what?’’ Then he said he would buy a house. Several, in fact.
‘‘Done,’’ I replied. ‘‘Now what?’’ Then he got himself a nice
wife—in fact several, in different cities. ‘‘Done. Now what?’’
Then he traveled, went through a whole long set of things
he wanted to do; and each time I replied the same: ‘‘Granted.
Now what?’’ Finally he began to quiet down. Then he suddenly turned all the way around, in the middle of traffic,
giving me quite a scare, and said: ‘‘Say, something funny is
going on here. I can’t seem to get to the bottom of all this.
What am I really looking for after all?’’ He had suddenly
totaled up the whole series, past and to come, and caught the
point. Then I began . . .

Response to Tillich
Let us return now to Tillich’s criticism, with which we began
our exposition. It should be clear, I think, that this inner way
of the mind to God, first developed formally and explicitly
by the Transcendental Thomists within the Thomist tradition as an argument or rational vindication for the affirmation of the existence of God, is quite different from the
Aristotelian-type argument to God through cosmic motion,
which Tillich found fault with for beginning with God as
absent and proceeding to search for Him somewhere outside
us. The inner ascent to God through the dynamism of the
human spirit starts rather with a God who is actually present
from the beginning in the depths of our knowing and willing
activities, because He is actually and efficaciously drawing us
all the time toward Himself. But this presence is at first only
implicit, veiled, dimly and obscurely intuited—perhaps ‘‘felt’’
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would be better—in our pre-conceptual awareness of the unlimited horizons of being and goodness. The process of
bringing this implicit, lived awareness into explicit, reflectively self-conscious and rationally grounded affirmation may
take a long time and much intellectual discussion and groping. It may even take the form of a chain of Aristotelian
syllogisms, though I, myself, do not think this method is
appropriate to the subject matter. But it is still not the search
for a God who is ontologically or even psychologically—in
the deep sense—absent. It is the unveiling, the uncovering
within us of the God who has always been there, existentially
drawing us to Himself, but not yet recognized as such. A
journey is indeed needed to find a God who appears to be
absent at first in the order of explicit conceptual knowledge.
But it is a journey within, into the depths of my own self, to
discover the treasure always present there but hidden at first
from the clouded vision of my sense-bound eyes.
By this turn to the inner way the contemporary Transcendental Thomists, stimulated by the challenge of Kantian
agnosticism to a realistic epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of God, have brought to light a hitherto largely undeveloped dimension of the authentic thought of St.
Thomas. In so doing they have significantly corrected and
enriched the apparent one-sidedness of the exclusively cosmic and ‘‘exterior’’ approach to God characteristic of the
original Thomistic Five Ways and their traditional elaboration in the classical Thomist school. And in so doing, these
contemporary Thomists have also, through the unlikely intermediary of Kant, rejoined in their own way the ancient
Platonic path through the eros of the soul, which gives it
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wings to ascend to Absolute Unity, Goodness, and
Beauty—a path which was so creatively assimilated into
Christian thought in the West by the Augustinian tradition
and worked so powerfully within it for a thousand years
before St. Thomas and the rise of Aristotelian-inspired
scholasticism.

Dynamism of the Spirit as the Image of God in Man
Before leaving this topic, we should not fail to note that this
Thomistic analysis of the dynamism of the spirit also provides us with a profound metaphysical analysis of the ancient
religious-mystical-philosophical doctrine of man as the
image of God, principally through the intellect and will. For
man to be truly the image of God in any strong sense, it
would seem appropriate (necessary?) that there be some mark
or manifestation of the divine infinity itself in man. This
obviously cannot be a positive infinite plenitude; that is
proper to God alone. But there can be an image of the divine
infinity in silhouette—in reverse, so to speak—within man,
precisely in his possession of an infinite capacity for God, or,
more accurately, a capacity for the Infinite, which can be satisfied by nothing less. This negative image points unerringly
toward the positive infinity of its original, and is intrinsically
constituted by this relation of tendential capacity. It is as
though—as with the ancient myths—God had broken the
coin of His infinity in two, holding on to the positive side
Himself and giving us the negative side, then launching us
into the world of finites with the mission to search until we
have matched our half-coin with His. By this only we shall
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know that we have reached the goal of our lives, our final
happiness.11
In connection with this notion of the dynamism of the
spirit as a veiled revelation of ourselves as image of God, I
share with you an interesting experiment I have tried with
marked success on many student groups and individual people. It is an attempt to answer the common complaint one
so often hears: Why is it that God remains so obscure and
difficult to find? With His omnipotent power, you would
think it would be the easiest thing in the world for Him to
reveal Himself with perfect clarity to almost anybody, without having to pass through the obscurity of faith or the difficulty of philosophical argument.
My answer is this. All right, suppose you are God, omniscient and omnipotent. Now suppose you wanted to manifest your true nature to men, as Infinite Spirit. You can use any
means—but not faith, or direct mystical experience, because
most people are not prepared for that and could not receive
it or interpret it properly; it takes a long process of purification to be able to receive it without distortion. You think it
would be such an easy job—if you were God. Go ahead and
try. What would you do?
Some come up with sensational physical cures. I laugh,
and point out that some higher spaceman could do that.
Others would produce great natural cataclysms, whirling
planets, and so forth. I point out that these things do presuppose a much higher power than ours, but not an infinite
power, let alone a pure spirit. I keep on knocking down every
physical or psychic feat they produce as nowhere near the
mark. When they have finally given up, I suggest that maybe
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it’s not such an easy thing to do after all, even for God.
Maybe God, too, has His own problems with self-manifestation to man. Then I suggest that there may perhaps be only
one way even for God to do this: by leaving some mark of
His infinity imprinted within us. But the only kind possible
is a negative infinity of capacity and longing, which can only
be matched by His own self, and hence, even though it gives
us no positive clear picture of Him, nevertheless serves us as
a guide to eliminate all other contenders less than Himself
for our final goal. Thus this apparently obscure way of revealing Himself may in fact be the best if not the only one
available, given our situation and His. If we explore it all the
way to its depths, our dynamism for the infinite turns out to
be a remarkably eloquent reverse image and pointer toward
God as He is in Himself, beyond all possible finites.

Comparison with Augustinian Tradition
Yet the significant philosophical differences between the Augustinian and the Thomistic traditions remain within this
common inner path. One difference, for example, is that Augustinians like St. Bonaventure tend to give the impression—in fact, assert quite explicitly—that God as Infinite
Being is somehow present to the mind of man as a kind of
uncreated Light, through whose light we then come to know
all eternal truths, eternal value judgments, and finite beings
as finite. Through the light of Being we know all beings, just
as through the Good we love all goods. The ontological order
of the priority of God as First Cause and our radical dependence on Him for all knowing and loving tends to be identi-
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fied here with the epistemological and psychological order of our
discovery of God (though some are inclined to think this
may be due more to technical imprecision of concepts and
methodology than to irreconcilable doctrinal differences).12
Another significant difference—due to more than technical
imprecision, I think—derives from their differing analyses of
the cognitive process in man, specifically the relation of intellect to sense, rooted in the relation of soul to body. For the
medieval Augustinian tradition, the soul had two ‘‘faces.’’
One, the Aristotelian face, looked downward toward the
material world, known through sensory knowledge, from
which the intellect abstracted the essences of material things
in the mode of Aristotelian abstraction. But there was another face of the soul, its Platonic or spiritual face, which
looked directly and intuitively into the realm of spiritual
being—including its own soul as spiritual, other spirits
(angels), and God Himself, the Supreme Spirit—without
passing through the mediation of sense knowledge and the
abstraction of intelligible forms from it.13 For St. Thomas,
on the other hand, there was no such independent upper face
of the soul which could look directly on its own into the
higher spiritual world, without at least the initial mediation
of the sense world. Because of the intrinsic interdependent
unity of soul and body—hence of intellect and sense—in
man, all his natural knowledge was intrinsically sensitive-intellectual in origin, though the act itself of intellectual insight
and its final products, concept, and judgment transcend the
body and its senses.14 St. Thomas makes an explicit exception, of course, for supernatural mystical knowledge of God,
which he held was directly infused by God at the so-called
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fine point of the spiritual soul, bypassing all its faculties,
both sensitive and rational. (One has the impression that the
Augustinian tradition never clearly distinguished the natural
from the mystical or supernatural modes of human knowing,
and that this accounts at least partly for their expressed differences from the Thomistic tradition.)
As a result of this close union of intellect and sense in St.
Thomas, man could come to the knowledge of himself as
spirit and of the higher spiritual world only by first awakening his intellect through understanding the material world
and his relation to it, then—‘‘led by the hand’’ by material
things, as St. Thomas colorfully puts it—ascend to God as
the ultimate Source both of the world and of himself.15 This
does not mean that man cannot rise to God through the
inner path of his own soul, but that when he does, the élan
of his mind must always lean on some sensible image or
symbol as a springboard to take off from. It means also that
our natural knowledge of God in this life can never attain to
a pure, direct spiritual intuition or clear conceptual representation of His nature, but can only point to Him through
very general open-ended analogous concepts as that which
is required by the mind’s radical exigency for intelligibility:
affirmed as the ultimate Source of all being, intelligibility,
and goodness, but at present wrapped in mystery for the
cloudy finite vision of our embodied minds, unable to gaze
directly on the Infinite Light. Thus for St. Thomas—and
for the Transcendental Thomists, faithfully following him
on this point—the content of our natural knowledge of God,
known through the dynamism of the human spirit as the
ultimate fulfilling Whereunto of its exigency for the fullness of
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being as truth and goodness, is considerably more indirect
and modest than that of Augustinian man. And, as we shall
see in Part II of this book, this inner path of discovery of
God through the transcendental analysis of the a priori conditions of possibility of the dynamism of the human spirit as
knower and lover needs to be completed by the so-called
outer path of cosmic ascent to God, by which we reach God
not just through final causality—as my God, my ultimate
satisfaction—but through efficient causality also as God the
Creator, the ultimate Source of all being and goodness in the
universe.
St. Thomas also diverges from St. Augustine and the Augustinian tradition in another significant way. Augustine in
his De Libero Arbitrio lays out his famous argument for the
existence of God from the existence of eternal truths, which
are ‘‘given’’ but require the existence of an eternal mind, i.e.,
God, thinking them as their foundation. Without mentioning Augustine, St. Thomas quietly undermines the possibility
of any such Platonic-based argument by pointing out that
since truth resides only in an intellect, there are no eternal
truths given us unless they are already thought by an eternal
intellect, i.e., God (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, art. 7).

Conclusion
Despite these reservations, the development by contemporary
Transcendental Thomists of an authentically Thomistic
inner way to the philosophical discovery of God is a major
new contribution to and enrichment of the 700-year-old
Thomistic tradition. It seems to me also that it responds

................. 16344$

$CH3

01-23-07 15:25:30

PS

PAGE 35

36

The Philosophical Approach to God

much more adequately and sensitively to the demands of
contemporary religious thinkers in the existentialist-personalist tradition, like Tillich himself, for whom the feeling for
the radical difference between the human person—with its
inner life of self-consciousness, freedom, and love—and the
non-personal material cosmos is so acute that if God is not
found as immanent within the human person, He cannot be
found at all. I myself believe, with St. Thomas, that the truly
Christian God must be found as immanent both within the
person and within the cosmos, as Lord of both the inner and
the outer world. But that is the subject of our next section.
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The Metaphysical Ascent to God through
Participation and the Analogical Structure of
Our Language about God
In the book’s first section we presented the new turn to the inner path
of philosophical ascent to God, through the dynamism of the human
spirit and its a priori conditions of intelligibility, as developed by contemporary Transcendental Thomists. We showed how it corrected a tooextraverted, exclusively cosmological approach to God which had been
characteristic of traditional Thomistic natural theology. However, taken
by itself, this inner path is one-sided and incomplete. It must be paired,
it seems to me, with a more cosmically oriented metaphysical approach
if we are to reach the full notion of God. This section will develop this
second approach to see how it enables us to speak meaningfully about
God through an analogical structure of thought and language.
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Why is the inner path to God through the dynamism of the
human spirit insufficient by itself to deliver the full content
of the traditional notion of God?
If taken strictly by itself, as proceeding in the order of
final causality alone, this approach does deliver, I think, eminently reasonable grounds for affirming the existence of an
infinitely perfect being as my God, my ultimate fulfillment of
both intellect and will. But this conclusion does not of itself
give me the warrant to assert this same God as the ultimate
source of all being, including my own. In a word, it does not
deliver the knowledge of God as Creator of all things. To know
God as Omega, as goal, is not ipso facto to know Him as Alpha,
as source. It is indeed plausible to suppose that, once we have
discovered the existence of an infinite being as our goal, it
will also turn out to be the Source of all finite beings. Still,
39
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the argument from final causality by itself does not deliver
this conclusion explicitly. Yet without this conclusion we do
not yet know the true God in His full meaning: as at once my
God and God of the cosmos. The God of authentic religion
must always be both, the God of Genesis as well as Exodos. To
reach this fuller conclusion I must make a new start. I must
turn to the rest of the vast universe of beings outside myself
and raise the question for them as to what they need to fulfill
the exigencies of intelligibility respecting their own actual
existence. I have seen that God is needed to make ultimate
sense out of my life as the ultimate goal of its dynamic tendency. Is He needed to make ultimate sense for me out of
their being as well, as the very source of their being, and of
mine too? The questions, though closely connected, are not
identical. Nor can they be answered by the same argument.
This point is sometimes forgotten by enthusiasts for the
inner path, including by some Transcendental Thomists. The
inner path and the cosmic path are sisters who must walk
hand in hand if they are to reach their common goal of the
true God. What we need to do, then, is to raise the question
of the intelligibility of the whole realm of the beings of my
experience, and then of all finite beings. The answer to this
question cannot be found in the dynamism of my own spirit
considered in itself alone, but in the wider reach of the metaphysics of being itself. Or, if you wish, it will be found in
the application of the dynamism of my intelligence to the
quest for the intelligibility of all being.
To be fair to those Transcendental Thomists who prefer
to combine the two approaches in a single argument from
the dynamism of the spirit, as does Father Donceel in his
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Natural Theology, I think it is possible to develop the argument
in such a way that it would include both thrusts of the mind
as complementary movements toward the fullness of intelligibility. For the same act of rebounding of the mind beyond
any and all finites can be unfolded under two aspects: one is
the necessary movement toward the Infinite as the search for
the fulfillment of my own dynamism as such, quite independent of this particular finite being I am rebounding beyond;
the other is the necessary movement of the mind toward the
Infinite as searching for the full intelligibility of this very
finite being itself I have just laid hold of and am trying to
understand. The two are indeed closely intertwined, and perhaps only abstractly separable. However, the two modalities
of explanation through final cause or goal and through efficient cause or origin still seem to me so distinct in the reasons grounding them that it is a little confusing to fuse them
into a single argument without leaving too much implicit.
Hence I prefer to follow out the two lines separately, partly
for the sake of clarity, partly to maintain my links with the
long and explicit tradition of analysis through efficient causality that is so deeply ingrained in St. Thomas himself and
has always been one of the chief bonds of union between all
Thomistic schools.

Deficiencies of St. Thomas’s ‘‘Five Ways’’
Does this mean that I am going to treat you, willy-nilly, to
an exposition of the famous classical Five Ways of St.
Thomas?1 Not at all. First of all, I consider them in their
actual textual form to require too much adaptation to con-
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vince the ordinary modern thinker. Second, I do not think
that they represent the best of St. Thomas’s own truly original and most characteristic metaphysical structure of ascent
to God as shown in the rest of his works.
The main trouble with the Five Ways is that they are too
incomplete as they stand. There are other troubles too, as we
shall see. The first three are Aristotelian and for that very
reason incomplete. The first two—from motion or change
and from chains of efficient causality—conclude only to a
Prime Mover, a First Cause, in the particular causal series
which each is posited to explain. They do not and cannot
deliver a single, infinitely perfect Source of all being. The
same difficulty is found in the Fifth Way, from order in the
world (though this is not of Aristotelian origin). It reaches a
Cosmic Planner—or possibly Planners, since the argument
by itself does not establish whether this Planner is one or
many, nor whether it is the Planner only for our material
cosmos or for all existing and possible universes. Still, this
argument, if properly filled out, remains a very effective first
major step toward establishing the existence of God, and has
always been a popular way in traditions of thought both
Eastern and Western—so popular that St. Thomas calls it
the ‘‘most efficacious way’’ for people generally in all times
and cultures.2 But as it stands it is extremely condensed and
incomplete.
The Third Way, from contingent beings (which means
for St. Thomas corporeal beings which come into being and
pass away) is an extremely difficult and controversial one in
its internal formal structure.3 Despite desperate attempts by
many Thomists to save it, it seems to me not merely incom-
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plete but formally invalid in its logical form because it necessarily depends for its efficacy on an unexpressed
principle—namely, that given infinite time, all possibilities
will come true. One such possibility is that all contingent
beings together should at some time have ceased to be. Since
that possibility must have already come true, given infinite
past time, then if all beings in the universe were contingent,
nothing at all would now exist: out of nothing no-thing at
all could ever come. Hence there must exist at least one necessary being. The argument proceeds soundly from this point
on, save that it does not conclude to a single infinite Source
of all being. But the key principle at work in the first part of
the argument—that all possibilities must come true, given
infinite time—seems to me not only not provable but actually not true at all. For another equally plausible state of
affairs is that each corruptible being should generate another
before it perished, and so on forever; the two logical possibilities, like many such cases, are not co-possible in the same
universe.
It is rare that St. Thomas falls into any genuine logical or
epistemological slips. But I think, with many others, that he
has fallen into a serious one here, following precisely the lead
of his master Aristotle, who asserts and tries to prove in De
Caelo (book 1, chapters 11–12) that if a body did not actually
‘‘corrupt’’ (i.e., perish), given infinite time, then it would be
incorruptible, could not perish—that every real potency must
be fulfilled, given infinite time. His argument is intriguing,
but quite invalid, it seems to me. The whole argument is a
complex and fascinating one, which we have no time to go
into here, but it is strewn with so many logical and meta-
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physical booby traps that it hardly provides a solid and effective basis for affirming the existence of God, even in
Aristotle’s and St. Thomas’s time, let alone our own. Most
Thomistic manuals—and even a few distinguished commentators like the great Gilson himself—discreetly (but none
too honestly, to my mind) sidestep the whole problem by
substituting (for purposes of simplicity and brevity, as they
put it) the apparently similar but much briefer argument
from the Summa contra Gentes (book 1, chapter 15, 5; Pegis
translation). This argument, quite a valid metaphysical one
in its own right, proceeds on an entirely different principle
requiring no recourse at all to the principle that all possibilities must come true, given infinite time.
The Fourth Way, the closest to St. Thomas’s own personal Neoplatonically inspired metaphysics of participation,
can be fixed up fairly easily to fit the latter. But as the argument is actually expressed in the text, appealing to a misreading of a terse text of the early Platonic period of Aristotle—a
misreading apparently widely current in St. Thomas’s time—
the arrangement of premises follows an inverted and defective order. Beginning from degrees of perfection in the world,
it concludes directly to a maximum as norm for ranking the
other degrees, and then in a second moment tries to show
that this maximum—which, so far as the force of the argument goes, might be a merely ideal norm—is also the efficient cause of all the limited degrees of perfection. This is
an order, strange to say, that St. Thomas never follows elsewhere in his own metaphysics of participation and ascent
from the finite to the Infinite, where he always passes across
the bridge of efficient causality first in order to reach a real
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maximum. The reverse order, as found in the text of the
argument, I consider to be of highly dubious metaphysical
vintage and value, despite various attempts of Thomists to
salvage it by appealing to exemplary causality. There is no
valid passage in St. Thomas to exemplary causality except
through the prior establishment of an efficient cause, in
which the exemplary ideas reside. The text of Aristotle which
St. Thomas quotes as authority is a mistranslation, widely
quoted in the thirteenth century but later corrected by William of Moerbeke’s translation and all modern translations.
The text here used by Thomas runs: ‘‘Highest in a genus is
the cause of all in the genus.’’ The correct translation runs:
‘‘The cause of all in the genus is the highest in the genus.’’
The inversion in the Greek is merely for rhetorical emphasis.4
These are some of the reasons why many contemporary
Thomists today—especially Transcendental Thomists like
Rahner and Lonergan—stay away from the Five Ways in
developing their own presentation of Thomistic natural theology. This is definitely my position. I look on the Five Ways
as quick, condensed sketches of philosophical approaches to
God, laid down by St. Thomas at the beginning of his Summa
Theologiae—intended for ‘‘beginners,’’ by the way, as he tells
us—deliberately not taken from his own personal participation metaphysics but drawn from the thought of pagan philosophers, especially the newly introduced Aristotle, the
philosopher for Thomas and so many in his day, for the
express purpose of showing that even the pagan philosophers
could by the use of reason alone arrive at an initial knowledge of God. After this first step, St. Thomas comes in with
his own more high-powered metaphysics, and later Revela-
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tion, to work out a full Christian, metaphysically guided theology of God. But these Ways as they stand are so condensed
and incomplete—so tied in implicitly (the first three at least)
to certain assumptions of the Aristotelian cosmological
framework of the time, and as a result need so much explanation, qualification, revision, and supplementation to make
sense to a modern reader—that the results are no longer
worth the effort, save for scholarly historical purposes. I
must warn you, however, that this view, which I have exposed
to you quite candidly and forthrightly, is not shared by all
Thomists today.
We can, however, first reconstruct from the Five Ways,
beginning from the Second Way from efficient causality, a
single synthetic argument that goes all the way to a single
infinite Source of all being, as I have done in my Explorations
in Metaphysics (chapter 8), and The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (chapter 14). Only the last part of the
argument will be borrowed from the Thomistic participation
metaphysics. I shall briefly restate this reconstruction of my
own here.
the cosmic way
(1) All around us we see beings that lack their own sufficient
reason for existing, and hence require an efficient cause. But
every being in the universe cannot require an efficient cause.
For then there would be an endless regress of causes with
the necessary conditions for actual existence never fulfilled
anywhere—which is unintelligible. Hence there must exist at
least one self-sufficient, unconditioned being.
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(2) But no self-sufficient being can be limited, finite, in its
qualitative perfection. For then it would have to be the sufficient reason why it exists in this particular limited mode of
perfection rather than another already existing or possible.
But to do so it would have to pre-exist its own being and
choose for itself this particular limited degree of perfection
rather than another—which is impossible. Hence, since every
finite being requires a cause for its existence, no self-sufficient
being can be finite, but must be an infinite fullness of qualitative perfection.
(3) It immediately follows that there can only be one such
infinite being. For if there were two such, at least one would
have to lack something the other had and so would be finite,
or simply fuse into identity with the other. Hence there must
exist one single infinite Source of all being.
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As a result, what most contemporary Thomists who think
this way and yet still wish to develop an authentic Thomistic
metaphysical approach to God are actually doing today is
drawing not from the primarily Aristotelian side of St.
Thomas’s thought, which the Five Ways express, but rather
from the much richer and profounder resources of his Neoplatonically inspired participation metaphysics, the deepest
and most original level of St. Thomas’s metaphysics.5 It is a
personal synthesis which he constructed by (1) taking over
the general formal structure of Neoplatonic participation
theory, (2) emptying it of its excessive Platonic realism of
ideas, (3) filling it with the new wine of his own quite original
insight into the act of existence as the ultimate positive core
of all real perfections—an act which is multiplied and diversified by reception into various limiting modes of essence,
48
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and (4) expressing the whole structure in a transformed Aristotelian terminology of act and potency. It is this existentialized participation metaphysics which will allow us, I hope to
show, to ascend in only a few steps from any finite reality of
our experience directly to God as unique, infinite Source of
all reality, quite independent of any scientific assumptions
from our own or any day. This same structure will also provide the ground for our ability to speak meaningfully about
God in analogical language drawn from the perfections we
find in creatures.
The rest of this lecture will be devoted to laying out in
condensed form, first, this ascent to God through Thomistic
participation metaphysics and, second, the analogical language built upon it. I must warn, however, that this ancient
Neoplatonic ascent of the mind from the many to the One
and from the finite to the Infinite is not the type of formallogical argument that can (if indeed any argument for anything real can) force all minds to accept it with compelling
logical rigor. Its power perhaps lies more in the evocation of
a basic metaphysical insight which is then laid out in the
form of an argument. It may be also that the efficacy of the
arguments is so inextricably involved in a profound existential commitment of the living dynamism of the spirit to a
truly personal quest for the full intelligibility of the universe
that it can remain opaque if one stands back in a purely
detached, abstract, logical perspective. The quest for the hidden Center of the universe, whose presence—or better, the
exigency for whose presence—most of mankind seems to
feel obscurely, dimly, and inarticulately in the ineffable recesses of their minds and hearts, may well have to be indis-
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solubly a quest of the whole person, of the whole being of a
man or woman. (This does not mean that I am quietly hedging my bets and opening an escape hatch to avoid rigorous
critical reflection on the arguments.) With these preliminary
cautions, let us put on our metaphysical wings.

First Argument: From the Many to the One
The first argument I propose is, in my opinion, the simplest,
most streamlined, most direct of all metaphysical arguments
for God that have ever been proposed. (I mean, of course,
valid arguments, since, with just about all Thomists, I consider the famous Ontological Argument—i.e., from the very
concept of God to His actual existence, which is indeed
briefer—to be incorrigibly invalid.) The first argument
moves in a single step from the beings of our experience,
taken simply as many and existing, to a single Infinite Source of all
being and all perfection. I love it myself, as I am sure St.
Thomas did and Plotinus in his own way before him did,
but it is not always easy to share this vision.
Let me first read one of St. Thomas’s own succinct versions of it—which, I might add, I have a strong suspicion
that most of you, even professional philosophers, have never
heard proposed as a Thomistic proof for God. In fact, in the
article in question—Question 3, Article 5 of his Disputed Question on the Power of God (De Potentia)—he is not formally seeking to prove the existence of God, but rather to establish that
there can be only one single Creator of all things, that all
things outside Him must be created by Him alone. In so
doing he establishes in a single sweep of thought both that
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there is a creator and that there is a single one of all things.
The text reads thus, in my translation:
It is necessary that if some one attribute is found in common among many things, it be caused in them by some
one cause. For it cannot be that this common attribute
belongs to each one as derived from its own self (ex se
ipso), since each one, according as it is its own unique self,
is distinguished from every other, and a diversity of causes
produces a diversity of effects. Therefore, since the act of
existence (esse) is found common to all things (shared by
all things), which, according to what they are, are distinct
from each other, it must be that their act of existence is
communicated to them not from their own selves but
from some one cause. And this seems to be the reasoning
of Plato, who maintained that before all multiplicity there
is a unity, not only in numbers but in real things.
Similar arguments, with slight variations, are found elsewhere.6 Let us paraphrase their common essence. Whenever
a real common attribute or perfection is shared among many,
its only adequate ontological grounding is a single common
source (efficient cause) for all, which possesses this common
perfection in all its fullness. The reason is that the common
sharing of the same perfection—i.e., the real similarity between
all the members in the order of this perfection—needs an
adequate sufficient reason or ontological grounding, and it
cannot be because these sharers are many and diverse that they
have something in common, that they are really similar. For
real similarity—though it is not identity—is still a mode of
unity, and diversity and multiplicity as such cannot be the
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ground of any unity. Now if this common perfection as in
each member had its ultimate origin or source totally from
each individual member by itself as unique and individual, as
self-sufficient and self-enclosed, then it would be their radical individual diversity and multiplicity which would be the
cause for their similarity, for their common bond of community. This is not intelligible. Diversity as such can never be
the cause of unity. Therefore, ontological similarity among
many, to have an adequate sufficient reason, must be
grounded somewhere in a concrete ontological unity, a single
source from which all the others ultimately derive this common perfection by participation. This argument works indeed on the level of form/matter composite of the same
species, the unifying factor being the form with its generative
power. But the unity remains on the limited level of specific
form only.
Now let us apply this general schema to the most basic
and universally shared of all positive perfections, the act of
existence itself. I say ‘‘act of existence’’ and not merely ‘‘existence,’’ because for St. Thomas, actual existence is not merely
a static state or minimum ‘‘fact’’—i.e., the mere extrinsic referent of a true assertion—but an intensive inner act of presence
within the thing itself which grounds the mental assertion
about it: a kind of qualitative energy (virtus essindi: the power
of be-ing, in St. Thomas’s words), condensing within it all the
positive perfection of anything real, ‘‘the act of all acts and
the perfection of all perfections,’’ as St. Thomas himself puts
it in a famous phrase. ‘‘For no real perfection,’’ he says, ‘‘can
accrue to a man from his wisdom unless he actually is wise.’’7
Now since existence is thus shared most really and univer-
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sally by absolutely all beings, this radical bond of similarity
and community between all that is must be explained, ontologically grounded, by being traced back to some one ultimate common Source of existence for all beings—a Source
which must not merely have existence in some limited way,
but be the very subsistent fullness of existence itself, Ipsum
Esse Subsistens, from which all others ultimately receive their
own particular limited modes of being. And since existence
is the most basic and all-inclusive of all positive perfections
or attributes, outside which no being or perfection lies, save
nothingness—and hence condenses into itself implicitly all
positive perfections as diverse modes of active presence—in
reaching one Source of all existence we have at a single stroke
reached the unique, ultimate, hence infinite Source of all possible perfections, a perfect description of what we mean by
God, though not yet a fully explicated description. St.
Thomas himself identifies this as the ancient Platonic path
from the many to the One. It is applied by him not merely
to participation in a world of ideas or forms but to participation in the most radically concrete and existential of all perfections, the power or energy of existence itself as the
ultimate inner act of each real being.
This argument can be summed up extremely briefly,
grasped in a single synoptic insight. Wherever there is a
many sharing some real perfection, there must be a single
common source for this perfection. Since existence itself is
the most universally shared of all perfections, including all
that is real in any way, there must be a single common ultimate Source of all existence from whence all others participate in it, each in its own way. The same basic schema, of
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course, can be applied to other ‘‘pure perfections’’—i.e.,
those containing no imperfection or limitation in their meaning—such as goodness, intelligence, power, love, unity, activity, etc.
This extremely condensed formulation of St. Thomas
contains implicitly within it a few basic epistemological and
metaphysical principles that must be made explicit for the
argument to remain valid. The central one is the epistemological realism of Aquinas, which is needed as a critical corrective or qualification on the scope of application of the
principle that wherever there is a many there must be a
grounding one. For Plato, every universal idea automatically
belonged to the realm of the ‘‘really real,’’ so that for him
the grounding idea behind the universal linguistic term ipso
facto becomes a real causal grounding principle. For Thomas,
with his Aristotelian realism, the vast majority of universal
ideas drawn from our material cosmos are in fact only abstractions of intelligible forms from the individualizing matter
or body in which alone they actually exist. Our knowledge
of the act of existence, on the other hand, for Thomas, is
not an abstraction from real existence—obviously—but rather
the result of a judgment of actual existence. The application
of the argument from the many to the one is valid, therefore,
only for a few predicates like existence itself or some similar
transcendental predicate like ‘‘good, active,’’ etc. Here the
one grounding the many shared instances must itself be in
the order of actual existence.
For the full explication of the sharing (participation) relation also, the dialectic of finite and infinite is required. Hence
we are immediately adding a second basic argument directly
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from any finite being to a single infinite source. This can also
serve as an independent argument on its own.
Before we pass on to the next argument, I call attention
to a significant characteristic of this one as related to the
criticism by Paul Tillich of St. Thomas’s approach to God
that we mentioned in the first part of the book. If you recall,
Tillich called St. Thomas the first Christian atheist because
his Aristotelian proofs from motion to a Prime Mover seek
to demonstrate or prove the existence of God—i.e., to start from
God’s absence in the initial data and then try to find Him
elsewhere in the cosmos at the end of a chain of premises.
The present type of Neoplatonically inspired participation
argument from the many to the One, however—though it
can indeed be laid out discursively in a series of premises like
a syllogism, if one wishes—is really more in the nature of a
synoptic insight into the presence of the One as reflected in
the many. For the common shared perfection, though not
identically the fontal One itself, is nonetheless the mark or
sign, the reflected image, of the One in the many, since it
transcends the self-enclosed diversity and otherness of each
one of the many, uniting them in a common bond of shared
perfection and thus pointing implicitly to the unifying Source
that is at once beyond and yet imminent in them all. This
argument does not move, like the Aristotelian proof through
motion, from the absence of God in the changing being to
His presence elsewhere, but rather from the already positive
but imperfect mark of His concealed presence to His fully
revealed presence. It is not a journey to find an absent one,
save in the order of our cognitive awareness, but rather a
coming to explicit recognition of what was already implicitly
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present under the veil of an imperfect image, similar to what
we found in the inner path to God through the dynamism
of the spirit as described in the book’s first part.
It is one of the powerfully perennial attractions of the
Neoplatonic style of philosophy that the inner spiritual ascent of the soul to the One and the outer metaphysical ascent
through the cosmos reveal themselves as two sides of the
same coin. The spiritual and the metaphysical are not closed
off from each other, but mirror each other in different orders. Some of this reflected glow of the inner life of the spirit
can be found in St. Thomas too, once we learn to live within
his more austere and impersonal-sounding expositions of the
metaphysical ascent to God through participation. The abstract metaphysical ‘‘reduction’’ (reductio: his favorite term for
a metaphysical proof ), which is a ‘‘drawing back’’ of the
beings of our experience to their source through causal participation metaphysics, mirrors the existential inner journey
of the soul home to God as its blissful fulfillment.8 I might
add, too, that this movement of the mind from the many to
the One reflects what seems to be the most basic structure
of the human mind’s constant quest for intelligibility in all
fields. To understand is ultimately to unify: it means first to
discern the parts of anything clearly, but finally to unify them
into a meaningful whole in itself and then with all else that
we know. He who does not understand something as one,
St. Thomas says, understands nothing.9

Second Argument: From the Finite to the Infinite
The second pathway of metaphysical ascent to God through
participation is slightly more complex than the first. It in-
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volves a passage from the finite as finite to the Infinite, which
is shown to be necessarily unique. It is thus a two-step argument. The first path above, moving directly from the many,
as a many sharing a one, to the One as Source, did not even
have to pass through the mediation of finitude or degrees of
perfection. The present one does, but it has an added richness of its own in that it unveils the One explicitly as infinite.
It is also one of the two great Neoplatonic paths of metaphysical ascent to God. I say Neoplatonic rather than Platonic here advisedly, because although Plato was the father
of the ascent from the many to the One, he had not yet
worked out the path from the finite to the Infinite. The
reason is that, like all classical Greeks, including Aristotle, he
still held that the finite was the perfect, the completed or
finished-off typified by form, whereas the infinite was the
imperfect, the unfinished and indeterminate, typified by the
indeterminacy and incompleteness of formless matter by itself. Plato did, however, have an equivalent movement from
the particular and imperfect to the absolute and perfect, the
Good in itself, Beauty in itself, etc. But for him to have called
the One and the Good ‘‘infinite’’ might well have seemed like
a blasphemy, as though the most perfect were also the most
incomplete and unfinished. Plotinus was the first to acknowledge explicitly a higher Infinite of perfection beyond the limits of form, in addition to a lower infinite of imperfection
below form—i.e., in matter by itself. He was thus enabled to
develop formally and explicitly the metaphysical ascent from
the finite to the Infinite.
Now to the argument itself, after a brief prefatory note.
The term ‘‘finite’’ which we shall be using here, always in
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connection with finite perfection, has nothing to do with a
beginning or end in space and time, with a quantitative finite.
It is a strictly qualitative notion, signifying a limited degree of
an intensive perfection in the qualitative order, capable of
higher and lower degrees of intensity. So, too, ‘‘infinite’’ does
not mean having no end in space or time (although not a
few ancient, medieval, and modern thinkers have been quite
fuzzy on this, confusing metaphysical infinity of perfection
with eternity or omnipresence). It means rather the unrestricted qualitative plenitude of a perfection as it is in its
unparticipated state, contrasted with any limited mode of
participation, which possesses the perfection in question imperfectly and incompletely.
The argument proceeds as follows:10
(1) Whenever we find a common perfection possessed by
many beings in various finite or limited degrees, no finite
possessor of this perfection can adequately explain its own
being as this finite participant. The reason is this. Since many
degrees are possible, there must be some reason why this
participant has this perfection only in this limited degree and
not in some other possible degree. But the finite possessor
cannot explain its own finite possession as finite, for then, as
self-explanatory, it would have to be itself the ultimate
source of this perfection which it has only to a limited degree. But if it were the ultimate source of this perfection,
there is no reason why it should not have it in all its possible
fullness instead of imperfectly, partially. It does not make
sense for the ultimate source of a perfection to have it only
imperfectly, incompletely. Furthermore, even to possess it
only partially it would have to determine its own nature to
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participate only so much and no more. This would mean
that it would already have to exist, prior to its own nature,
in some indeterminate state, and then actively determine its
own nature to be this particular limited mode of being. But
it is evident that nothing can pre-exist its own nature, so to
speak, and actively determine its own essence to be what it
is, since it would first have to be an existing determinate
nature in order to perform any action at all. All this makes
no sense. Hence no finite possessor of a perfection can ever
be the ultimate self-sufficient source of a perfection that it
possesses only imperfectly and incompletely.
Every finite being, therefore, by the very fact that it is
finite—i.e., possesses a given perfection in a limited degree—
points beyond itself to an infinite Source which possesses the
same perfection in all its unlimited fullness. Every finite is
thus by its very nature a pointer toward the Infinite. It is an
image, a road marker, that necessarily carries the dynamism
of the mind beyond itself in a search for intelligibility that
can end only with an actual Infinite, from which all finite
degrees of participation ultimately proceed.
Now if we apply this general participation schema to the
basic transcendental perfections which contain no imperfection or limit in their meaning and hence can be applied to
God—such as existence, goodness, love, power, intelligence,
etc.—of which the most fundamental for St. Thomas is existence itself, we find that every finite possessor of these perfections points beyond itself to an Infinite Plenitude-Source of
the same, from which all finite possessors receive these perfections—primarily existence itself—according to the limited nature and capacity of each. There must, therefore, be
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an Infinite Source of existence itself, as the ground of all
other perfections.
(2) Now the second step in the argument, from the Infinite
to the One. This is an easy and quick one, generally admitted
by all metaphysicians who are willing to deal with a qualitative metaphysical infinite at all. It is impossible for there to
be two actually existing absolute infinities of perfection, for
there could be nothing to distinguish them. All duality in
being implies negation: A is not B. But all negation implies
some limitation: one of the two must lack something that
the other has; otherwise they would fuse into one. But then at
least one of the two must be limited. Any positive qualitative
infinity absorbs all other infinities of the same order of perfection into itself. And since we are dealing in the present
case with the ultimate perfection of existence itself, an infinite in the order of existence must be the ultimate, most
absolute infinity of all, excluding all others. We have reached,
therefore, the unique, ultimate, infinite Source of all being,
the ultimate mystery of Plenitude that is also the magnet and
final goal of the entire dynamism of the human spirit, both
intellect and will.
This argument is clearly not an Aristotelian one, for two
reasons. First, because Aristotle’s crucial decision to reject
the whole Platonic doctrine of participation cut off all the
paths by which he could ascend from this lower world to the
divine except through motion. Second, like Plato himself,
Aristotle still considered the finite to be the perfect and the
infinite the imperfect, and thus could not posit the Supreme
Being as infinite. However, as St. Thomas has adapted it
from the various medieval Neoplatonic sources which trans-
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mitted it to him, he has first recast it in a more realistic and
existential mode by applying it to participation in the basic
perfection of existence itself as intensive qualitative act, then
explained the derivation of the finite from the Infinite in
terms of Aristotelian-inspired efficient and not merely exemplary causality, and finally reformulated the general participation schema in terms of a transformed act-potency
composition structure also inspired by Aristotle—so that for
St. Thomas (though not yet for Aristotle), act of itself was
unlimited and could be limited only by reception into some
limiting potency, forming various kinds of act-potency
compositions.
This synthesis of Neoplatonic participation, Aristotelian
act-potency and efficient causality, and his own notion of
existence as intensive act and the core of all perfections, constitute the profoundly original and personal participation
metaphysics of St. Thomas, which I consider as perhaps his
greatest contribution to philosophical thought. This is his
transposition into technical metaphysics of the ancient religious, mystical, and metaphysical vision of the world as
image of God, imperfect and obscure though it may be, up
whose degrees of participated perfection the soul can mount
like a ladder, and then use them as springboard for its final
metaphysical-mystical leap to the Infinite Fontal Source of
the whole, hidden in mystery from our direct gaze but
pointed to by every finite image, which necessarily bears the
mark of its Source upon it, inscribed on its very nature as
only finite.
This Neoplatonic dimension of St. Thomas’s metaphysics
was left somewhat in the shadow by his early disciples, even

................. 16344$

$CH5

01-23-07 15:25:32

PS

PAGE 61

62

The Philosophical Approach to God

in the early phases of the Thomist revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His Aristotelianism was
traditionally stressed, against the ultra-realism of the Platonic
tradition. Even Gilson never seemed quite willing to acknowledge the full extent and import of this dimension in
St. Thomas, never quite going back on his early statement
that St. Thomas had made a basic option for Aristotle and
against Plato.11 There is much truth in the above statement
as to St. Thomas’s epistemology and philosophy of man, but
not as to his metaphysics. From about 1939 on, however,
various researchers, working independently during the war,
began to come out at the same time with impressive scholarly
studies highlighting the central role of participation in St.
Thomas’s metaphysics.12 Since that time, this Neoplatonically inspired aspect of his thought has come more and more
into central focus—although it is not entirely clear how
much this has filtered down to the ordinary philosophical
public which does not specialize in St. Thomas.
Three brief notations before we leave this argument. First,
the argument, though laid out by me at some length in discursive form, may well not be so much a formal-logical
movement of the mind through several distinct and independent premises as a more direct reflective insight into the exigency for the Infinite in every finite, into the imperfectly
imaged presence of the Infinite in every finite. Second, referring
to Tillich’s criticism discussed in this book’s first part, we
note that, as in the case of the inner path through the dynamism of the spirit, this metaphysical ascent through participation has the character not so much of starting from the
absence of God to find Him elsewhere as of progressively
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unveiling to our minds a presence that was always there, but
concealed under the veil of an image. I venture to make the
(I realize) highly controversial suggestion that all objective
metaphysical arguments for the existence of God must eventually pass over one or both of these aforementioned paths,
from the many to the One and from the finite to the Infinite,
if they wish adequately to attain their end. For example, I
myself think the perennial argument from dynamic order in
the world to a transcendent planning Intelligence is a thoroughly sound and effective first step—one which actually
may be enough for most people. But to get all the way to a
single infinite Source of all being and all perfection, I believe
that one must still make the last step across one of these two
bridges, or something similar to them.
It would be wise, I think, in view of my audience, to stop
here for a moment to add a postscript on the use of efficient
causality in this argument.
(1) I am well aware that many post-Kantian philosophers
of religion, including personalists such as Gabriel Marcel,
Neo-Hegelians (following Hegel himself ), and others, are
convinced that the notion of efficient causality has become
so restricted and impoverished by its use in science and in
Humean-Kantian models of extrinsic antecedent-consequent
sequences in time (on the model of Hume’s famous billiard
balls) that it is no longer fitted to express the far more profound and intimate relation of God to the world. Hence
they prefer the language of ‘‘self-communication,’’ or ‘‘selfexpression,’’ to express this relationship, rejecting the language of causality. I have no serious quarrel with this new
‘‘self-communication’’ terminology, as long as the expression
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or communication is sufficiently other than the self expressing itself in them, so as to be somehow distinct in being, and
originates existentially from this self as source. This is an
enriched but almost exact equivalent of the Thomistic metaphysical causality. For St. Thomas, ‘‘every act is by its nature
self-communicative’’ through action, and every act of efficient causality is by its very nature a self-communication and
self-expression, at least in some minimal way. It is connatural
to all action to be a self-revelation of being. What terminology one uses is not crucial; it is the insight behind it that
counts. We would be willing to rephrase what we have developed in the previous pages and say that the world takes its
origin from God as His self-expression. The only difficulty
with using the language of self-expression in the context of
an ascent of the mind to discover the existence of God is the
obvious one that one can hardly speak of the world as the
self-expression of God until one has first discovered that
there is a Self of which the world is an expression. The causal
argument is not subject to such a circle.
(2) Another and much larger group of post-Kantian philosophers, again including many religious thinkers, is unwilling to accept any use of efficient causality which moves from
something given in experience to some cause that lies beyond
the horizon of our human experience—at least of our possible
experience, as some qualify it. Thus many analytic philosophers, following Strawson and others,13 are willing to do descriptive metaphysics—i.e., analysis of the most general
categories of our experience (reflected in our language, of
course), but ban all explanatory metaphysics—i.e., an analysis
which postulates the real existence of explanatory principles
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(causes, etc.) beyond our experience. Anthony Quinton expresses it neatly when he says, ‘‘For a causal inference is only
legitimate if it is at least possible to obtain evidence for the
existence of the cause which is independent of the events it
is said to explain.’’14 Others allow explanatory causal chains
as long as they move in a horizontal series linking one finite,
empirically known being or event to another, but will allow
no vertical causal chain moving from finite to Infinite, from
empirical data to a transempirical, transcendent source.
To my mind, this is an entirely unjustified restriction of
the traditional and much richer classical notion of cause and
causal explanation found in almost all pre-Humean thought
and still clearly dominant in our ordinary, everyday, practical
life, including technology. The restricted notion, derived
from Hume and Kant, presumes that we have built up our
concept of causality from science, from the experience of regular law-governed sequences of antecedent and consequent
events in nature or human activity, which we then link by
a purely mental subjective law of psychological association
(Hume) or an a priori categorical necessity (Kant), then name
the ‘‘cause-effect relation.’’ For Kant, as for Hume, such a
relation can only be validly applied when both terms of the
relation are found in experience and then linked together. It
follows that such a causal relation can never be applied to the
noumenal or real world outside the knower, not even within
the knower to anything beyond the narrow circle of his empirical (sense-given) experience. There is no valid movement
from within experience to anything outside it.
The older metaphysical and everyday concept of efficient
cause and causal explanation is of quite different origin. The
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notion is first grasped indeed in the context of some sequence given in experience, such as moving our own body or
moving other things with our body. But the understanding of
the causal relation has nothing to do with regular repetition
or law. It comes when one understands one term (the cause) as
actively producing the other, as responsible by its action for making
the other term (the effect) come to be (either in whole or in
part), so that without the cause in this particular situation
the effect would not be. This is an active understanding, not
merely a passive reporting of an observation.
The origin of the Greek term for cause (aitia) comes originally not from science but from the law courts, where it
signified the one guilty, or (more generalized) the one responsible for something happening.15 It grew to signify whatever is
actively responsible for some given event or entity needing to
be understood and recognized as not sufficiently intelligible by
itself. Thus a causal explanation was not an observation of
experience but a judgment, based on evidence judged adequate,
which assigns active responsibility for an observed event to a
non-observed cause—not observed, that is, by the judgers, either judge or jury. The notion of efficient cause, therefore,
becomes simply a function of the inquiring mind at work, and its
application just as analogous as the unlimited horizon of this
mind and the relevant questions it judges fit to raise. It is,
like all metaphysical explanations, an at least implicit commitment to the general principle of the intelligibility (in
principle) of all being, tailored to fit the particular situation
needing explanation. It can also be expressed as the Principle
of Sufficient Reason (though not in the strong rationalist
deductive sense of Leibniz): whatever is must have the suffi-
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cient reason or ground of adequate intelligibility for its existence somewhere in the realm of being, either in itself or in
another. But if not in itself, which must first be judged on
adequate evidence, then this sufficient reason must be found
in another real being, which is called its efficient cause.
Thus there is no artificial restriction built into the meaning or application of the notion of cause at all, a restriction
either to regular temporal sequence or to the domain of sensibly experienced or even finite events or entities. Wherever the
mind judges that something needs a further explanation or
grounding of its being, it posits as cause whatever is needed to
be actively responsible for it, together with whatever attributes are needed by the responsible one in order to fulfill its
job description. It is this broadly analogous use of cause and
causal explanation that I have been relying on here, and I
make no apologies for it, to Kant or to anyone else. This is
the fundamental movement of all explanatory metaphysics:
that there are ‘‘must-be’s’’ (relations of intelligible exigency)
woven everywhere into the very fabric of reality which are
not merely explications of the meaning of words.
In fact, Kant himself is guilty of a fundamental incoherence in his own system of thought because of his refusal to
apply causality beyond the realm of sense experience. On the
one hand, he insists that the causal relation is an a priori
category of the mind that can be applied only within the
phenomenal domain of given sensory experience. But on the
other hand he insists with equal vigor that he is not an idealist, that he holds a real noumenal world of things-in-themselves which act upon us, producing our not entirely
indeterminate sense experience within us, since we do not

................. 16344$

$CH5

01-23-07 15:25:34

PS

PAGE 67

68

The Philosophical Approach to God

create our sense data out of whole cloth but receive it first
passively and only then impose our various a priori forms of
sense and intellect upon it. But this is precisely to do what
he says cannot be done: extend the law of causal action and
explanation from what is given within experience to something (the source) outside our horizon of experience—
namely, the thing-in-itself.
He cannot have it both ways. He must either deny the
application of causal explanation beyond experience—then
also deny that we can know that any real world is there at
all to act on us, that we are receptive at all of any kind of given,
sense or otherwise—or he must affirm the real world as active source of our sense data and thus extend causality beyond our experience. Yet he denies he is simply an ‘‘idealist.’’
He should never have gotten himself into this impossible
straightjacket in the first place. And there is no reason for
us, 200 years later, to remain within the artificial prison he
erected for himself by denying with no good evidence that
most fundamental insight of all ancient and medieval metaphysicians as well as everyday practical wisdom—namely,
that all action is of its nature revelatory of the nature of its
agent-source, even if the latter lies itself beyond the range of
our direct experience. Causal explanation, grounded on the
principle that all action is the self-revelation of being (also
its partial concealment, of course) is but another expression
for the mind’s radical openness from within the narrow circle
of its own inner experience to the vast world of the not-yetexperienced—perhaps never experienceable—surrounding
environment of being, insofar as the latter manifests itself as
the necessary support and ground of all experience.
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We have now completed the two basic modes of philosophical discovery of God currently being used by leading NeoThomist schools of thought: the inner path through the
dynamism of the human spirit toward Infinite Being and
Goodness and the cosmic-metaphysical path through participation metaphysics, rising from the many to the One and
from the finite to the Infinite, as ultimate Source of all being.
Now arises the problem of whether we can say anything
more about God than just that He is the ultimate Source of
all, wrapped in a mystery into which we can penetrate no
further. This is the problem which St. Thomas and the
medievals treated under the ‘‘names of God,’’ which for St.
Thomas involves the analogical structure of all our meaningful language about God. There has been a great ongoing
dispute in contemporary philosophical circles as to whether
69
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language about God, insofar as He is a being beyond our
experience, can be meaningful at all, and if so how this is
justified.16 Positivists, empiricists, naturalists, and some types
of analytic philosophers deny that language about God or
about any transcendent being can be meaningful. They refuse
even to discuss arguments for the existence of God: since the
very term in question can be given no meaningful content,
propositions about ‘‘God’’ are neither true nor false, but simply meaningless. Their basic reason is that all meaningful
language about the real world is drawn from a matrix of
human experience, and that to use such language to talk
about a being beyond our experience and not testable in experience is in principle impossible because it is empty of any
content we can understand when applied to such a being.
Nor can the traditional recourse to analogy, as done by
Thomists, be of any help, it is said.17 For an analogous term
is defined as partly the same, partly different when applied
to different subjects (or analogates, as they say). Hence the
term used—e.g., ‘‘intelligence’’—partly shifts in meaning
when applied to God as compared with its meaning when
applied to man. But there’s the rub. The new meaning that
is different because applied to God, precisely because it lies
beyond anything we experience, or can test in experience,
turns out to be empty. Hence what we can understand in the
term ‘‘intelligence’’ applies only to man, whereas what applies
to God in its new use we cannot understand. Consequently, as
applied to God it remains empty and can tell us nothing
meaningful.
But even among contemporary religious thinkers—even
many Christian thinkers, both philosophers and theolo-
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gians—analogy, especially of the technical Thomistic kind,
has fallen on bad days and is rejected by perhaps a majority,
outside Thomists. At least so it seemed to me a few years
ago among the philosophers of religion with whom I am
acquainted. They do not feel that Thomistic analogy is any
real help in solving the problem, either because it remains
too formal and empty, too agnostic, or because it is based
on a dubious metaphysics they cannot accept. Many of these
thinkers, in fact, have abandoned any philosophical attempt
to prove or argue at all for the existence of God or His
attributes. They have recourse instead to faith or revelation,
to suggestive metaphors and symbols or ‘‘veridical parables,’’
to existential disclosure experiences (Ian Ramsey, for example) and the like.
I must say that I deeply sympathize with their dissatisfaction with Thomistic analogy as a tool for speaking about
God, since I find it a sad fact that it is very difficult to find
a good, clear, trustworthy explanation of Thomistic analogy
that makes sense to contemporary thinkers and also does
justice to St. Thomas’s thought. One reason is that around
1960 a rather profound revision of interpretation of analogy
in St. Thomas took place among contemporary Thomistic
scholars, concomitant with and partly resulting from the rediscovery of the notion of participation and its role in his
metaphysics. Thomistic scholars are now generally agreed
that it is impossible to find any one consistent theory of
analogy that fits all the texts of St. Thomas, that his thought
has evolved rather profoundly on this point, and that in particular the doctrine expressed in the early text from the De
Veritate—which was taken as the paradigm structure for inter-
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preting all the others by the great classical Dominican commentator Cardinal Cajetan, and which has set the style for
all the expositions of Thomistic analogy over the last several
centuries—was actually quietly abandoned by St. Thomas
himself in his later works as too agnostic, to be replaced by
a much richer and more metaphysically grounded ‘‘analogy
of causal participation,’’ as it is now called.18
I believe this basic structure of analogical language about
God, based on the participation metaphysics which we have
presented, can be presented with reasonable clarity and brevity, though there will be many loose ends for further discussion. I would like to attempt this now, drawing heavily on a
long article which I wrote for the January 1976 issue of The
Thomist in reply to a full-dress attack on analogy by Kai Nielsen, the well-known atheist who has written widely on the
philosophy of religion.19 Let us proceed step by step.

Meaning and Use of Analogous Language
An analogous term in general is one which is predicated on
several different subjects with a meaning that is partly the
same and partly different, as applied to each. Of the various
kinds of analogies, we are interested here only in those analogous terms which express literally and properly, not metaphorically or by extrinsic denomination, some real intrinsic
similarity found diversely but proportionately in all the analogates. Such analogies are called ‘‘analogies of proper proportionality’’ in traditional Thomistic terminology and are
the only ones which are really useful in metaphysics, especially in speaking about God. They include basic terms such
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as ‘‘existence,’’ ‘‘goodness,’’ ‘‘knowledge,’’ ‘‘activity,’’ ‘‘unity,’’
‘‘beauty,’’ ‘‘power,’’ ‘‘love,’’ etc.
Why do we need such analogous terms in our language?
We need them in order to express the real similarities we discover between different kinds and levels of beings in our
experience. These objective real similarities are not in the
order of forms or essences, strictly speaking, precisely because they range over many different forms and essences.
They are found habitually in the order of activities and of
states which can be assimilated to an act or activity in the
most general sense. The reason why activity-terms lend
themselves to analogous predication, rather than form-terms,
is that the same kind of activity can be performed in quite
different ways by different agents on different levels of being.
Thus power can be exercised by an atom, a plant, a muscle,
a mind, or a will; the modes of exercising it can be radically
different in each case, yet we notice a genuine similarity,
which we wish to express by the unified analogous term
‘‘power.’’ Similarly in the case of knowing, in a worm, a dog,
or a human being, in both his sense and intellectual activities:
the activity is similar, but exercised in a different mode by
each subject to which it is applied. Unity and presence, not
immediately thought of as activities, are nonetheless best understood as the act of cohering, the act of presence-ing, or
presenting oneself, exercised diversely as we run up and down
the scale of being.
The importance of this basic principle cannot be overstressed, although it is more often than not never expressed
at all in traditional expositions of Thomistic analogy. I state
it clearly: all terms expressing a proper analogy of propor-
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tional similarity are action-terms, activity-terms, expressing
some action or activity that can be exercised diversely by
different subjects, proportionate to their natures. Thus even
‘‘unity,’’ if carefully analyzed, turns out to be, not a static
state, but an active cohering, done diversely by different subjects, from material to spiritual.
The next point is that properly analogous terms, at least
the great broad ones that are of use to us in metaphysics and
speaking about God, are systematically vague terms. They elude
all attempts to pin them down in a strict definition. They can
to some extent be defined negatively in what they exclude, but
it is impossible to define them positively save by synonyms
equally as broad and vague. Just try defining ‘‘unity,’’ for
example, as it is found in an atom, a man, a mind, an argument, a family, the universe. Any attempt to do so will at
once narrow its range and destroy its usefulness precisely as
a flexible concept—a stretch-concept, as I like to call it. How
then do we come to know the meaning of such a term? Simply by running up and down the scale of its known examples
and seeing the point, catching the point, of the similarity
it expresses in all. This is a most important point for the
understanding of analogy. A concept or term is not empty
or meaningless simply because it cannot be defined. There is
an indispensable role played in our thought and language by
those systematically vague and elastic terms that alone can
catch the similarities and affinities running all up and down
and across the universe, especially between the realms of matter and spirit, cosmos and psyche. This is the secret life of
the mind nourishing all metaphor, poetry, and art: the insight
into authentic similarities and affinities across the universe.
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It follows from the above that we cannot properly understand the analogous range of a concept and the partial shift
in meaning it undergoes in a particular usage simply by examining the concept by itself. The analogous shift occurs
only as the concept (and term) is actually used in the living
act of judgment when the mind actually applies it to a given
subject and knows what it is doing. No formal analysis of
logical structure can capture this dynamic movement, despite
all the complicated attempts that have been made, even by
such distinguished Thomists as Father Bochenski and James
Ross. In my humble opinion all such attempts are fundamentally misguided. Analogy is found and understood only in
the lived use of concepts and language which takes place in
the act of judgment: ‘‘This plant has unity’’; ‘‘This argument
has unity.’’ It is beyond all formalism and formal analysis,
yet we use analogy quite effortlessly and skillfully many times
a day.

How We Extend an Analogous Term beyond our Present
Experience
So far we have been examining analogical language to express
discovered real similarities within the horizon of our human
experience. But we also learn after a while how to extend
them beyond to take care of new frontiers of experience or
necessary references from within our experience to something
outside it. Thus when Freud first found it necessary to postulate the existence of a subconscious and unconscious dimension of cognitive activity in man and extended the term
‘‘cognition’’ to embrace a new level of reality, it is not that he
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first directly experienced consciously the unconscious, which
would obviously be a contradiction, but rather that from new
effects manifesting themselves in our conscious experience—
similar to the effects of other cognitive activities which we
already know and which are impossible or unfruitful to explain in completely non-cognitive terms—he concluded to
some kind of meaningful similarity between this hidden
source of activity and the conscious modes of cognition we
already know. He quite spontaneously and legitimately extended the analogous range of the term ‘‘knowledge’’ to include this new postulated dimension of reality beyond the
direct reach of our experience. So, too, there is now considerable speculation as to the possible existence of new modes of
physical or psychic forces, so-called psi-forces and the like,
to account for some of the baffling data of parapsychology,
such as precognition, for example. No one knows yet just
what they might be like, or whether they exist at all, but we
have no trouble extending the analogous notion of ‘‘force’’
or ‘‘power’’ to describe this possible new dimension of reality.
So too with notions like ‘‘rational’’ and ‘‘intelligent.’’ We
speculate on the possibilities of contacting some other species of galactic inhabitants, somehow like ourselves, but we don’t
yet know how, in what we can meaningfully call their ‘‘conscious’’ life, as Heisenberg has so insightfully remarked.20
The general rule is this: whenever the mind finds it rationally necessary or fruitful, either under the anticipation of a
possible new dimension of experience or under the pressure
of finding necessary conditions of intelligibility outside our
experience for what we encounter within our experience, it
simply expands its conscious horizon of being as intelligible
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to open up some new determinate beachhead in the already
unlimited, indeterminate horizon of being in which the mind
lives implicitly all the time. This is the very nature of the
inexhaustible dynamism of the human mind, the root whence
all its particular activities flow, as we saw in the first part of
this book: that it should be constantly open and seeking to
expand its conscious possession of the limitless horizon of
being. Thus once the mind has set up a new beachhead of
experienced or postulated intelligibility within being, it immediately envelopes it with its own pre-existent and potentially all-embracing field of analogy. If it judges it necessary
to save the intelligibility of something in our experience by
positing some necessary condition of intelligibility outside
our experience, it posits the latter at once as a real condition
of intelligibility and as necessarily analogous with the rest of
being, in one and the same movement of thought. From the
very beginning of our intellectual life there is a necessary
mutual co-involvement of being, intelligibility, and analogy.
But as soon as we have found it either necessary or fruitful
to expand the application of a particular attribute analogously to some new dimension of reality, we must immediately in the same act purify the meaning-content of this
analogous term, rendering it less determinate and precise so
that its possible range of application will no longer be restricted by its presently experienced range of application. If
the term we first pick is resistant to such inner stretching of
meaning, we seek for another, broader one which will allow
it. This progressive stretching of concepts is going on ceaselessly in our intellectual life, as our experience and our explanatory hypotheses expand.
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But it should be noted that analogy is not itself a way of
discovering anything new, as many mistakenly suppose with
respect to the attributes of God. It is the inquiring mind
itself that leaps ahead first to establish the new beachhead in
being, to whose unrestricted intelligibility it is committed
ahead of time by the very nature of its dynamism of intentionality. Analogy comes along only afterwards to organize the
newly conquered territory and work out the conceptual and
linguistic expression of the bonds of community with the already known. It is a perfectly natural, spontaneous, and valid
movement of the mind to extend thus the analogous range
of its concepts and language, provided it has good reason to set up
the new beachhead in the first place. What is this good reason in
the case of God?

Extension of Analogous Language to God
As we have seen, we have to have a good reason to extend our
analogous language all the way to God, understood philosophically as the Fontal Mystery beyond our direct experience. (The language of mysticism has its own logic, which
we cannot go into here.) What is this good reason for a
Thomist? We are here at the very heart of the authentic
Thomistic doctrine of analogy as applied to God—a point
consistently missed by many critics. There is only one bridge
that enables us to pass over the cognitive abyss between ourselves and God and talk meaningfully about Him in our
terms: the bridge of causal participation, or more simply of
efficient causality, taken with all its implications. If God were
not the ultimate causal Source of all the perfections we find
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in our world, we would have no way of talking meaningfully
about Him at all. It is the causal bond which grounds all
analogous predication about God.
What is there in this relation that forges a bond of community between the effects and their cause? It is the fundamental property of all efficient causality—a doctrine implicit
in Plato but first laid down by Aristotle, echoed with some
reservations by the Neoplatonic tradition, and systematically
exploited by St. Thomas in his participation metaphysics—
that every effect must in some way resemble its cause. Since
all that the effect has comes from its cause and is the gift of
the cause, and since the cause cannot give what it does not
possess, at least in some higher equivalent way, then under
pain of unintelligibility there must be some resemblance between the effect and its cause, at least in the most fundamental order of existence and the latter’s satellite properties, such
as unity.21 That is precisely why the world, as created by
God, has always been considered—and rightly so—as an
image of God, imperfect but still participating in its own
limited way in the infinite plenitude of the divine perfection.
Creation itself, therefore, immediately sets up a bond of
community between the world and God. That is why I find
metaphysically unsatisfactory and refuse to use myself the
description of God given by some mystics and many religious thinkers, following Rudolf Otto: that God is the ‘‘totally Other.’’ I understand what they mean, but I think it is
more accurately expressed by saying that God is ‘‘infinitely
Higher,’’ not ‘‘totally Other’’ than we are. If we took such
total otherness at face value, it would sever entirely the bond
of community, of connatural affinity, between ourselves and
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God. Why then should I wish to be joined in blissful union
with something totally lacking any affinity or resemblance
with anything in me? Total heterogeneity would allow of
no meaningful union. Cut this bond of causal participation
between creature and Creator, and all bonds of ontological
similarity vanish into the mists; with it all meaningful analogical language about God vanishes too. These may seem hard
words for those who have no taste for causal metaphysics in
philosophical theology, but I see no alternative for speaking
about God, save poetic, metaphorical, symbolic language.
This is either going to be empty, excessively anthropomorphic, and without any clear principle of conceptual control,
or, if it does indeed turn out to be truly illuminating, as
carefully chosen metaphorical language certainly can, it seems
to me that it will secretly presuppose the causal bond of
similarity through creation as already given. Any metaphor,
symbolic image, or story that is not underlaid and supported
by some ontological similarity with what it symbolizes evaporates into mere subjective fantasy. Even the language of
Revelation, to be meaningful for us who receive it, must
presuppose and implicitly build upon the community in
being and intelligibility established by the causal bond contained in the notion of creation, even though this may never
have been worked out in an explicit technical metaphysics.
The core of such causal participation metaphysics is already
contained in germ, in fact, in the inexhaustibly rich phrase
of Genesis, which has nourished so deeply the contemplation
and reflection of so many medieval—and modern—mystics
and metaphysicians: ‘‘Let us make man to our own image and
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likeness.’’ I stress the make, the our, and the likeness, the second
two flowing from the first.
If there is one point I would like to highlight in this chapter, it is the capital importance of the ontological bond of
similitude deriving from causal participation as the indispensable metaphysical underpinning for giving meaning to
language about God in Thomistic (and, I do not hesitate to
say, I think any viable) philosophical theology. It is a source
of constant amazement to me how critics of Thomistic analogy, including many Christian thinkers who are good friends
of mine, consistently and habitually omit any mention of the
metaphysical foundation for analogy when they bring up and
discard analogy as an inefficacious tool. All attempts to solve
the problem solely by linguistic strategies, Wittgensteinian
‘‘forms of life’’ and so forth, seem to me doomed in principle
to failure. Cut the bond of causal similitude between God
and creature which, outside direct mystical experience, is our
only bridge across the unfathomable abyss between finite and
Infinite, and there is no path left to the mystery-shrouded
peaks of the farther shore.
Hence the Buddhists are right in not allowing any positive
attributes to be applied to God or the Ultimate Reality. For
Buddha expressly forbade his disciples to raise any questions
about the origin of things, since this would just get them
involved in academic disputes and not help them practically
to relieve suffering, the main point of his teaching. But once
one has removed the bridge of causal similitude between Creator and creatures, there is no way to cross over in our
thought or language the abyss between finite and infinite.
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Which Attributes Can Be Applied to God?
Once we have set up this basic framework of causal similitude between all creatures and God, from which it follows
that there must be some appropriate analogous predicates that
can be extended properly and legitimately to God, the next
step consists in determining just which attributes—in addition
to ones of existence, infinite perfection, and causal power
revealed by the causal argument itself—can allow for openended extension all the way up the scale of being, even to
the mode of Infinite Plenitude, without losing their unity of
meaning. This is the search for the ‘‘simple or pure perfections,’’ as St. Thomas calls them, which are purely positive
qualitative terms that do not contain as part of their meaning
any implication of limit or imperfection. Once we have located one of these, even though we enter into its meaning in
first discovering it through the limited and imperfect modes
belonging to the things we find in our experience, what we
intend or mean directly by the concept, when we have purified
or enlarged it for good reasons into an analogous concept, is
a flexible, broadly but not totally indeterminate core of
purely positive meaning that transcends all its particular possible modes—both those we know and those we do not
know.
We can recognize that we have effected this purification
when we can meaningfully affirm, as we certainly do, that all
the experienced modes of these open-ended perfections, such
as unity, knowledge, love, and power, are limited, not-yet-perfect modes. For to affix the qualification ‘‘limited or imperfect’’ to any instance of an attribute is already to imply that
our understanding of this attribute transcends all the limiting
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qualifiers we have just added to it. Any attribute that cannot
survive this process of purification or negation of all imperfection and limitation in its meaning without some part of
its very meaning being cancelled out does not possess enough
analogical ‘‘stretch’’ to allow its predication of God. The
judgment as to when this does or does not happen is of
course a delicate one that requires careful critical reflection,
along with sensitivity to the existential connotations of the
use of the term in a given historical culture.22
Two types of attributes have been sifted out as meeting
the above requirements by the reflective traditions of metaphysics, religion, and theology: (1) those attributes whose
meaning is so closely linked with the meaning and intelligibility of being itself that no real being is conceivable which
could lack them and still remain intelligible—i.e., the socalled absolutely transcendental properties of being, such as unity,
activity, goodness, and power—and (2) the relatively transcendental properties of being, which are so purely positive in meaning and so demanding of our unqualified value-approval that,
even though they are not co-extensive with all being, any
being higher than the level at which they first appear must
be judged to possess them—hence a fortiori the highest
being—under pain of being less perfect than the beings we
already know, particularly ourselves: such are knowledge
(particularly intellectual knowledge), love, joy, freedom, and
personality, at least as understood in Western cultures.

The Absolutely Transcendental Properties
Once established that God exists as supreme, infinitely perfect
Source of all being, it follows that every attribute that can be
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shown to be necessarily attached to or flow from the very
intelligibility of the primary attribute of being itself must necessarily be possessed in principle, without any further argument, by this supreme Being, under pain of its not being at
all, let alone not being the supreme instance. Thus it is inconceivable that there should exist any being that is not in its own
proportionate way one, its parts, if any, cohering into one and
not dispersed into unrelated multiplicity. Hence God must be
supremely one. Such all-pervasive properties of being are few,
but charged with value-significance: e.g., unity, intelligibility,
activity, power, goodness—in the broadest ontological sense
as having some perfection in itself and being good for something, if only itself—and probably beauty too.
Since these properties are so general and vague or indeterminate in their content—deliberately so, to allow for their
completely open-ended spectrum of application—we derive
from this inference no precise idea or representation at all as
to what this mode of unity and so forth will be like in itself.
But we do definitely know this much: that this positive qualitative attribute or perfection (in St. Thomas’s general metaphysical sense of the term as any positive quality) is really
present in God and in the supreme degree possible. Such
knowledge, though vague, is richly value-laden and is therefore
a guide for value-assessment and for value-responses of worship, love, and the like. What we know with certainty is that
God must be Number 1 in all these attributes, hence eminently worthy of our unique adoration and veneration.

The Relatively Transcendental Properties
There is a second genre of transcendental attributes of being
that are richer in content and of more immediate interest and
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relevance in speaking about God. These are terms that express positive qualitative attributes having a floor or lower
limit but no ceiling or upper limit, and hence are understood
to be properties belonging necessarily to any and all beings
above a certain level of perfection. Their range is transcendental indefinitely upward but not downward. Such are
knowledge, consciousness (especially self-consciousness and
intellectual knowledge), love, joy (bliss, happiness—i.e., the
conscious enjoyment of good possessed), and similar derivative properties of personality in the widest purely positive
sense—not the restrictive sense it has in many Oriental traditions. All such attributes reveal themselves to us as ‘‘pure
perfections’’ once—and only if—we come to recognize them
as totally positive values in themselves, no matter how imperfectly we happen to possess them here and now. As such,
they demand our unqualified approval as unconditionally better
to have than not to have. Hence we cannot affirm that any
being that exists higher than ourselves, a fortiori the supremely
perfect being that God must be, does not have these perfections in its own appropriate mode. To conceive of some
higher being as, for example, lacking self-consciousness in
some appropriate way—i.e., being simply blacked out in unconsciousness—would be for us necessarily to conceive this
being as lower in perfection than ourselves. Nor is there any
escape in the well-known ploy that this might merely mean
inconceivable for us but in reality might actually be the case,
for all we know. The reason is that to affirm that some states
of affairs might really be the case is to declare it in some way
conceivable, at least with nothing militating against its possibility. This we simply cannot do with such purely positive
perfection-concepts.
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What happens in our use of the concepts, as soon as we
know or suspect for good reasons that there exists some
being higher than ourselves, is that even though our discovery
of their meaning has been from our experience of them in
limited degree, we immediately detach them from restricting
links with our own level, make them more purified and indeterminate in content, and project them upward along an
open-ended ascending scale of value-appreciation. This is not a
logical but an existential move, hooking up the inner understanding of the conceptual tools we use with the radical
open-ended dynamism of the intellect itself. One way we can
experience this power of projection of perfections or valueattributes beyond our own level is by experiencing reflectively
our own poignant awareness of the limitations and imperfection of these attributes as we possess them now, even though
we have not yet experienced the existence of higher beings.
We all experience keenly the constricting dissatisfaction and
restlessness we feel over the slowness—the fuzzy, piecemeal
character—of our knowing and our intense longing the further we advance in wisdom for an ideal mode of knowledge
beyond our present reach. The very fact that we can judge
our present achievement as limited and imperfect implies that we
have reached beyond it by the implicit dynamism of our
minds and wills. To know a limit as limit is already in principle to have reached beyond it in dynamic intention, though
not yet in conceptual representation. This point has for long
been abundantly stressed by the whole Transcendental Thomist school, not to mention Hegel and others, who bring
out that the radical dynamism of the spirit indefinitely tran-
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scends all finite determinate conceptual expressions or temporary stopping places.
The knowledge given by such projective or pointing concepts, expressing analogous attributes open-ended at the top,
is again very vague and indeterminate, yet charged with far
richer determination and value-content than the more universal transcendental attributes applying to all being, high or
low. By grafting the affirmation of these attributes, as necessarily present in their appropriate proportionate mode in
God, on to the lived inner dynamism of our spirits longing
for ever fuller consciousness, knowledge, love (loving and
being loved), joy, and so forth, these open-ended concepts,
affirmed in the highest degree possible of God, can serve as
very richly charged value-assessment guides for our valueresponses of adoration, reverence, love, and longing for
union.
But note here again that the problem of the extension of
analogous concepts beyond the range of our experience cannot be solved by logical or conceptual analysis alone, but
only by inserting these concepts into the context of their
actual living use within the unlimitedly open-ended, supraconceptual dynamism of the human spirit (intellect and will)
existentially longing for a fullness of realization beyond the
reach of all determinate conceptual grasp or representation.
Thomistic analogy makes full sense only within such a total
notion of the life of the spirit as knowing/loving dynamism.
The knowledge given by these analogous concepts applied to
God, therefore, though extremely indeterminate, is by no
means empty. It is filled in by a powerful cognitive-affective
dynamism involving the whole human psyche and spirit,

................. 16344$

$CH6

01-23-07 15:25:41

PS

PAGE 87

88

The Philosophical Approach to God

which starts from the highest point we can reach in our own
knowing, loving, and joy, from the best in us, then proceeds
to project upward along the line of progressive ascent from
lower levels toward an apex hidden from our vision at the
line’s end. We give significant meaning to this invisible apex
precisely by situating it as the apex of a line of unmistakable
direction upward. This delivers to us, through the mediation
(not representation) of the open-ended analogous concept—an obscure, vector-like, indirect, non-conceptual, but
recognizably positive knowledge-through-love—through the
very upward movement of the dynamic longing of the spirit
toward its own intuitively felt connatural good: a knowledge
‘‘through the heart,’’ as Pascal puts it; or through ‘‘connatural
inclination,’’ as St. Thomas would have it.23 Such an affective
knowledge-through-connatural-inclination is a thoroughly
human kind of knowing, quite within the range of our own
deeper levels of experience, as all lovers and artists (not to mention religious people) know. Yet it is a mode of knowing
that has hitherto been much neglected in our contemporary
logically and scientifically oriented epistemology.

Conclusion
To sum up, analogous knowledge of God—as understood in
its whole supporting metaphysical context of (1) the dynamism of the human spirit, transcending by its intentional
thrust all its own limited conceptual products along the way,
and (2) the structure of causal participation or causal similitude between God and creatures—delivers a knowledge that
is intrinsically and deliberately vague and indeterminate, but
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at the same time richly positive in content. For such concepts
serve as positive signposts, pointing vector-like along an ascending spectrum of ever higher and more fully realized perfection, and can thus fulfill their main role as guides for
significant value-responses, both contemplative and practical.
Such knowledge, with the analogous terms expressing it, is
(and by the nature of the case is supposed to be) a chiaroscuro
of light and shadow, of revelation and concealment, as Heidegger would say, that alone is appropriate to the luminous
Mystery which is in its ultimate object—a Mystery which
we at the same time judge that we must reasonably affirm, yet
whose precise mode of being remains always beyond the
reach of our determinate representational images and concepts, but not beyond the dynamic thrust of our spirit which
can express this intentional reach only through the openended flexible concepts and language we call analogous.
Such concepts cannot be considered ‘‘empty’’ save in an
inhumanly narrow epistemology. What critics who make this
charge consistently and strangely overlook is that, though
our analogous knowledge of God does not provide us with
any clear mental representation or insight as to the manner or
way in which God possesses the perfections we attribute to
Him for good reasons, what it does do is inform us with
unambiguous clarity and precision as to His rank on the scale
of value and perfection—namely, that He is Number One,
the supreme peak in all orders of perfection. It is this knowledge which is, after all, the most essential and fruitful for the
principal religious purposes that thought and language about
God are called on to serve. Thus for purposes of reverence,
worship, love, hope, and longing, it is not necessary for us to
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know exactly what God’s wisdom, love, goodness, or power
are like in themselves; it is enough to know that He is supreme on the scale of these values, and for this reason eminently and uniquely worthy of our unqualified worship, love,
hope, and desire for union with Him. Such luminous precision in the order of value-knowledge is far from empty or
sterile: it is life-guiding and life-inspiring in the highest
degree.
Could we reasonably ask more of a philosophical knowledge of God?
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Christian Theism and Whiteheadian Process
Philosophy: Are They Compatible?
There is little doubt that during the last few years the principal challenge
to traditional Christian theism has come from Process philosophy and
theology, which has continued to show itself as one of the most lively
and creative movements in contemporary philosophical and religious
thought.1 A growing number of Catholic thinkers have also been drawing
inspiration from the writings of this school.2 But I have the impression
that some of the latter, especially theologians, are a little incautious in
speaking of themselves as ‘‘Process theologians,’’ or as ‘‘using Process
philosophy,’’ taking the latter rather vaguely and generally as thinking
about God in dynamic terms, without fully realizing all the implications
involved in taking on the whole Process philosophical system as such.
Hence it seems timely to propose some initial and tentative reflections
on just how far Process philosophy and traditional Christian theism—
especially as found in the Catholic tradition—are really compatible, or
whether there are still some irreducible differences between the two.
Let me begin by summing up briefly the general position I will develop here. On the one hand, Process thought contains a number of basic
insights that can and should be fruitfully recognized by Christian theism.
On the other hand, Process thought as a system, at least in its principal
presently established forms—the systems of Alfred North Whitehead
and Charles Hartshorne—is still in serious tension, if not incompatibility, with traditional Christian theism on several key points, both philosophical and theological, with respect to the nature of God and His
relations with the world. It would be unwise, however, to lay down any
unbridgeable incompatibilities of principle with future possible developments of the Process stream of thought, since it itself is in full process
of evolution, to which it is committed in principle.3
A very significant evolution has in fact already taken place. With
some notable exceptions, such as Charles Hartshorne, the early Whiteheadian disciples tended to form a closed school interested mainly in the
internal creation and clarification of the system rather than in creative
adaptations. When confronted with incompatibilities between the system and traditional Christian teaching, many Whiteheadians tended to
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bend their theology to fit their philosophy rather than adapt their philosophy to their theology, as has always been the hallmark of the great
orthodox Christian theologians of the past. Now that the main lines of
the system have been tied down with some general consensus, this ‘‘scholastic period,’’ as some have called it, is for the most part over. NeoWhiteheadians are springing up everywhere, especially among Christian
theologians and philosophers, who exhibit a new spirit of creative adaptation, even significant revision, of the system where they feel it necessary
to fit their Christian belief or human experience. Catholic thinkers can
only welcome this trend, since it promises a much more open and creative context for fruitful dialogue to the enrichment of both parties. All
that we say hereafter must be understood in this open-ended context
of development among sincere Christians who seek to understand their
faith.
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Is God Creator of the Universe? Whitehead’s
Position

God is not, in the original Whiteheadian system, the Creator
of the universe out of nothing—i.e., out of no pre-existing
material or subject.4 The universe is an ongoing system which
has always been and always will be. God does indeed play an
indispensable role in this world system, in four ways: (1) as
source of the ‘‘eternal objects,’’ the possible intelligible forms
or structures which He holds eternally in His mind and presents at the appropriate time for integration by the momentary
‘‘actual occasions’’ or events (also called ‘‘actual entities’’),
which alone are real agents outside God Himself; (2) as providing the initial ‘‘subjective aim’’ or ideal goal of each newly
arising actual occasion; (3) as providentially guiding the universe toward the greatest possible realizable value, not by
determining or coercing creatures through efficient causality,
but by ‘‘luring’’ them with the persuasive power of the good;
93
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(4) as eternally preserving in His memory the objectified values achieved by the successively perishing actual entities.
But God is not the ultimate source of the very being of
the universe, or even, it seems, of its universal built-in character of self-creativity, for two reasons. In the first place, God’s
activity always presupposes the universe as somehow already
present, at least in inchoate form, as subject of His action, as
something He can lure to the good by presenting form and
goal, but of which He is not the ultimate source and hence
over which He does not possess absolute control. The situation is close to that of the Platonic Demiurge, which injects
forms into pre-existing chaotic matter and which Whitehead
explicitly recalls as his basic model. Thus he excludes any
theory of the absolute beginning of the universe or of any
one ultimate source for all reality. A few texts from Whitehead himself will make this clear:
There is another point in which the organic philosophy
[Whitehead’s] only repeats Plato. In the Timaeus, the origin
of the present cosmic epoch is traced back to an aboriginal
disorder, chaotic according to our ideals. This is the evolutionary doctrine of the philosophy of organism. Plato’s
notion has puzzled critics who are obsessed with the Semitic notion of a wholly transcendent God creating out of
nothing an accidental universe . . . it is necessary to remind
ourselves that this is not the way the world has been described by some of the greatest intellects. Both for Plato
and Aristotle the process of the actual world has been
conceived as a real incoming of forms into real potentiality, issuing into that real togetherness which is an actual
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thing. Also, for the Timaeus, the creation of the world is the
incoming of a type of order establishing a cosmic epoch. It
is not the beginning of matter of fact, but the incoming
of a certain type of social order5 . . . the doctrine of an
aboriginal, eminently real, transcendent creator, at whose
fiat the world came into being, and whose imposed will it
obeys, is the fallacy which has infused tragedy into the
histories of Christianity and Mahometanism.6
Because God gives the initial subjective aim to each new
actual occasion, God can be termed the creator of each
temporal actual entity. But the phrase is apt to be misleading by its suggestion that the ultimate creativity of the
universe is to be ascribed to God’s volition. The true
metaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action. . . . But of course there is
no meaning to ‘‘creativity’’ apart from its ‘‘creatures,’’ and
no meaning to ‘‘God’’ apart from the creativity and the
‘‘temporal creatures,’’ and no meaning to the temporal
creatures apart from ‘‘creativity’’ and ‘‘God.’’7
Elsewhere Whitehead adds that we should not pay God
the dubious ‘‘metaphysical compliment’’ of being ‘‘the foundation for the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity.’’ For if this were the case, ‘‘there can be no alternative
except to discern in Him the origin of all evil as well as of
all good. He is then the supreme author of the play, and to
Him must therefore be ascribed its shortcomings as well as
its successes.’’8 Thus God is not the ultimate initiator of the
cosmic drama with all its players, nor, especially, does He
initiate and carry it on by an act of free volition. God and
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the world are necessary mutual collaborators forever, by the
very nature of each: ‘‘metaphysics requires that the relationships of God to the world should lie beyond the accidents
of will, and that they be founded upon the necessities of the
nature of the world.’’9
The second reason why Whitehead cannot accept the strict
interpretation of creation out of nothing is closely linked
with the first. It is because each actual occasion (or actual
entity) is a self-creative act—not entirely out of nothing, but as
a novel autonomous integration of the prior actual occasions
in its environment which present themselves to it for selective prehension (these data for decision include God’s own
presentation of ideal form and goal). ‘‘Creativity,’’ which is
really self-creativity, is a universal attribute of all actual entities, of which God is the supreme but not the only instance.
This concrete act of self-creative integration, which constitutes the very subjective being (⳱ becoming) of each actual
occasion, must, insofar as it is a concrete existential act, be
its own act and not received from another. At best God might
be called ‘‘co-creator’’ of each actual occasion, in that He
provides the initial subjective aim to guide the entity’s own
self-creative act. Creativity is not concentrated in God alone,
nor does it seem to derive from Him alone (as we shall see,
this point might be open to a different interpretation or at
least adaptation of Whitehead), but is shared among all actual entities, from the lowest to the highest, and necessarily
from the very nature of things, not from any free volition on
God’s part. As Whitehead puts it,
In this way an actual entity satisfies Spinoza’s notion of
substance: it is causa sui. The creativity is not an external
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agency with its own ulterior purposes. All actual entities
share with God this characteristic of self-causation. For
this reason every actual entity also shares with God the
characteristic of transcending all other actual entities, including God.10
And Lewis Ford comments:
From the standpoint of Christian concerns Whitehead’s metaphysics is most distinctive in that it is a philosophy of creation which does not identify creative power
exclusively with God. Instead of distinguishing between a
creator who is uncreated and creatures who do not create,
Whitehead conceives of all actualities, including God, as
self-created. . . . Creativity is the underlying dynamic activity enabling each actuality to create itself, but this creativity is not actual in and of itself, only in its particular
instantiations. The role of God is not to supply this creativity but the actuality’s ideal of itself (the initial subjective aim) which functions as the principle of selective
appropriation of past causes.11
Lewis Ford goes on to explain elsewhere, very perceptively, why, according to his mind, Whitehead cannot accept
a strict doctrine of divine creation.12 Take, for example, a
free act. It would make sense—say, in a Thomistic system—
for God to create a free agent which then produced its own
free act from within by its own power (supported, if need
be, but not determined by God). But this would imply a
distinction between subject or agent and act which a Whiteheadian could not accept without going back to the old sub-
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stance-accident doctrine. For him, there is no distinction
between the agent and its act. There is no other being of the
free agent save the momentary free act itself. The agent is its
act. On the other hand, it would not make sense to say that
God created the free act itself of another being, for then He
Himself would be responsible for the act and it would no
longer be the free act of another. Hence, just as the act of
any agent must be its own, if it is free, and cannot be given
to it ready-made by God or anyone else, so the very being of
the free agent for Whitehead, since its being is identical with
its act, must be causa sui and not given by anyone else, even
God—though God can contribute to it and cooperate with
it. It follows that in the Whiteheadian system it is impossible
for God to create any free agent.
Furthermore, we can push the argument all the way to
include all actual entities. For since every actual occasion for
Whitehead is a novel, not entirely predetermined act of selfintegration, it contains something analogous to freedom
within it. Hence none of them could have been created by
God. In a word, if all actual entities are nothing but their acts,
one actual entity for each act, and even God cannot directly
create the act, let alone the free act, of another being, then
God cannot create any actual entities at all. If God were a
creator, He could directly create only agents, not acts. (As
we shall see later, there may be another alternative to this
neat and tight argument against the possibility of creation for
Whitehead, in that he himself carefully limits the meaning
of self-creation and distinguishes it from the prior initial
constitution of the new subject by the inflow of God and
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the surrounding world, from which point the creative selfintegrating act of the subject then takes off.)

Conflict with the Traditional Christian Notion of Creation
It seems evident enough from all these texts, especially the first
set, that Whitehead is quite explicitly and self-consciously
rejecting what he understands to be the traditional Christian
conception of God as radical ultimate source of the universe,
bringing it into being out of nothing in an absolute beginning, by His own free creative act of will. In so doing he is
returning to an older Platonic primal dualism of God and
the world, in its aspect of primal raw material or multiplicity
to be brought from chaos to order—neither of these two
poles being ultimately responsible for the origin or total
being of the other. The only ultimate source of unity in the
universe—if there is one at all (there was none in Plato)—
seems to be pushed back even beyond God to an inscrutable,
necessary, and eternal amorphous force of ‘‘creativity’’ or
self-creativity (of which God is the primary and highest instance, but not, it seems, the ultimate source): a force which
carries strong overtones of the ancient Greek ananke, or necessity, to which Plato himself appeals. We shall see later how
the implicit resources of Whitehead’s own system will allow
contemporary Neo-Whiteheadians to take quite a different
position on this point.
This conception of God’s relation to the world falls short
of the traditional Judaeo-Christian belief in God as the radical Creator or Ultimate Source of the very being of the universe with all its components—a belief professed clearly by
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all major Christian creeds: ‘‘I believe in one God, the Father
almighty, Creator of heaven and earth . . .’’ From the early
Church Fathers down to the present, this has always been
interpreted as meaning creation out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo)—i.e., initiating the being of the world out of no preexisting subject or matter. It is true that the Biblical texts
themselves contain no explicit metaphysical statements such
as ‘‘creation out of nothing.’’ But the early Fathers, from the
second century on, quickly agreed on this interpretation as
what distinguished their doctrine from that of the pagans.13
Thus St. Theophilus of Antioch, writing as early as a.d. 181,
explicitly repudiates the doctrine of the ‘‘Platonists’’ that
matter itself was not created by God but is eternally coeval
with Him as that out of which He made the world:
But if both God and matter are ungenerated, then God
is no longer the creator of all things, according to the
Platonists. . . . But the power of God is shown forth in
this, that he made out of nothing whatsoever he wished.
. . . And so in the first place all the prophets have taught
with complete consensus that God created all things out
of nothing.14
This doctrine was agreed upon so unanimously by all,
heretics included, that the early Church councils, directed
primarily against Trinitarian and Christological heresies,
found no need to explain and define the point explicitly. But
in the thirteenth century the resurgence of new forms of
Manicheanism brought about a formal definition of the doctrine, in 1215, in the Fourth Lateran Council—an ecumenical
one—where God is defined as ‘‘Creator of all things, visible

................. 16344$

$CH7

01-23-07 15:25:39

PS

PAGE 100

Is God Creator of the Universe? Whitehead’s Position

101

and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who, by his almighty
power, from the beginning of time has created both orders
in the same way out of nothing, the spiritual or angelic world
and the corporeal or visible universe.’’15 The same teaching
was repeated in later councils, down to the Second Vatican
Council in the twentieth century.16 Thus the doctrine of the
initial creation of all things out of nothing is not merely one
theological interpretation put forward by some particular
theological school or schools, but a basic pillar of orthodox
Christian faith, in both Eastern and Western Churches, for
all who accept the teaching authority of the Church, unanimous on this point from its earliest days, in both East and
West. It should be carefully noted, however, that in no fully
authoritative document of the Church (decrees of councils,
for example) is there any further determination of what is
meant by ‘‘from the beginning of time.’’ Whether this positively excludes interpretation in all possible Whiteheadian
senses might still be open for theological and philosophical
discussion.

Metaphysical Difficulties
In addition to being incompatible with traditional Christian
belief in God as creator, Whitehead’s rejection of an initial
creation of the world out of nothing runs into serious metaphysical difficulties. On the one hand, as we have said above,
it brings us back to an older Platonic primal dualism of God
against the world (in the latter’s aspect of primal raw material
or multiplicity to be brought from chaos into order), where
neither of these two primal poles is ultimately responsible for
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the other. What then is the ultimate source or explanation of
the unity of the universe, of why its two correlative poles,
God and the multiplicity of the world, are attuned to each
other so as to make up a single system, since neither one
ultimately derives all its being from the other? If there is to
be any ultimate source of unity in the universe at all—which
is dubious, just as it was for Plato—it seems to be pushed
back beyond even God to an inscrutable, faceless, amorphous
force of creativity which is just there, everywhere in the universe, as a primal fact with no further explanation possible—a kind of generalized necessity of nature, with striking
similarities to the ancient Greek ananke. It should be remembered, too, that creativity for Whitehead is not an actuality
in and for itself, but only a generalized abstract description
of what is a matter of fact instantiated in every actual occasion of the universe. Creativity seems to be an ultimate primordial many, with no unifying source.
But not only is this doctrine in any of its forms not a
Christian one, it also suffers from all the irreparable deficiencies of any ultimate dualism or multiplicity not rooted
in the prior unity of creative mind. This lacuna in Plato was
quickly recognized by the post-Platonic schools of Neoplatonism, culminating in the great synthesis of Plotinus, who
considered himself as only completing the unfinished business of Plato by his doctrine of emanation of all reality from
the One, including matter itself. Whitehead has turned our
metaphysical clocks back not only to a pre-Christian but to
a pre-Neoplatonic position, thus cancelling out one of the
most decisive metaphysical steps forward in Western thought.
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Even aside from the question of how to ground the unity
of the system of the universe, with its two intrinsically correlated poles, God and the world, there remains another difficulty: if all creativity does not ultimately derive from God,
why does this creativity continue to spring forth endlessly
and inexhaustibly, all over the universe, in each new actual
occasion, from no actually existing source? For creativity is
not, as Lewis Ford insists, an actuality in and of itself, but
merely a generalized description of the primal fact that it
does spring up in each new actual occasion. It is not itself a
source because it is not in itself an already existing concrete
actuality. Hence the individual bursts of self-creativity which
characterize each newly arising actual entity, and which are
the only ground or referent for the term ‘‘creativity,’’ seem
literally to emerge out of nothing insofar as their actual existence (⳱ becoming) is concerned, with no prior ground for
their actuality whatsoever—though there is prior ground for
their formal elements. Why this creativity should bubble up
unfailingly and inexhaustibly all over the universe through
endless time, with no active causal influx or gift of actuality
from another already existing actual entity, remains a total
enigma—one that is not simply a mystery to us at present,
but in principle rebuffs any further penetration by intelligence, since there is no more ultimate ground.17
Lewis Ford, one of the most representative Process thinkers in America, has responded to this objection by stating
that once this first step is granted everything else falls into
place, and that this is the most one can ask of an initial
metaphysical principle. It seems to me, however, that the
price of this initial enigma is too high. The doctrine of cre-
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ativity is admittedly obscure and undeveloped in Whitehead.
But until this difficulty is cleared up, the process theory of
God remains both theologically and philosophically inadequate to express either the traditional Christian conception
of God as creator—i.e., Ultimate Source of the very existence
of the universe, as well as of its intelligible structures—or
the metaphysical exigencies of an ultimate ground for the
unity of the universe. An infinitely fragmented force of creativity cannot be an authentic ultimate, precisely because it
is actually a many, and only abstractly one.
(To his great credit, however, in his later years, after the
first edition of this book, Lewis Ford has suggested that a
creative adaptation of Whitehead can be and should be
made, according to which God becomes the ultimate Source
of all creativity, which he then actively shares with all other
beings. This would go far towards healing one of the basic
gaps in the internal unity of the system.)
We find ourselves here in the presence of what seems to
many of us the most radical metaphysical opposition between
Whitehead and St. Thomas—and, it seems to me, on St.
Thomas’s side, most of the great metaphysicians in history,
both Eastern and Western. In St. Thomas there is an absolute priority of the One over the many, so that the many is
unqualifiedly derivative from and dependent on the One, in
an asymmetrical relation. In Whitehead, there is in the last
analysis an original priority of the many over the One.18 No matter
how much Whiteheadians may insist that the One brings
into unity the many—that the One and the many are intrinsically correlative to each other, so that neither is prior to the
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other—it remains unalterable that the unity of synthesis is a
later or secondary ontological moment (not necessarily temporal).
The original or primordial ontological contribution of
each side of the correlation of God and world is radically
and ultimately independent of the other. God is not responsible
for there being a many at all—i.e., the basic ‘‘raw material’’
for there being a world to be brought into order at all. He is
not even responsible for its primordial potentiality to be ordered; nor, obviously, is the world responsible for there being
a God with the power to order it. This is true even in the
primordial nature of God with respect to the infinite set of
‘‘eternal objects’’ or formal pattern-models of order and value
which He eternally envisages and draws upon to lure the
world into harmony, like the Platonic Demiurge which
Whitehead takes as his explicit inspiration. Though the determinate ordering of these pure formal ideal possibilities is
due to His creative initiative, still the primordial presence of
some quasi-indeterminate reservoir of not yet integrated formal possibilities is not itself generated by the divine creative
act but—vague and obscure as its status is in Whitehead—
remains an ultimate given of independent origin even for the
divine mind and power.19
Though this ultimate reservoir of the many in the order
of forms does not possess full actual existence as actual entities, still they possess some kind of primordial being of their
own as their own contribution of raw material for the act of
divine ordering into a determinate world of possibilities.
Again the many has radical priority, since the duality of God
and world, God and possibles, is itself an ultimate original
many. Thus there is no explanation finally of why both sides
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of this correlation are originally present at all, nor (another
serious difficulty often overlooked) is there any reason given
why there should be a positive affinity of one for the other—
i.e., a positive aptitude or intrinsic capacity in one to be ordered
by the other. Thus neither the original presence or givenness of
the two sides of the correlation One/many (God/world)
nor their intrinsic tendency and capacity to mutual correlation is
given any explanation or ground. The many—at least in the
sense of this initial duality of component terms—retains absolute priority, grounded in no prior or deeper unity.
But practically all of the great metaphysicians of the past,
East and West, except Plato and Aristotle, have agreed on at
least this: that every many must ultimately be grounded in
some more primordial and ultimate One. A many makes no
sense at all unless there is some common ground or property
(existence, goodness, actuality, creativity) shared by each,
without which they could not be compared or correlated at
all. Nor can any many be intrinsically oriented toward order
and synthesis unless some ultimate unitary/ordering mind
first creatively thought up within itself this primordial correlation and affinity and implanted it in the many from one
source. Not only all actual order, but all ultimate possibility
of order must be grounded in a One, and in a Mind. As St.
Thomas often put it, following the ancient ‘‘Platonic way’’
(via Platonica), ‘‘Wherever there is a many possessing some
one real common property, there must be some one ultimate
source for what the many hold in common; for it cannot be
because things are many (not one) that they share something
one.’’20 Thus either we leave the many and its correlation
with the One ultimately ungrounded, with no attempt at

................. 16344$

$CH7

01-23-07 15:25:42

PS

PAGE 106

Is God Creator of the Universe? Whitehead’s Position

107

intelligible explanation at all, or else we must have recourse
to some further hidden ultimate principle of unity. But this
would require for Whitehead recourse either to some ultimate inscrutable principle of blind necessity or to some further God hidden behind his God—hardly Whitehead’s cup
of tea.
In sum, despite Lewis Ford’s insistence that the primordiality of the many as co-equal with the One is one of Whitehead’s unique new contributions to modern metaphysics,21
the fact that it is new does not make it viable. In the last
analysis, what is missing from Whiteheadian metaphysics is
that it remains content with Plato’s Demiurge without pushing on to the underlying doctrine of the One or the Good,
which Plato himself finally saw had to be the last word and
which Plotinus carried all the way to its implicit consequences—the origin of matter from the One.
I am delighted, however, to learn that in these later years,
after the publication of the first edition of the present book,
Lewis Ford has been more and more willing to concede that
creativity is not simply an independent force on its own, but
may be said to be an original gift from God to all other
beings, thus strengthening the unitary source of the universe.
This would be a significant step toward healing the original
unreduced dualism of the system and open a more fruitful
dialogue with traditional Thomistic metaphysics.

The Response of the Whiteheadians
Process philosophers, especially theologians, are by no means
unaware of these difficulties.22 They are generally willing to
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admit that the Whiteheadian conception of God as ‘‘cocreator’’ or collaborator with the universe differs significantly
from the traditional Christian interpretation. Some conclude
that the latter, especially as it includes the notion of an absolute beginning, is a mythological image which should be
dropped. Such a response, however, simply wipes out a large
part of the unanimous Christian tradition on this point and
can hardly be acceptable for orthodox Christians. Others,
like John Cobb, wish to push the Process conception closer
to the tradition by drawing out the implications of the
Whiteheadian doctrine that God alone gives the initial subjective aim to each new actual occasion. Since this constitutes
the initial phase of the latter’s being/becoming, it might be
likened to an initial gift of being, as an overflow from the
divine creativity.23 At least it makes God the indispensable
primary initiator of every new entity, the One without whom
the universe would not be.
Why could this not be a somewhat new but still orthodox
interpretation of the Biblical datum of creation? If it meant
that giving the initial subjective aim to each new actual entity
includes giving the dynamic thrust or energy to pursue this
goal, we might have a more acceptable interpretation. In this
case the self-creativity of the created actual occasion would
consist only in how it would use the creative energy given it
by God to integrate in its own novel way the environment
presented it to pursue its subjective aim. But if it meant that
God gave only the formal determination of the subjective
aim and its drawing power as a final cause or good, but not
the actual energy to pursue it, we would still be faced with
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the emergence out of nothing of the entity’s actuality or actual power.
There is, however, another, much more promising line of
approach now being advanced by a number of younger NeoWhiteheadian Christian philosophers and theologians, who
propose that there is a positive overflow, an actual causal
influx, both from God and from the neighboring perishing
actual entities, by which the living current of creativity is
passed on before or just as the immediately preceding actual
entities pass away. To back this up, appeal is made to Whitehead’s too-little-exploited terms such as ‘‘transitional creativity,’’ ‘‘transference of energy,’’ and ‘‘transmission of energy.’’
The ‘‘self-creativity’’ or causa sui aspect of the newly arising
actual occasion so stressed by Whitehead is in fact limited
to what it does with this influx of transitional creativity, how
it selects subjectively its own ways of prehending its past. It
is here that the transitional creativity, not yet fully subjectivized, passes into concrescent subjective creativity. When this
phase is completed and turns into objectification, the concrescent creativity turns again into transitional creativity and
is passed on to the next occasion, or rather actively evokes it.
The above interpretation is well expressed by one of the
younger, creatively independent Neo-Whiteheadian process
thinkers, Marjorie Suchocki, then teaching at the Pittsburgh
Theological Seminary, in a personal letter to me about her
use of the term ‘‘evocation’’ in an article:
‘‘Evocation’’ may be my word rather than Whitehead’s,
but it seems justified to me on the basis of the language
he does use: ‘‘transmission of energy,’’ ‘‘transitional cre-
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ativity,’’ ‘‘transference of energy,’’ ‘‘universe incarnating itself ’’ (that seems a quite active word), and by the whole
notion of objectification defined categorically (1.Il.xxiv) as
the functioning of one entity in the self-creation of another. The completion of concrescent creativity is at the
same time the transmission of creativity—each completed
occasion acts as an impulse of energy forcing a new concrescence into being. The causa sui nature of the new occasion is its own decision as to how it will deal with the
past; the selectivity of its prehensions is its own. This
selectivity, of course, turns transitional creativity into concrescent creativity; but upon its completion a new impulse
of energy is added to the universe, and creativity is transitional once again. If occasions did not function in this
evocative way, how is there an account of the origination
of prehensive activity as a new occasion at all?
If one rightly claims God’s initial aim as the evocative
factor, this still substantiates the above, since God is not
an exception to the metaphysical principles. In fact,
Whitehead expands on the initial aim’s creative character
by saying that God and world jointly constitute the character of creativity for the initial phase of the novel concrescence. The priority of God’s aim is really only
practical—that is, the impulses of energy from the past
place repetitive demands upon the nascent occasion, creating a cacophony of impulses. God’s continuous unification
of the world within the divine nature continuously moves
new possibilities for harmonies into play; this initial aim
does not add to the cacophony; rather, it renders it orderable; hence the priority which is placed on the creativity
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of the initial aim. . . . So that the transitional creativity of
both God and the world evoke the new occasion into
being; the selective prehensive activity is the subjective response by which finally the occasion creates itself, utilizing
the creative energy of the past. Transition energy is turned
to concrescent energy, becoming at its conclusion transitional energy—the many become one and are increased by
one, and the rhythmic dance goes on.
This is an admirable statement and in many ways congenial—this part of the system, at least—to a Thomistic metaphysical conception of the active causal influx of both primary
and secondary causes on the ongoing production of the
world. If this is authentic Whitehead, then there is surely a
fruitful basis for metaphysical dialogue. Notice the two key
points: (1) the active causal influx of actual occasions on each
other, which (2) is proposed as the answer to the key metaphysical objection I posed above, put in her own words: ‘‘If
occasions did not function in this evocative way, how is there
an account of the origination of prehensive activity as a new occasion at all?’’ Excellent! A Thomist could hardly do better in
identifying the key metaphysical question. But then it seems
that we have overturned what has usually been maintained as
one of the key metaphysical principles of Whitehead—
namely, that there is no active causal influx of one actual entity
on another in the present and not even strictly from past to
present, since, as is well known, the traditional properties of
efficient cause and effect are reversed in Whitehead. It is the
effect that actively lays hold of the cause, which offers itself
passively, as it were, to be assimilated, more in the manner
of an Aristotelian material cause.24
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Many of what we might call the more ‘‘classical’’ Whiteheadian interpreters insist that the denial of active causal influx from one actual entity to another is such a central piece
in the Whiteheadian system that it cannot be given up without radically transforming the system into something else.
Yet it seems to me—and to many others, including a growing
number of Neo-Whiteheadians—that this is precisely one of
the two or three weakest points in the whole Whiteheadian
metaphysical system, that this is precisely where Whitehead
must be adapted, expanded—transformed, if necessary. Dr.
Suchocki seems to me entirely on the right track here. It is
simply impossible to render intelligible a dynamic universe
without a strong role being given to active causal influx—
what an Aristotelian or Thomist would call ‘‘efficient causality.’’ Perhaps all that Whitehead really meant, or should have
meant, is that one actual entity does not actively determine
the inner part or core of another actual entity that is the latter’s
own subjective dealing with the creative energy that has been
actively given to it by another. This would not preclude,
indeed would require, a genuine active influx into the first
phase of the new entity—not merely a presentation of form
and lure to the good—and from something actually present,
not past.

Possibilities of Adaptation within Whitehead Himself
As regards what Whitehead held in his own meager textual
developments of the topic and how far they can be pressed
to extract a coherent doctrine, the following seems to me to
be the case. A selection of texts from the crucial pages of
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Process and Reality and of Adventures in Ideas will be enough for
our purposes:
According to the ontological principle there is nothing
which floats in the world from nowhere. Everything in the
actual world is referable to some actual entity. It is either
transmitted from an actual entity in the past, or belongs
to the subjective aim of the actual entity to whose concrescence it belongs. . . . The subject completes itself during
the process of concrescence by a self-criticism of its own
incomplete phases. . . . But the initial stage of its aim is an
endowment which the subject inherits from the inevitable
ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature of
God. . . . Thus the initial stage of the aim is rooted in the
nature of God, and its completion depends on the selfcausation of the subject-superject . . . God . . . is that
actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts.
That aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of
eternal objects for conceptual feeling; and constitutes the
autonomous subject in its primary phase of feelings with
its initial conceptual valuations, and with its initial physical purposes.
If we prefer the phraseology, we can say that God and
the actual world jointly constitute the character of the
creativity for the initial phase of the novel concrescence.
The subject, thus constituted, is the autonomous master
of its own concrescence into subject-superject. . . . The
deterministic efficient causation is the inflow of the actual
world in its own proper character of its own feelings, with
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their own intensive strength, felt and reenacted by the
novel concrescent subject.25
The doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that,
however far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed in
the determination of components of a concrescence—its
data, its emotions, its appreciations, its purposes, its
phases of subjective aim—beyond the determination of
these components there always remains the final reaction
of the self-creative unity of the universe.26
An actual entity’s own constitution involves that its
own activity in self-formation passes into its activity in
other-formation.27
What can be drawn from these passages? It is clear that
the meaning of creativity, which is self-creativity, is precisely
delimited. It does not refer to the radical emerging of the
new actual occasion or subject out of nothing, but only to
the activity by which the new subject, already constituted by the
inflow of God and the actual world as partly determined subject,
proceeds to its further autonomous ‘‘self-formation’’ by deciding what to do with its given input, how to restructure it
selectively and creatively, in order to become a fully constituted subject. Thus creativity is not the power to emerge into
existence or actuality in an unqualified way, but only the
power of an initially constituted subject to transform a given
multiplicity, a many, into a new unity, a new one.
Creativity is the universal of universals characterizing
ultimate matter of fact. It is that ultimate principle by
which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, be-
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come the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that many enter
into complex unity. The ultimate metaphysical principle
is the advance from disjunction to conjunction, creating a
novel entity other than entities given in disjunction.28
What then is to be said of the actual initial ‘‘constitution
of the subject’’ in its initial, partly indeterminate phase, the
point from which its own creativity takes off? What is responsible for this primary constitution of a unique existential
active subject having its own power of creativity? Whitehead
clearly states that this constitution is the result of the inflow
of both God and the prior actual world, an inflow of which
the new occasion must be a passive recipient in this initial phase,
since before it there is nothing at all to exercise creative decision. Yet here is where the ambiguity arises.29 It looks, on
the one hand, as though we are in the presence of a straightforward classical productive action, bringing the new subject
into initial existence—a position which an Aristotelian or
Thomist would find quite congenial. On the other hand,
when Whitehead explains more in detail how this constitution takes place, he seems to pull back from what he has said
above, and we are no longer quite so sure that he has a
productive action in mind. For on the one hand, God’s action seems, when explicitly described, to consist only in the
presentation of the initial subjective aim or ideal goal of the
new occasion, an action which seems to be in the genre of
constituting only the final cause of the new entity, not its actual
presence as a new pulse of energy. Moreover, if one strictly
applies Whitehead’s own definition of creativity, it does not

................. 16344$

$CH7

01-23-07 15:25:46

PS

PAGE 115

116

The Philosophical Approach to God

seem that such a constitution of another entity in initial existence could be said to come from the creativity of the prior
actual entities inflowing their partially determining data to
it. For the creativity of an actual occasion consists, properly
speaking, only in its own interior action of creatively unifying
the input presented to it by others, not in the active production of the actuality of something else. Somehow or other
the actual appearance of a newly nascent pulse of concrescing
energy seems to have slipped through the net of categories
without explanation, as a sheer brute fact. But for a metaphysical explanation it is not enough simply to state the fact
that new entities actually do arise. This is a mere description,
in no way an explanation or rendering the brute fact intelligible. To accept such a mere statement of fact as an ultimate
principle is to accept an unintelligible surd as the basis for
all subsequent explanation.

Suggested Adaptation of Whitehead
There seems only one viable path open to us. It is to expand
the notion of creativity so that it includes not only the aspect
Whitehead has explicitly analyzed—i.e., the power to integrate within oneself the data presented by the actual world
and God—but also the power actively to evoke new entities
and pass on to them a share of one’s own power of creativity
in its double aspect. Thus creativity would include in it an
active-productive-of-another aspect (or, if you wish, evocative-of-another) much like the traditional notion of efficient
causality.
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This seems to be the line that Marjorie Suchocki and
other young Neo-Whiteheadians are now exploring. For example, Elizabeth Kraus, of the Fordham University faculty,
proposed in another article that there are two strands or
notions of causality in Whitehead which must be combined.
One is his better-known and more explicitly developed notion of efficient causality as the reverse of the Aristotelian—
i.e., the passive presentation of data or material for active
integration by the effect (the new actual occasion). But there
is another implicit and undeveloped notion of ordinary commonsense active or productive causality which suddenly surfaces here and there, one which Whitehead simply takes for
granted and uses where necessary. This could be called the
‘‘overflow aspect’’ of creativity. Such a notion seems to be
implied in a number of the above texts—e.g., when Whitehead speaks of ‘‘the transition of creativity,’’ ‘‘the constitution of the subject by God and the actual world,’’ and, in the
last text especially, ‘‘its own activity in self-formation . . .
into its activity in other-formation.’’30
Some months after the first draft of this lecture I was
delighted to witness exactly the same point being made with
striking clarity and vigor, built up carefully from Whitehead’s texts, in a brilliant but obviously (from the strong
opposition it aroused among the leading Whiteheadian commentators present) highly controversial paper delivered by
the Neo-Whiteheadian scholar Jorge Nobo, at the December
1978 meeting of the Society for the Study of Process Philosophies. Nobo’s point was that in the total process of the appearance of a new actual entity there are for Whitehead two
quite distinct phases: (1) transition, the process by which the
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already constituted and objectified world actively flows over
in efficient causality to constitute in being the initial stage of
the new subject with its relevant data represented within it
(in this phase the new occasion is ‘‘other-caused’’); and (2)
concrescence itself, the process by which the now initially constituted subject actively and self-creatively responds to the
data given to it to form its own original subjective synthesis
(the self-causing or self-creative phase). The consensus of the
leading commentators (Leclerc, Christian, Sherburne, Ford)
has telescoped the two phases unjustifiably into one, so that
transition becomes nothing more than the succession of concrescences, with all the activity condensed into the selfcreation of the new actual occasion. Professors Sherburne,
Ford, and others who were present, however, objected that
Nobo’s texts were taken mainly from the early sections of
Process and Reality and that Whitehead had reversed himself
on this point in his last section—a point denied by Nobo.
Whether or not Whitehead had clearly in mind or consistently held onto this other-regarding aspect of creativity,
Nobo’s analysis makes eminent metaphysical sense to me and
fills in beautifully what would otherwise be an obvious and
puzzling lacuna in the system. Creativity would thus become
a significantly richer notion than usually attributed to Whitehead. Though not an actual entity by itself, apart from its
presence (might we not say participation?) in particular
concrete actual entities—supremely so in God—it would
nonetheless be an actually present power, amorphous and
indeterminate in itself but taking on the determinations of
whatever actual entity it temporarily inhabits—a power by
which each new entity both integrates within itself the input
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of the actual world prior to it and also transcends itself by
actively evoking (or communicating its power to) new actual
entities as it itself perishes. Such a notion would bring
Whitehead into much closer relation to the whole classical
tradition of efficient causality and open up the possibility of
more sympathetic dialogue between his system and these
other traditions, in particular Thomism.
Such a conception of creativity as an actual causal influx—hence at first passively received, for the simple reason that
it constitutes the receiver in actuality as the initial phase of a
henceforth self-creative subject—might also open the way to a
theory of the radical origin of the universe out of nothing,
springing from the primal influx of creativity from God
alone, who would not merely lure a previously existing many
into increasing and more valuable unity, but would also start
off the primal many into the existential adventure of the
universe. Once the active evocative power of creativity over
others is admitted, I see no intrinsic reason why the Whiteheadian system could not creatively expand its horizon to
incorporate the notion of absolute beginning.
I know that Whitehead and Whiteheadians object to
allowing this one limit-situation of an absolute beginning,
because (among other reasons) it would introduce an exception to the general metaphysical laws by which each new
actual entity comes to be in the present ongoing universe—
i.e., by creatively selecting and responding to the contribution of previous actual entities.31 But such laws can only be
for Whitehead descriptive of what goes on now. This might
be enough if all one is intending to do is a philosophy of nature,
of the internal structure and functioning of the already con-
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stituted cosmic system, as Whitehead himself seems to have
started off intending to do. But Whitehead was gradually
forced to move more and more into the claims of a total
metaphysical system, and his present disciples certainly propose his system as an adequate competitor to the great total
metaphysical systems before him. Once one accepts the burden of total metaphysical explanation—not merely of descriptive generalization of our limited horizon of present
experience—then it seems to me a lack of metaphysical
imagination to refuse to make place for the special ‘‘limit
situations,’’ involving absolute beginnings if necessary. The
radical question of absolute origin and unity—i.e., why there
actually exists a universe at all and its ultimate source of
unity—cannot be dodged by a metaphysician.
With regard to the situation of an absolute beginning, for
example, I see no compelling reason why a Whiteheadian as
metaphysician should not say that this unique limit-situation
is in the nature of the case filled with mystery and beyond
the reach of direct description, and that what must be (to
render the situation intelligible) is that each actual entity in
the simultaneously co-created initial state of the cosmic system responds creatively to the only data provided for it: (1)
the subjective ideal aim proposed to it by God, who has
already taken into account the entire ordered system of ideal
aims He proposes to all the other co-created actual entities,
and (2) whatever already objectified minimal data, immediately created by God, the first actual entities need to get
going. In such a Whiteheadian creationist perspective, all creativity would derive from God as Ultimate Source, but then
be shared immanently with all creation as an actually imma-
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nent—part actual, part potency-laden—reservoir of energy
or power, in itself amorphous, hence not existing as another
entity apart by itself, but taking on the determinate form of
each new actual entity that it would enter into, and actively
flowing over from one to the other as the evocative, creative
source not merely of an entity’s own subjective act of integration but also of the initial phase of another’s. The similarity
with the Thomistic act of existence—esse or virtus essendi, the
power of the act of being, as St. Thomas likes to put it—is
striking, though from other points of view the two notions
are not identical. I see no good reasons (apart from historical
ones, which have never deterred metaphysicians) for not expanding or if need be transforming Whitehead along these
lines. Such a move would open up promising and fruitful
new lines of dialogue between Whiteheadians and Thomists,
for example—not to mention other Christian thinkers
strictly as metaphysicians. Thomists would still have their
problems with the notion of an entity that partially determines
its own essence, but this problem might well be contained
inside the confines of a strictly philosophical discussion
within the general horizon of a shared Christian vision of
God as creator, as Ultimate Source of the very coming into
being of the universe as a whole.

Reasons behind Whitehead’s Refusal of Creation
Just why is it that Whitehead himself seemed so adamant in
refusing to explore this possible line of development of his
own principles? It seems to me that this arises from a basic
misunderstanding, both by himself and by many White-
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headians following him, of the implications that necessarily
follow accepting the traditional doctrine of God as omnipotent creator. In their minds, only two alternatives seem to be
open: (1) either one holds that God is the ultimate source of
all reality by a free act of creation out of nothing and is thus
the source of all power, the omnipotent planner of the world
and its destiny (and in this case one must also hold that
creatures have no power of their own but are totally determined like puppets in all their actions) or (2) if one wishes
to hold that creatures do have power of their own, and can,
if free, make their own decisions even against the will of
God, then one must also hold that God cannot be an omnipotent, free creator. Thus either God is the all-powerful creator,
and creatures are powerless, or creatures have power of their
own, to exercise on their own responsibility, and God cannot
be all-powerful creator. Naturally—and wisely, if these are
the only alternatives—Whitehead chooses the latter. A similar conception of the traditional doctrine and a similar choice
also comes out with unambiguous clarity in the very recent
(and in other respects admirable) work of David Griflin32
—which indicates, I suspect, that it is widely shared among
contemporary Whiteheadians.
But such is not at all implied in the traditional position.
In Thomistic metaphysics, for example (the general standpoint from which I speak, since I know it best), all creatures
participate, as images of God, in the basic perfections of
God—including His power—although in varying limited degrees, of course. St. Thomas is explicit in rejecting the doctrine of the Arab Occasionalists of his time, according to
which God alone exercises power and activity, on the occasion of
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the presence of creatures. He insists that to detract from the
power of creatures in order to increase the glory of God is
in fact to detract from the power and perfection of God, for
the more perfect the cause the more of its own perfections it
can share, and this precisely shows forth the power of God
more perfectly that He shares His power so abundantly with
creatures.33
To say that God is ‘‘all powerful’’ does not mean that He
alone holds and exercises all power, but only that He is the
ultimate source of all power and can produce any being or
set of beings compatible with His wisdom and goodness. To
say that God is the creator of all things does not mean that
He directly creates all the acts of creatures. God creates agents,
beings with active natures—or, if you wish, beings acting, not
acts. The proper terminus of creation is not matter or form,
acts or accidents, but the whole substantial being with its
active powers. The creature, thus endowed with its own intrinsic active power—which makes it also an Aristotelian
nature—produces its acts from out of its own power, necessarily or freely, according to its nature. For St. Thomas, God
does indeed support or ‘‘concur’’ with the being in its actions. But this divine collaborative power is always channeled
through the nature, as root of the act, into the act, and is
determined to this or that particular act, not independently
and extrinsically by God, but only by the form given it by
the determinate nature and whatever use it makes of its powers. The fact that all creatures are totally dependent on God
both in their being and in their action does not therefore
mean that God determines their actions from without. He
communicates to creatures their own being and their own
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native power and supports them in its use, so that without
Him they could neither exist nor act. But since He really has
given them a share in His own power, they determine the use
to which this power is put, even to use it against the express
conditional will of God (⳱sin). This is a free self-limitation
of God’s exercise of His own unlimited power: a self-limitation inherent in every notion of participated perfection and
hence part of the very logic of participation.
Thus God does not govern the universe, if He is its creator out of nothing, by ‘‘imposing His will absolutely’’ on
creatures from without, as Whitehead seems to believe. The
actual carrying out of divine providence (and predestination)
can take place very much along the lines that Whitehead and
Griffin beautifully describe—by persuasion, by luring to the
good—not by coercion. All that an orthodox Christian (even
a good Thomist, I would say, according to the basic principles of St. Thomas) must hold today with respect to predestination is that God determines the general set of goals He
wishes to achieve, the goals at which He aims the universe,
and knows that in general He will be able to achieve by His
suasive power, but does not determine ahead of time in detail
just whether or how each particular creature will achieve its
share or not in this overall goal. Divine providence unfolds
by constant instantaneous ‘‘improvisation’’ of the divine
mind and will—from His always contemporaneous eternal
now—precisely to fit the actual ongoing activities, especially
the free ones, of the creaturely players in the world drama.
God does not ‘‘foresee,’’ from His point of view, anything:
He only sees what is going on, and acts accordingly. In a
word, predestination does not and should not imply total prede-
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termination. It leaves a large dose of indetermination, to be
made determinate—not ahead of time, independently, but
only contemporaneous with the actual ongoing development
of the world.34
My point here, in sum, is this: Whiteheadians and Thomists should not be fighting on the point of divine providence or of the power and freedom of creatures. The
Thomistic doctrine of creatures’ participation in the power
of God, freely granted them by God, plus the distinction
between the created agent and its act, is aimed at achieving
in its own way the same result as Whiteheadian self-creativity. It is true that in the stricter classical interpretation of
Whiteheadian metaphysics one would have difficulty holding
both that God is creator and that creatures can freely produce their own acts, since there is no distinction between the
agent and its act: the agent is the act, and if God creates the
agent, He must create the act itself, which would indeed
destroy its freedom. But all this proves is that the Whiteheadian
system has a difficulty in holding God as creator; it does not
warrant attacking traditional Christian theism or Thomism
as though they had the same problem. It is Whitehead’s
problem, not theirs.
But we can go even further. If the interpretation of the
Whiteheadian texts on self-creativity which I have suggested
earlier is accepted, then he too admits a certain distinction:
not only between entities or things, but between phases or
aspects of an actual entity—i.e., between (1) the initial phase of
the new entity as a newly present, already largely determinate
nascent ‘‘subject,’’ as he calls it, constituted by God and the
surrounding world and (2) the immediately subsequent act
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of self-creative integration by this already inchoately present
subject. The notion of self-creation is strictly a limited one,
referring only to what the subject does when it ‘‘takes off ’’
from its initial passively received constitution by another. In a
word, there is here too a distinction between agent or subject
and act. The difference from the Thomistic theory is not
that for Whitehead there is no distinction, but that the act
in question is not just one of a successive series in the same
subject. Rather, it exhausts the essence and power of the
subject in a single act.
But if Whitehead were to follow this line, he too should
have no serious difficulty in reconciling divine creation out
of nothing with a genuine autonomous power in creatures
over their own acts. There is thus a genuine limited self-creativity of creatures in the order of action in both Whitehead
and St. Thomas—except that for the former the self-creation
is said to be in the order of essence, whereas for the latter it
is in the order of accidental action, of ‘‘self-determination’’
of one’s own action, so that one creatively forms or constructs one’s own ‘‘accidental’’ (this does not mean unimportant) psychological and moral personality. Every person as
such is, for St. Thomas, dominus sui, ‘‘master of himself,’’ and
thus partly self-creative of his own historical personality.
Thomists here are much closer to Whiteheadians than the
latter suspect, and the way should be open for more positive
dialogue on certain common ground.

Divine Infinity
The second point of tension between the Whiteheadian
Process concept and the traditional Christian conception of
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God is the question of divine infinity: is the divine perfection
truly infinite, and in what respects? As far as the traditional
Christian position is concerned, the doctrine of the positive
infinity of the divine perfection has been solidly established
and universally recognized since at least the fourth century.
The term ‘‘infinite’’ itself occurs nowhere explicitly in the
Scriptures or in writings of the very early Church Fathers,
since it had not yet worked its way into either ordinary or
philosophical vocabulary as a positive concept. In classical
Greek thought, including both Plato and Aristotle, perfection was habitually identified with the finished, the welldefined or determinate—i.e., the finite or limited—typified
by intelligible form. The infinite was identified with the indeterminate, the unfinished, the chaotic, the unintelligible, typified by unformed matter. Even the linguistic term in Greek
for perfection came from limit, end (teleios, ‘‘perfect,’’ from
telos, ‘‘end’’ or ‘‘limit’’). It is only with Plotinus and Neoplatonism, as foreshadowed by Philo Judaeus, that the notion
of a positive infinity, indicating an excess of perfection above
all form and not below it, is finally worked out with clear
conceptual and metaphysical precision.35 The first Greek
Fathers trained in the Neoplatonic schools at once took it
over as the only adequate expression of their belief, and from
then on it became the common doctrine of all Christians. It
was finally, solemnly defined in the First Vatican Council
(1869–70) that God is ‘‘infinite in intellect and will and in
every perfection.’’36
When we turn to the Whiteheadian God, we must first
distinguish between the primordial nature of God, as He is
in Himself independent of His relations with the created
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world, and the consequent nature of God, as He is in terms
of the mutual ongoing interchange between Himself and the
world. As regards the primordial nature, we shall follow
mostly the interpretation of Lewis Ford.37
The primordial nature of God, Whitehead says, is infinite.
But when the concept is pressed hard, what it finally seems
to come down to is only an infinity by extrinsic denomination—i.e., in terms of the infinite number of all intelligible
possibilities, each of which is of course finite in itself, which
the divine mind thinks up in a single act of primordial envisagement from all eternity. The infinity lies thus on the side
of the products of the divine mind, and even here only in
their number. But nothing seems to be said of any intrinsic
infinite fullness of perfection within God’s own being in itself. In fact, the primordial nature in itself is said by Whitehead to be ‘‘deficient in actuality and unconscious.’’ The
reason is that for him all actuality involves a definite, determinate decision, finished off and completed; hence all actuality as such is finite. Whitehead still remains here under the
domination of the ancient Platonic notion of the finite as the
finished, the perfect—already decisively surpassed by Plotinus. The primordial nature is also ‘‘unconscious,’’ because
the special meaning of consciousness for Whitehead involves
the actual prehending of another actuality. God thus becomes properly conscious only by His actual interchange
with the world. It seems, then, that the entire satisfaction
and conscious fulfillment of God is an extroverted one, absorbed entirely in guiding the world toward intelligibility and
value and in treasuring up within Himself the values actually
achieved by it in an endlessly ongoing process of mutual
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enrichment. Here we have a world-dependent God as well as
a God-dependent world. And since God is not seen as the
actual fullness of all perfection, which He communicates as
ultimate source to all creatures in varying finite degrees of
participation, His enrichment in the actual order by what He
receives from the world is to be taken in a literal and quite
strong sense.
If we leave this conception of God undeveloped, as stated
above, it is clear that there is quite a gap between it and the
traditional Christian theological and metaphysical one of an
infinite fullness of God’s own intrinsic perfection, of His
own inner self-conscious life, quite independently of the
world, which He then shares graciously and freely with the
world out of the superabundance of His own goodness. Here
is where the Christian theological notion of God as Trinity
of Persons takes on sharp philosophical relevance. For it illumines how God’s own inner life is already rich in infinite
self-expression by the Father’s total gift of His own being to
the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit from both as
their mutual act of love. It is then quite freely—although
one might well say inevitably, according to the natural ‘‘logic’’
of love—without any need or desire for further self-enrichment, but purely out of the joy of giving that this divine
inner life can pour over to share itself with creatures.38 However, if we admit the creative expansion of the Whiteheadian
notion of God to make room for a doctrine of creation as
suggested above, I see no insuperable reason why the richness
of the traditional notion of the divine infinity cannot also
be poured into the admittedly undeveloped Whiteheadian
conception of the primordial nature of God. But in order to
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pull this off successfully, a theory of participation would
have to be injected into Whiteheadian metaphysics, according to which the unlimited fullness of an ultimate source is
shared diversely in limited degrees by varying finite participants. The apparent absence of such a doctrine casts a puzzling ambiguity over the Whiteheadian metaphysics of God
in relation to the world.
With respect to the finitude of the consequent nature of God
and its constant ongoing enrichment by the response and
value-achievements of the world, I would like to treat it in
the following chapter, since it is inseparable from the question of the divine relativity and mutability.
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In this chapter I shall deal with the questions of God’s relatedness to the world, His mutability, and the resulting finitude of His ‘‘consequent nature’’ (according to Whitehead),
since all three are inextricably linked. This chapter is an
expansion of my previous paper, ‘‘A New Look at the Immutability of God,’’ published in 1972.39 Continued reflection
and discussion with Process thinkers on these problems have
led me to a partial rethinking of some of my earlier positions,
and on one of them in particular—namely, the real relatedness of God to the world.
There is no doubt that the primary positive contribution
of Process thinkers to the philosophical elucidation of the
Christian (and any personalist) conception of God has been
their notion of God as profoundly involved in and personally
responsive to the ongoing events of His creation, in particu131
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lar to the conscious life of created persons as expressed in
the mutuality, the mutual giving and receiving, proper to
interpersonal relations. All metaphysical explanations must
make room for these exigencies in any form of personalist
theism. From this Whitehead drew three main consequences:
(1) God is really related to the world, especially to persons; (2)
since what happens in the world makes a real difference to
the conscious life of God (for Whitehead, His consequent
nature) and since He is constantly experiencing new joy from
the growth of value in the world and the personal loving
response of His creatures (as well as new compassion for its
disvalues) and newly responding to this, God is constantly
changing in time as the world goes on; (3) because of this, His
consequent nature is finite in perfection. As Hartshorne puts it, at
any one moment God is the supremely perfect Being, surpassed by no other, yet constantly surpassing Himself as He
both gives and receives more from the world. God is truly
enriched by the genuine novelty of the ongoing world.
These three conclusions run into headlong opposition to
the traditional Thomistic position that there are no real relations on the part of God toward the world (though there
are, of course, on the part of the world toward God, because
of its dependence on Him), and that God is totally immutable, and not finite in any way in his real perfection or being.
In my earlier article, I tried to mitigate this opposition by
distinguishing between two orders in God: the order of real
being (esse reale)—His own intrinsic, real perfection, which remains always an Infinite Plenitude—and the order of intentional being (esse intentionale)—i.e., the contents of the divine
field of consciousness as related to creatures. With respect to

................. 16344$

$CH8

01-23-07 15:25:39

PS

PAGE 132

God’s Real Relatedness to the World

133

the latter—even for St. Thomas, as I tried to show—God’s
consciousness is certainly contingently different in content (in
the order of both knowledge and love), corresponding to
His decision to create this world rather than that, and also
corresponding to what actually happens contingently in the
created world, especially the free responses of rational creatures. Thus the world clearly makes a highly significant difference to the conscious, hence personal life of God. And
since the divine consciousness as knowing and loving is truly
related, by distinct and determinate relations in the intentional order, to creatures—relations based on His distinct
ideas of them—it follows, even for St. Thomas, that it is
both correct and necessary to say that God is truly personally
related to the world. Relations in the intentional order are
not simply nothing; they are true and authentic relations. But
it is also true that in his strict technical terminology and
theoretical framework such relations cannot be called ‘‘real
relations,’’ since all ‘‘real’’ relations for him require that both
ends of the relation be real beings in themselves, whereas in
the relation of the divine consciousness to creatures only one
end is a real being, the creature, and the other is a mentalintentional being which is about a real being but not itself
another real being.
And it must always be remembered that for St. Thomas,
the difference in the divine consciousness as intentionally related to particular creatures does not thereby entail any change
in the divine consciousness, let alone the intrinsic real being
of God. For these relations are not first absent at one moment of time and later present at another, but simply present
without change in the eternal Now of God. This eternal
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Now is itself outside the flow of our motion-dependent time,
but present in its own unique time-transcending way to all
points of time without internal succession in God. Difference (could have been otherwise, this rather than that) does
not logically imply change (this after that).

God as Really Related to the World
I would now like to make a significant shift of perspective in
the above position, with respect to the lack of real relations
between God and the world. Can a Thomist say that ‘‘God
is really related to the world of creatures, and especially to
persons endowed with intellect and will’’? I think we should
be able to use this language, understanding what we are doing
and why. We can certainly say, as above, that ‘‘God is truly,
personally related to his creatures in His intentional consciousness.’’40 Within the technical framework of Thomistic
terminology, we would also have to add, ‘‘but not by what
Thomists call ‘a real relation,’ since this requires that both
ends of the relation be real beings, which is not the case
here.’’ That is quite true within that technical framework.
But I have found over many years of dialogue with modern
philosophers outside the Thomistic tradition and most students being introduced to it for the first time that this seems
so strange and counter-intuitive to say that God is not really
related to us, His creatures; they find it difficult to accept
or be intellectually comfortable with this notion. The effort
to make this intellectually accessible to them takes more time,
with diminishing returns. A widely current looser meaning to the term ‘‘really’’—that it means little more than
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‘‘truly’’—further complicates understanding. Thus, in current vernacular, to say that ‘‘God is not really related to us’’
is equivalent to saying, ‘‘God is not truly related to us at all,’’
which is, of course, false. Hence I would allow such people
to say, ‘‘Yes, God is really and truly related to us, in His
intentional consciousness.’’
But I present this only as a practical strategy for improved
communication in teaching and dialogue with contemporary
thinkers outside the Thomistic tradition. It does not at all
mean that the traditional doctrine of no real relations between God and the World, especially involving change in
God for the Whiteheadians, is false or incorrect. I would
still explain to graduate students the traditional doctrine and
the reasons for it. Especially I would explain why creation
cannot involve a real relation in God to the creature. For
when God creates, bestows existence itself on creatures ‘‘out
of nothing’’ (no preexisting subject), He is not relating himself to anything real, since there is nothing there yet. He
posits in existence the whole other pole of the relation by his
own creative act alone. This obviously cannot be a real relation, which requires two real poles to be already there. So let
me be clear: I am not proposing a change in Thomistic doctrine itself, but only a realistic strategy for communication
with contemporary non-Thomistically trained thinkers.
Thus when I tell Whiteheadians that I too am willing to say
that God is really related to the world, they are truly delighted, as Hartshone once told me, that at last he could
really talk with a Thomist. And I was able to agree with him
that this also meant that if God is related at all, then he is
the Sur-related One who is related without exclusiveness to
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every least creature. But I am not demanding that any other
Thomist follow my practical strategy in this matter.
Does this real relatedness of God to the world imply that
God is ‘‘affected’’ by what happens in the world, in particular
by the response of the love of created persons, so that the
personal relation of love between God and man can properly
be called a mutual relation, with not only giving but receiving
on both sides? This is one of the points that Process thinkers
insist on most strongly as alone being able to do justice to
the implications of Christian (or any personalist) religious
language and to the very nature of interpersonal relations as
we understand them more reflectively today.
I would answer—in my project, ‘‘creative retrieval of St.
Thomas’’—that our metaphysics of God must certainly
allow us to say that in some real and genuine way God is
affected positively by what we do, that He receives love from
us and experiences joy precisely because of our responses: in a
word, that His consciousness is contingently and qualitatively different because of what we do.41 All this difference
remains, however, on the level of God’s relational consciousness
and therefore does not involve change, increase or decrease,
in the Infinite Plenitude of God’s intrinsic inner being and perfection—what St. Thomas would call the ‘‘absolute’’ (nonrelative) aspect of His perfection. God does not become a
more or less perfect being because of the love we return to
Him and the joy He experiences thereat (or its absence).
The mutual giving and receiving that is part of God’s relational consciousness as knowing and loving what is other
than Himself is merely the appropriate expression or living out
of the intrinsic perfection proper to a perfectly loving personal
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being, the expression of the kind of being He already is. To
receive love as a person, as we better understand the unique
logic of interpersonal relations today, is not at all an imperfection, but precisely a dimension of the perfection of personal
being as lovingly responsive. What remains fixed as the constant point of reference in our concept of God is Infinite
Perfection.
But just what such perfection in fact entails, especially
when applied to God as personal, is something that can
slowly evolve in our consciousness—as the latter itself slowly
evolves and deepens in both experience and understanding.
Our concept of God is bound to be open to partial evolution
as our own understanding evolves as to what it means to be
a person, drawn from reflection on our own experience of
what it means to be a human person, both in relation to other
human persons and to God. And if we examine the matter
more fully, we realize that God’s ‘‘receiving’’ from us, being
delighted at our response to His love, is really His original
delight in sharing with us in His eternal Now His own original power of loving and infinite goodness which has come
back to Him in return. Could we not then possibly agree
with the Whiteheadians in saying, in a very carefully qualified
way, that God is not only the universe’s great Giver, but
also thereby its great Appreciator, its great Receiver? This is
stretching the language indeed for a Thomist, but perhaps
not beyond the bounds of what is really, truly the case?

God as Changing in Time
Does this mean, then, that God undergoes change—is mutable, properly speaking? Does contingent difference in God’s
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relational consciousness necessarily imply change—i.e., temporally successive states in that consciousness? Process thinkers insist on this as one of the key innovations in their
concept of God as compared with the traditional Thomistic
concept, and as necessarily following from the admission that
God is really related to the changing world and positively
affected by what happens in it.
My answer here is two-fold. First, it does not follow that
contingent difference in the divine relational consciousness of
the world necessarily involves temporally successive states in God.
I have the impression that Process thinkers tend to move too
quickly here, taking for granted without sufficient exploration of other hypotheses that the only way to register in
consciousness differences deriving from a changing world is
by being immersed in the same kind of time-flow. I do not
see how they have ruled out the possibility that the divine
consciousness is present to the contingent changing world in
a mode of presence that transcends our time-succession.42
Just because we cannot imagine what it would be like to know
this is not a reason why it cannot be thought and affirmed for
metaphysical reasons.
Our kind of time-succession is based principally on the
continuous physical motion going on in our world and in ourselves
which serves as a point of reference for asserting change, a
continuous flow of before and after, subject in principle to
measurement. It is therefore based not principally on the
pure ordering of contents of consciousness, of ‘‘intentional
being,’’ but in change in our underlying real, physical, and
psychic being. But in God there is only the relational order
of the contents of God’s intentional consciousness as related
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to us, without any ‘‘moving around’’ or physical motion inside His own intrinsic being. As to just what God’s timeless
knowledge of our changing world is like, we have no clear
idea and should be more willing than Process thinkers seem
to be to leave this as a mystery, not prematurely closing off
any metaphysical options.
I have the distinct impression that the Process thinkers I
know have never clearly grasped the extremely austere and
metaphysically spare meaning of the eternal Now of God’s
presence to all time-events as proposed by St. Thomas.43
They tend to conceive of the divine eternal Now as some
kind of continuously ongoing time-flow, existing long before—and perhaps after—the present created world, so that
God is conceived as knowing the future and responding to
it from all eternity—i.e., long before it happened. Such a concept would indeed be open to the severe criticism advanced
by Process thought. But a Thomist would rather say that
God knows and responds to the world not from all eternity,
but in His eternal Now, simply present to each event as it
actually takes place.
The key point usually overlooked is that our ‘‘nows’’ exclude each other, whereas the divine Now includes all others.
Hence an equivocation or category mistake is always involved if we attempt to answer questions such as this: ‘‘Does
God know now (i.e., at 10:00 a.m., August 3, 1978) what will
happen on August 3, 1980?’’ The proper answer should be
either ‘‘No,’’ or ‘‘The question is meaningless, or at least
badly put.’’ What we can and should say is simply this: ‘‘God
knows what happens on September 5, 1980, as it happens, for
John Smith, or Mary Jones, or anyone you mention, but not
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for God.’’ But no time adverb at all, none of our ‘‘nows’’ or
‘‘thens,’’ can be applied to situate His knowledge anywhere
in our time-sequence. The relationship between His Now and
our nows is not expressible in any of our ‘‘nows’’ or timelanguage. The ‘‘No’’ answer would also be appropriate, since
any of our nows excludes a future one; hence even God could
not know in one now another now excluded by the first!
It follows in St. Thomas’s austere logic of the divine eternity, as pure Presence to that which is, that all questions
about divine foreknowledge, predestination, and so forth are,
properly speaking, false problems, misplaced questions if
taken to refer to temporal priority in God. The mode of the
divine presence is left entirely mysterious. In other words, it
is impossible for us ever to say in our language when God
knows anything. Any translation from the all-inclusive Now
of God into any of our exclusive ‘‘nows’’ or ‘‘whens’’ is irremediably equivocal. God simply knows—period! The consistent overlooking of this key point of the logic of Thomistic
God-language by Process thinkers seems to me to vitiate
most of their objections to this part of the Thomistic doctrine of God. To see the point can lead to a sudden metaphysical illumination of the Wittgensteinian type: ‘‘Whereof
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.’’
It is clear, however, that Whitehead cannot accept the
above Thomistic doctrine of timeless divine knowledge. The
reason is simple. In the primordial nature of God, where
there is a certain infinity (indeterminate for Whitehead),
there is not yet actual, fully conscious knowledge. This requires determinate (finite) acts of knowledge with respect to
our finite world, by successive interactions with our world.
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This in turn requires that the divine knower be Himself immersed in the finite time flow of what He knows, so that
His treasury of actual conscious knowledge grows steadily
through time in tune with the changing world itself. And
since God for Whitehead does not already possess the infinite fullness of all perfection in full conscious enjoyment,
with a timeless presence to all events in time in His eternal
Now, his God must learn of all these events in time from
the temporal agents themselves, and also gather up in His
memory all the values produced by us in our lives as they
occur in time, God also depends on this world itself for His
ever-growing knowledge and appreciation of how the world
responds to His collaboration. Thus God and the world are
always mutually dependent on each other. God can never be
truly transcendent of the finite world and consciously infinite
in Himself. All this is obviously totally unacceptable to a
Thomist, following Aquinas himself.

God’s Way of Knowing
All of our discussion about God’s knowledge being distinctly
different in proportion to our free actions in time may easily
give rise to a serious misconception, and already has, not
only among Whiteheadians but among many contemporary
thinkers outside the Thomistic tradition. It may seem that
we creatures, especially free human persons, actually determine God’s knowledge by positive causal action on God
Himself. This, of course, would make God dependent on
His creatures—which would again be totally unacceptable to
Thomists. They must, then, explain an alternative way that
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God knows the actions, especially the free ones, of His creatures, without positive causal dependence on them.
In fact it does not follow that the only way God knows
and receives from creatures is by being acted on physically
by them. It is not clear that this even makes any sense in the
case of material beings acting on a pure Spirit. The explanation of the way God knows what is done by creatures as I
outlined it in the previous paper still, I believe, holds. It is
that God is constantly working in and through us with His
supportive and collaborative power, supporting both the
being and action of every creature. But He allows this transcendent power, becoming immanent within us, to be determinately channeled by the respective natures, especially the
free-will decisions of creatures. Thus God knows what we
are doing by how we allow His power, in itself superabundantly indeterminate, to flow through us; by how we determinately channel this flow of power, according to our own
free initiatives and how we respond to His constant drawing
us to our proper good. Thus He knows not by being acted
on, but through His own action in us. He knows what we
are doing by doing with us whatever we are doing, except that
it is we who supply the determinations to specify the initself-transcendent (and thus indeterminate) fullness of His
power. To receive these determinations from creatures is not
to be acted upon by them in any proper sense, though the
result is determinate knowledge in the divine consciousness.44
We might add that the reason why Whitehead himself
cannot use such an explanation for divine knowing is that he
lacks the resources of a participation doctrine in which creatures truly participate in the divine power, as well as the
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other perfections of God. For Whitehead, either God has all
power and creatures have none, or creatures have their own
power to exercise by their own initiative—power which is
independent of and against God’s own power. In the latter
case, of course, if God does receive from creatures it can only
be by their acting on Him from without, so to speak. The
Thomistic interior symbiosis of divine and creaturely power
in every creaturely act avoids the serious problems of this
passive and extrinsic conception of divine receiving.

Divine Simplicity
A last but important point. One of the bê.tes noires of Process
thinkers is the Thomistic doctrine of the divine simplicity—
namely, that God’s being as absolutely infinite must also be
absolutely simple, allowing no real composition or multiplicity within it. As Process thinkers such as Hartshorne, Ford,
Griffin, and others understand it, it is this doctrine more
perhaps than any other which is the villain, rendering void
the religious concept of God as involved in mutual loving
relations, really related to us, and receiving joy from our responses. Such pure, unqualified simplicity, turning the divine
infinity into a motionless, impassive block indifferent to all
outside itself, is, they say, an incautious heritage from pagan
Neoplatonism, quite alien to personalist Christian thought.
Why, after all, should simplicity be put on a higher ontological level than a rich multiplicity?
My answer to this objection contains two parts, beginning
with a defense of the Thomistic understanding of this attribute. Against the classical Neoplatonic doctrine of the sim-
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plicity of the One, the critique of the Process thinkers is in
some respects, I admit, a valid and devastating one. The absolute simplicity of Plotinus’s One allowed of no multiplicity, even in the intentional order or the order of relations.
Hence all intentional consciousness of the multiplicity of the
world had to be relegated to a lower level of divinity, the
divine Nous or Intelligence, which, as containing a multiplicity of cognitive objects (ideas), was definitely inferior in unity
and hence perfection to the ultimate One from which it emanated. There is no place either for an interior Trinity of
Persons or for knowledge and love of creatures in such an
ultimate and absolutely simple principle.
But Process thinkers fail to recognize the profound
transformation that the attribute of divine simplicity has undergone in medieval Christian metaphysical thought, culminating in St. Thomas. The simplicity of the divine being
now means only this: that there are no really distinct ontological
parts making up the absolute divine being in itself. For each
such part would involve incompleteness and limitation in
itself and would require some higher unitive composing force
to unite it with the other parts. But the simplicity thus postulated is restricted to the absolute intrinsic being of God. It is
explicitly compatible with the triple relational distinctness of the
three divine Persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—within
God. Real multiplicity in the order of certain relations does not
vitiate simplicity in the absolute (in the technical sense always of ‘‘non- relative’’) being or essence of God, the qualitative perfection of the divine nature as such. Thus when the
Father gives His entire identical nature (what He is) to the
Son in love, and both together to the Holy Spirit, the two
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are relationally distinguished as Giver and Receiver, but what
they both possess as their intrinsic perfection of being is the
identical simple and infinite plenitude of absolute perfection
that is the divine nature, one nature shared identically by
three giving/receiving Persons. Thus the official Catholic
doctrine, defined in the Councils of the Church and accepted
by all orthodox Catholic theologians, including St. Thomas,
runs thus, in paraphrase: ‘‘The only distinction of any kind
between the three Persons in the Trinity is that stemming
from the relation of origin, originator-originated, giver-receiver, not from anything in what is given and received, the
identical, intrinsic, infinite fullness of perfection of the absolute divine nature.’’
Whether one likes, agrees with, or even understands this
doctrine, it is the doctrine taught by St. Thomas and all
traditional Christian metaphysicians. Hence it is clear that
for them (though not for Plotinus and his non-Christian followers) divine simplicity of nature does not exclude real multiplicity in the order of relations. As they habitually pointed
out, relation is unique among all the categories in that the
addition of relations to a being does not necessarily add to or
subtract anything from its absolute real being and perfection. It
relates the subject to its term but does not necessarily change
or modify it internally in any non-relative way. Thus for one
acorn to be similar to another of the same species, or smaller
than one and larger than another, changes nothing in the
inner reality of the acorn: it simply relates it to another. I do
not wish to argue for or defend this doctrine of the Trinity
here—only to make the point that divine simplicity for St.
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Thomas remains only in the absolute order of divine being
and does not exclude real relational multiplicity.
So much for the first part of my answer, a defense of St.
Thomas. I now make another, perhaps significant, concession
to my Process friends. I think the simplicity attribute of God
has in fact remained too rigid and ‘‘simple’’ in St. Thomas
and his tradition. It too needs a loosening-up process of
further qualification and distinction similar to what we have
proposed for the notions of real relatedness to creatures,
namely, distinct multiplicity of content in the divine relational consciousness related to the mental-intentional content of the divine mind and will. As long as multiplicity is
confined to the strictly intentional order of the divine consciousness as oriented to the created world, I do not see any insuperable difficulty—rather its necessity—in rethinking the
interrelated field of meaning of the concepts ‘‘infinite,’’ ‘‘simple,’’ and ‘‘relationally multiple’’ to allow a rich multiplicity
of relations—even real relations, in the looser, broader modern sense of the term—within the infinite internal simplicity
(i.e., lack of absolute ontological component parts) of the
total divine reality. I am here professing myself ready to open
up this new avenue of dialogue, rather than exclude it on
some a priori metaphysical principle. But since I have not yet
had the opportunity to explore it dialogically with others, I
can give no more than a tentative commitment to its possibility at present, and assert only that the simplicity of God
must be adjusted to whatever is required in order to fit the
simplicity proper to the perfection of a loving personal being. But
I hope that the opening of this door may help to remove
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one of the most stubborn obstacles to constructive dialogue
between Thomists and Process thinkers.

Conclusion
In sum, I have made important concessions to Process thinkers as regards what seems to me to be the core of their valuable contribution to religious-metaphysical thought and
language about God: that God can be said in some significant
though carefully qualified way to be both (1) really related to
the world in His intentional consciousness and (2) contingently different in his ‘‘eternal Now,’’ because of what happens
in the created world—but all this only in His relational,
intentional consciousness with respect to us.
I have insisted, on the other hand, that Process thought
both can and should be able to adapt, to assimilate the notion of (1) an active causal influx of God on all finite actual
entities, such that He can radically constitute their whole
initial being in a first radical beginning without needing any
independent primordial multiplicity to work on—in a word,
a truly creative God from whom all creativity and other perfections flow as from a single ultimate unitary Source, to be
freely shared by loving participation with creatures, which
then truly have their own intrinsic (though received) power
to exercise by their own initiative. This implies the radical
and absolute priority of the One over the many, though not
the swallowing up of the many in the One; (2) the actual
infinity of the intrinsic reality of God, already present in His own
inner life—made specific by the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity of Persons within the divine nature—and not an in-
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finity merely potential or by extrinsic denomination resulting
only from thinking up an infinite number of finite possibilities.
This actual divine infinity can indeed be eternally enriched
by creatures in the order of determinate modalities of intentional consciousness, but can never be raised to a higher qualitative level of intensity than the original Source; and (3) that
the divine life is entirely outside of any of our (or any) time
systems that measure change, in his unique timeless eternal
Now, directly present to all events in any changing system
‘‘in their presentiality,’’ as Aquinas puts it, as they actually
happen; and (4) the divine life takes place outside of all time
systems measuring real change, in His own unique eternal
Now.
May new light flow in both directions through this sincerely and hopefully opened door!
It is clear, then, that in my judgment the present explicit
status of the Whiteheadian conception of God is not compatible in major ways with the traditional Catholic and even
with the creatively rethought Thomistic conception. But historians have noted that Whiteheadian Process thought in the
United States has passed through a first ‘‘scholastic stage’’ of
trying to get clear just what Whitehead himself actually
thought. But it has now entered a more creative independent
phase of assimilation and rethinking, which may well open
new doors of dialogue with an alert and creative Thomism.
I have already seen some striking examples of the latter, and
hope to see more!

Postscript
Lest there be some misunderstanding that the above difficulties are the only ones that I, as a Thomistic metaphysician,
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have against the Whiteheadian Process system, let me hasten
to add that the above discussion concerns only the theistic
doctrine of Process thought. Even within this restriction, I
have been concerned principally with Whitehead’s own position. The distinctive additions to it proposed in Hartshorne’s panentheism would require discussion that is far
more complicated. Outside the theistic area, the principal
(and very serious) difficulty I have with Process thought,
both as a metaphysician and a Christian thinker, is what
seems to me—and to many even among Process sympathizers—to be the lack of an adequate theory of the perdurance
of the concrete individual ‘‘I’’ or ‘‘self ’’ through time, with
the consequent threat to the assertion of authentic personal
immortality. For this is, like creation, a nonnegotiable belief
of all streams of Christianity that still remain in contact with
their roots. Here, too, Neo-Whiteheadian Process thinkers
are busily at work on possible creative adaptations of the
original Whiteheadian doctrine to make it more compatible
with the exigencies of the most common human experience
and of most religious beliefs. A fine example of the creative
adaptation of Whitehead is the lecture I heard given by Jorge
Nobo a few years ago, suggesting that it was necessary now
to add a new basic metaphysical category to those included
by Whitehead himself, namely, an ‘‘Inegrity,’’ that is, an individual nature and agent that perdured in a self-identity
through time, something like the Thomistic substance—not
quite the same but fulfilling a similar role!
In conclusion, let me say that the principal reason I have
been stimulated, challenged, and influenced by Process
thought in general is not so much the particular theses and
positions as certain general attitudes, such as the keen sensi-
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tivity to the profound interconnectedness and relationality
of all things (‘‘Actuality is through and through togetherness’’) and to God’s careful, compassionate watching over
and stimulating the creative unfolding and evolution of our
world.
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Pater, ‘‘The Question of the Validity of the Third Way,’’ in Studies
in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, ed. John Ryan, 2:137–77
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1963); Toshi-
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yuki Miyakawa, ‘‘The Value and Meaning of the Third Way of
St. Thomas Aquinas,’’ Aquinas 6 (1963): 239–95.
4. Cf. Vincent de Couesnongle, OP, ‘‘La causalité du maximum: pourquoi S. Thomas a-t-il mal cité Aristotle?’’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 38 (1954): 658–80; ‘‘Mesure et
causalité dans la Quarta Via de S. Thomas,’’ Revue thomiste 58 (1958):
244–84.
5. Cf. W. Norris Clarke, SJ, ‘‘The Limitation of Act by Potency in St. Thomas: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?’’ New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 167–94; ‘‘The Meaning of Participation in St.
Thomas,’’ Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 26
(1952): 147–57, with brief bibliography.
6. Summa Theologiae, Part I, question 65, article 1, and question
44, article 1; On Truth, question 2, article 14; Summa contra Gentes,
Book II, chapter 15.
7. For the first text, cf. On the Power of God, English Dominican
translation (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1952): question 7, article
2, response to objection 9; for the second, Summa contra Gentes,
Book I, chapter 28.
8. On Reductio, cf. the doctoral thesis of my student Astrid
O’Brien, ‘‘Resolutio in St. Thomas’’ (Fordham University, 1973).
9. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. John Rowan
(Chicago: Regnery, 1961): Book IV, lesson 17, number 615.
10. Cf. On the Power of God, question 3, article 5; Summa contra
Gentes, Book II, chapter 15, number 3; Summa Theologiae, Part I, question 93, article 6.
11. Etienne Gilson, ‘‘Pourquoi S. Thomas a critiqué S. Augustin,’’ Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge I (1926): 126.
12. Cf. L. B. Geiger, OP, La participation dans la philosophie de S.
Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1942); Cornelio Fabro, La nozione met
afisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommasso d’Aquino (Turin: Societa Internazionale Editrice, 1919); Joseph de Finance, SJ, Etre et agir dans
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la philosophie de S. Thomas, second ed. (Rome: Universita Gregoriana,
1960); and my articles cited in note 5 above.
13. Cf. Peter Strawson, Individuals (New York: Doubleday,
1963): xiii; the essays by Strawson and Stuart Hampshire in The
Nature of Metaphysics, ed. David Pears (New York: St. Martins,
1966); David Kolb, ‘‘Ontological Priorities: A Critique of the Announced Goals of Descriptive Metaphysics,’’ Metaphilosophy 6 (1975):
238–48.
14. ‘‘The Problem of Perception,’’ in The Philosophy of Perception,
ed. G. J. Warnock (New York: Oxford University, 1967), 62.
15. Hermann Boeder, ‘‘Origine et préhistoire de la question
philosophique de l’AITION,’’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 40 (1956) : 421–43.
16. Cf., e.g., Max Charlesworth, The Problem of Religious Language
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974); John Macquarrie,
‘‘Religious Language and Recent Analytical Philosophy,’’ Concilium
46 (1969): 159–74; my own essays, ‘‘How the Philosopher Gives
Meaning to Language about God,’’ in The Idea of God: Philosophical
Perspectives, ed. Edward Madden, 1–27 (Springfield, Ill: Charles
Thomas, 1969); and ‘‘Analytic Philosophy and Language about
God,’’ in Christian Philosophy and Religious Renewal, ed. George
McLean (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America,
1966).
17. Cf. John Morreall, Analogy and Talk about God: A Critique of
Thomism (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978).
For the agnostic point of view, cf. Kai Nielsen, ‘‘Talk of God and
the Doctrine of Analogy,’’ Thomist 40 (1976): 32–60; my answer to
him, ‘‘Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language about God,’’
follows in the same issue, 61–95.
18. Cf. George Klubertanz, SJ, St. Thomas and Analogy (Chicago:
Loyola University, 1960); Bernard Montagnes, L’analogie de l’être chez
S. Thomas (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1964); Bruno Puntel, Analogie und
Geschictlichkeit (Freiburg: Herder, 1970), with valuable historical
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summaries of leading authors; Thomas Fay, ‘‘Analogy: The Key
to Man’s Knowledge about God in the Philosophy of St.
Thomas,’’ Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 76 (1973): 343–64.
19. ‘‘Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language about God:
A Reply to Kai Nielsen,’’ Thomist 40 (1976): 61–95.
20. Cf. the remarkable expression of this by Werner Heisenberg, Der Teil und das Ganze (Munich: Piper, 1972): 288:
Is it entirely meaningless to infer the existence of a ‘consciousness’ behind the orderly structure of the observable
world—these structures being the ‘intention’ of such a consciousness? Of course, this very question is an anthropomorphization of the problem. For the word ‘consciousness’ is clearly
derived from human experience. So, properly speaking, one
should not apply this concept outside the human area. However, if one were to restrict the usage so much, it would be
prohibited, for instance, to speak of the consciousness of an
animal. Still, one has the feeling that an expression of this kind
makes a certain sense. One perceives that the sense of the concept ‘consciousness’ becomes simultaneously broader and
vaguer when we apply it outside the human area.
21. Cf. Summa contra Gentes, Book I, chapter 29, number 2, trans.
Anton Pegis, in On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (New York: Doubleday, 1955):
Effects which fall short of their causes do not agree with
them, i.e., are not identical in name and nature. Yet some likeness must be found between them, since it belongs to the nature
of action that an agent produces its like, since each thing acts
according as it is in act. The form of an effect, therefore, is
certainly found in some measure in a transcending cause, but
according to another mode and in another way. For this reason
the cause is called an equivocal cause [St. Thomas is here using the
technical Aristotelian term ‘equivocal by design,’ which is ex-
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actly equivalent to St. Thomas’s own term ‘analogous’]. So God
gave all things their perfections and thereby is both like and
unlike all of them.
See also ibid., Book I, chapter 32, numbers 2 and 7:
An effect that does not receive a form specifically the same
as that through which the agent acts cannot receive according
to a univocal predication the name arising from that form. . . .
Now the forms of the things that God has made do not measure up to a specific likeness of that divine power; for the things
which God has made receive in a divided and particular limited
way that which in Him is found in a simple and universal
unlimited way. It is evident, then, that nothing can be said
univocally of God and other things. . . . For all attributes are
predicated of God essentially. . . . But in other things these
predicates are made by participation.
See also Summa Theologiae, Part I, question 13, article 5.
22. For a fuller development of this point, cf. my two essays
cited in note 16 above.
23. Cf. Summa Theologiae, Part I, question 1, article 6, response to
objection 3; Parts I–II, question 45, article 2. See also Jacques Maritain, ‘‘On Knowledge through Connaturality,’’ Review of Metaphysics
4 (1950–1951): 483–94; Victor White, ‘‘Thomism and Affective
Knowledge,’’ Blackfriars 25 (1944): 321–28; Anthony Moreno, ‘‘The
Nature of St. Thomas’s Knowledge per Connaturalitatem,’’ Angelicum
47 (1970): 44–62.

part 3. christian theism and
whiteheadian process philosophy: are
they compatible?
1. This chapter is a follow-up to my previous essay. Here I
have both broadened its scope and taken into account some recent
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developments in Process philosophy. Cf. ‘‘A New Look at the
Immutability of God,’’ in God Knowable and Unknowable, ed. Robert
J. Roth, 43–72 (New York: Fordham University Press, 1973). It is
also a significant revision of the same article.
2. Cf. Robert Mellert, What is Process Theology? (New York: Paulist, 1975); Ewert Cousins, ed., Process Theology (New York: Paulist,
1971); David Brown, Richard James, and Gene Reeves, eds., Process
Philosophy and Christian Thought (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971).
3. Cf. the excellent historical survey by Gene Reeves in the
collection cited in note 2.
4. Cf. the various essays in the collections cited in note 2. See
also the standard studies such as Ivor Leclerc, Whitehead’s Metaphysics
(Bloomington: Indiana University, 1958); William Christian, An
Interpretation of Whitehead’s Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University,
1959). To me the fullest and most enlightening discussion of creation in Whitehead is Kenneth Thompson’s Whitehead’s Philosophy of
Religion (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), chapter 4, where the author
defends Whitehead as far as possible, while objectively pointing
out lacunae.
5. Process and Reality (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), 146–
47. For convenience I have (as in my first edition) cited from this
edition of Process and Reality, since the new definitive text does not
differ from the old in the texts I am using. The new text indicates,
in brackets, its correspondence to every page of the old.
6. Ibid., 519.
7. Ibid., 343–4.
8. Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1926), 258.
9. Adventures in Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1933), 215.
10. Process and Reality, 339.
11. Lewis Ford, ‘‘The Immutable God and Fr. Clarke,’’ New
Scholasticism 49 (1975): 191.
12. ‘‘Can Freedom Be Created?’’ Horizons 4 (1977): 183–88.
13. Rouet de Journel, Enchiridion Patristicum, 21st ed. (Rome:
Herder, 1951), at the Index Theologicus, number 783, for some 38 refer-
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ences on creatio ex nihilo and the non-eternity of the world and
matter.
14. Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum, 2, 4 (Patrologia Graeca,
6.1029; Rouet de Journel, number 178). Cf. also Irenaeus, Adversus
Haereses, 1.22.1 (Patrologia Graeca, 7:669; Rouet de Journel, number
194): ‘‘We hold the rule of truth, i.e., that there is one omnipotent
God who constituted all things through the Word and made them
out of what was not.’’ Also the very early text of Hermas Pastor,
Mandatum 1.1 (Patrologia Graeca, 2.913; Rouet de Journel, number
85): ‘‘First of all believe that there is one God, who made all things
from nothing into being (ek tou me ontos eis to einai).’’ Nothing could
be clearer than the later text of St. Augustine, De Genesi contra
Manichaeos, 1.6.10 (Patrologia Latina, 34.178; Rouet de Journel, number
1540): ‘‘God is rightly believed to have made all things from nothing, because, although all things formed have been made out of
matter, this matter itself has been made entirely out of nothing (de
nihilo omnino). . . . For we should not be like those who do not
believe that the omnipotent God could have made anything out
of nothing, since they consider that artisans and other workers
cannot fabricate anything unless they have something from which
to make it.’’
15. The Church Teaches: Documents of the Church (St. Louis: Herder,
1955), 146.
16. E.g., the Council of Florence (The Church Teaches, 148) and
the First Vatican Council (The Church Teaches, 152). For a similar
Protestant Christian view, see Langdon Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and
Earth (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 42–43: ‘‘Almost the entire
Christian tradition is in substantial agreement that God brought
the finite world into being out of nothing by a ‘purposeful’ act of
His free will.’’
17. Cf. Edward Pols, Whitehead’s Metaphysics: A Critical Assessment
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1967), 131.
18. Cf. David Schindler, ‘‘Creativity as Ultimate: Reflections
on Actuality in Whitehead, Aquinas, Aristotle,’’ International Philo-

................. 16344$

NOTE

01-23-07 15:25:14

PS

PAGE 159

160

Notes to Pages 105–114

sophical Quarterly 13 (1973): 161–71; and ‘‘Whitehead’s Challenge to
Thomism on the Problem of God: The Metaphysical Issues,’’ International Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1979). The point of the latter
article is that for St. Thomas the ultimate common attribute that
unites all things, the act of existence (esse), is grounded in one
actual, concrete source (God), in which it is found subsistent in
all its purity and plentitude and from which it flows by participation to all other instances, whereas for Whitehead the ultimate
unifying property, creativity, is never found condensed and concretized in one ultimate source, but remains always radically multiple, dispersed among many. See also the important article of
Robert Neville, ‘‘Whitehead on the One and the Many,’’ Southern
Journal of Philosophy 7 (1969–70): 387–93.
19. Process and Reality, 392: ‘‘God does not create eternal objects;
for his nature requires them in the same degree that they require
him. . . . This is an exemplification of the coherence of the categorical types of existence.’’ Cf. Leclerc, Whitehead’s Metaphysics, 199;
cf. also Kenneth Thompson, Whitehead’s Philosophy of Religion, 127:
‘‘God does not bring creativity into being. . . . Neither does God
bring pure possibilities into being. Pure possibilities are named
‘eternal objects’ precisely because they are uncreated.’’
20. On the Power of God, question 3, article 5; cf. Summa Theologiae,
Part I, question 44, article 1; Part I, question 65, article 1.
21. Lewis Ford, loc. cit., in note 11.
22. Cf. Gene Reeves and David Brown, ‘‘The Historical Development of Process Theology,’’ chapter 2 in Process Philosophy and
Christian Thought, op. cit., in note 2.
23. Cf. John Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1965). See also the careful discussion in chapter 4 of
Kenneth Thompson’s Whitehead’s Philosophy of Religion.
24. Cf. Leclerc, Whitehead’s Metaphysics, 110.
25. Process and Reality, 373–74.
26. Ibid., 75.
27. Adventures in Ideas, 248.
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28. Process and Reality, 31–2.
29. See Kenneth Thompson’s long and careful discussion in
Whitehead’s Philosophy of Religion, chapter 4.
30. Similar texts are presented by Thompson, Whitehead’s Philosophy of Religion, 120—e.g., ‘‘[Actual occasions, as they perish,] are
themselves energizing as the complex origin of each novel occasion’’ (Adventures in Ideas, 356); ‘‘The creativity for a creature becomes the creativity with the creature, and thereby passes into
another phase of itself. It is now the creativity for a new creature’’
(Religion in the Making [New York: Macmillan, 1926], 92); ‘‘In the
abstract language here adopted for metaphysical statement, ‘passing on’ becomes ‘creativity,’ in the dictionary sense of the verb
creare, ‘to bring forth, beget, produce’ ’’ (Process and Reality, 324).
31. Cf., for example, Leclerc, Whitehead’s Metaphysics, 194–95: ‘‘But
in saying that God is the ‘aboriginal instance of creativity,’ Whitehead does not mean or imply that God is in the past of all other
actualities, in the sense that God was once the sole existing actual
entity. A consistent metaphysical pluralism cannot hold that creativity originally had only a single instantiation. Moreover, such a
conception of God would constitute a violation of all the categories of Whitehead’s system. By the ontological principle and the
category of relativity, all actual entities require ‘data.’ Thus God
as an actual entity can no more be without other actual entities
than they can be without him.’’
32. David Griffin, God, Power and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976). His exposition of St. Thomas is a
distressing distortion of the latter’s authentic teaching and intention, drawing unwarranted implications from a simplistic and rigid
interpretation of his words.
33. Summa contra Gentes, Book III, chapter 68 entire, especially
numbers 14–15; On Truth, question 9, article 2.
34. John Farrelly, Predestination, Grace and Free Will (Westminster,
Md.: Newman, 1964).
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35. For a brief history, see my article, ‘‘The Limitation of Act
by Potency in St. Thomas: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?’’
New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 167–94; also ‘‘Infinity in Plotinus,’’ Gregorianum 40 (1959): 75–98.
36. The Church Teaches, 355.
37. See the important dialogue between Lewis Ford and William Hill, OP, ‘‘In What Sense Is God Infinite?’’ Thomist 42 (1978):
1–27.
38. Ewert Cousins makes this point cogently in his ‘‘God as
Dynamic in Bonaventure and Contemporary Thought,’’ Proceedings
of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 48 (1974): 136–48. See
also Anthony Kelly, ‘‘Trinity and Process: The Relevance of the
Christian Confession,’’ Theological Studies 31 (1970): 393–414.
39. See note 1.
40. There has been a remarkable convergence among recent
Thomists toward toning down St. Thomas’s doctrine on the real
relation between God and the world. Most do not go quite as far
as I go here, but try to show how, while not denying the strict
words of St. Thomas, one can loosen their interpretation and enrich his doctrine by saying much more than he does—for example,
that God is ‘‘truly personally related’’ to the world. See Anthony
Kelly, ‘‘God: How Near a Relation?’’ Thomist 34 (1970): 191–229;
William Hill, ‘‘Does the World Make a Difference to God?’’ Thomist 38 (1974): 148–64; idem, ‘‘Does God Know the Future? Aquinas and Some Modern Theologians,’’ Theological Studies 36 (1975):
3–18; and John Wright’s superb scholarly study, ‘‘Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom: The God Who Dialogues,’’ Theological
Studies 38 (1977): 450–77.
41. Hence I formally reject Lewis Ford’s interpretation of my
position in ‘‘The Immutable God and Fr. Clarke,’’ New Scholasticism
49 (1975): 194, where he says, ‘‘First, it is clear that the contents
of God’s intentional consciousness are not derived from the external world.’’ In my original essay, and again in this one, I assert

................. 16344$

NOTE

01-23-07 15:25:16

PS

PAGE 162

Notes to Pages 138–149

163

exactly the opposite—namely, that God’s knowledge of the actions of creatures, especially their free actions, is due to them,
determined by them, hence derived from them. This occurs, however, not by their physically acting on God, but rather by His
acting with them. This special mode of His knowing will be discussed presently.
42. See on this point the penetrating critique of Hartshorne by
Merold Westphal, ‘‘Temporality and Finitude in Hartshorne’s
Theism,’’ Review of Metaphysics 19 (1966): 550–64, and the discussion
of it in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, op. cit., 44–6.
43. Cf. John Wright, art. cit., in note 40.
44. After finishing this article my attention was called to a
book by a distinguished German Catholic theologian on the mutability of God as background for a future Christology. The author
develops the same point that the immutability attributed to God
must be that proper to a perfect personal being—i.e., an immutable
intention to love and save us, which intention then includes all the
adaptations and responses necessary to carry this intention
through in personal dialogue with us. Thus personal immutability
includes relational mutability. See Heribert Mühlen, Die Veränderlichkeit Gottes als Horizont einer zukünftigen Christologie (Münster:
Aschendorff, 1969).
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